China's Political Dynamics under Xi Jinping

The following sections are included:

• DEDICATION
• CONTENTS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On 15 December 2014, Ling Jihua (令计划), vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and director of the Central United Front Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), had just published an article in Qiushi (《求是》, Seeking Truth) — a mouthpiece of the CCP — pledging his loyalty to President Xi Jinping (习近平). In an article of 4,231 words, Ling mentioned Xi’s name 19 times. According to an old norm of Chinese politics, this is a clear indication that Ling, a member of the “Youth League” clique who served as the head of the General Office of Former President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) for 13 years, was switching his loyalty to the new boss and that he had already engineered a “soft-landing,” in spite of corruption scandals involving his family members. Yet on 22 December, Ling was declared a suspect of violations of party discipline and was placed under investigation.

Julius Caesar is not the only person who should "beware the ides of March." The date 15 March 2014 spelled doomsday for Xu Caihou, the former Central Military Commission (CMC)vice-chairman and Politburo member who became the highest ranking officer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be brought down for corruption since 1949. Exactly one year later, he died of bladder cancer.

Guo Boxiong, former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and former Politburo member, have been dismissed from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and handed over for a court martial.

On 3 April 2015, Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo Standing Committee member and former secretary of the Central Politics and Law Commission, was officially indicted on charges of "bribery, abuse of power, and intentional disclosure of state secrets".

Zhou Yongkang, the first Politburo Standing Committee member to be indicted for corruption in the history of the People’s Republic of China, was tried on 22 May 2015 behind closed doors, and his verdict was announced on 11 June. Compared to the trial of Bo Xilai, former Politburo member and former party secretary of Chongqing, the trial of Zhou was much more mysterious.

On 7 October 2015, the last day of China’s National Day holiday week, it was announced that Su Shulin (苏树林), Governor of Fujian Province, is being investigated for "serious violations" of party discipline.

It is no accident that Nanjing is the first provincial capital in China to have both its mayor and party secretary investigated for corruption. After the fall of Nanjing Mayor Ji Jianye (季建业), Ji’s father-in-law took revenge on the party secretary and brought him down as well…

For the past four months, the media has been obsessed with the idea of a “New Gang of Four”(Xinsirenbang, 新四人帮) in Chinese politics. It is popularly believed that Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou, and Bo Xilai (薄熙来) formed a political faction and conspired to overthrow the Xi Jinping leadership through a coup.

On 22 May 2015, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) under Wang Qishan announced the capture of the 100th “tiger” — the 100th corrupt official with a rank of vice-minister and above. At 11:30 pm that day, it was announced that Yu Yuanhui (余远辉), a standing member of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Party Committee and party secretary of Nanning (the capital of Guangxi), had been placed under investigation for “serious violations”of party discipline and state law. However, while Yu’s case is historic, it also posesa dilemma for the CCDI and Wang.

On 15 March 2015, the last day of the Third Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), it was announced that Qiu He (仇和), deputy party secretary of Yunnan, was being investigated by the "Organization" (i.e., the CCP) (zuzhi, 组织) for suspected serious violations of the party discipline and the state law. Three days later, on 18 March, it was announced that Qiu He had already been deprived of his leadership posts.

On 11 November 2015, Lü Xiwen (吕希文), deputy secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, was detained as a suspect for serious violations of party discipline. With her capture, along with the beginning of investigation against Vice-Mayor Ai Baojun (艾宝俊) of Shanghai one day earlier, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has managed to uncover corrupt officials of vice-ministerial rank (i.e., "tigers") in all31 provincial-level units in mainland China.

According to news released at 6:40 pm on 26 January 2016 on the website of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, Wang Bao’an (王保安), the party group secretary and chief of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, is under investigation for "serious violations of the Party disciplines".

With regard to political rumors in China, there are two basic rules to follow:

Rule No. 1: Do not spread them. You could be legally liable if you retell the story about the involvement of a former premier’s 90-year-old mother in a corruption scandal, even though the original reporter later won the Pulitzer Prize for "his striking exposure of corruption at high levels of the Chinese government." You could face severe sanctions if you cannot keep to yourself the story about the relatives of a former vice-president being filthy rich and having secret bank accounts overseas. If you are a member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, you might be dismissed. If you are a party member, you might be expelled. If you are neither, you will be sent to jail.

To be a good communist in China, one must obey the house rules of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Apparently, factionalism is a real issue in Chinese politics. The top leadership takes it so seriously that it held Politburo meeting on 29 December 2014 on combating factionalism within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, there are widespread misperceptions of factionalism in Chinese politics.

Deng Liqun (邓力群), former director of the Central Propaganda Department and former member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, passed away last week. His death is a glorious departure, as Mao Zedong had previously described the death of Liu Hulan (刘胡兰), a young communist spy who died in the Chinese Civil War.

Funeral politics, at least in their familiar form, apparently ended on 17 February 2015 when Deng Liqun’s funeral was held. As a matter of fact, they may have ended earlier, at Zhang Wannian (张万年)’s funeral on 22 January 2015.

On 8 March 2015, Madame Shen Yueyue (沈跃跃), vice-chairwoman of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic of China, reported to the second meeting of the third session of the NPC that 89 out of the 2,964 deputies were absent. This begs the question: who was absent from this meeting?

Eleven days after Guo Boxiong, one of Jiang Zemin’s lieutenants in the People’s Liberation Army and former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member for a decade (2002–2012), was expelled from the Party for corruption and handed over to the military prosecutors for legal procedures, the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), published an article on 10 August 2015 on the issue of old men in politics.

On 3 September 2015, the Chinese Communist Party conductedits first military parade on the occasion of commemorating victory against the Japanese invaders since taking power in 1949. Previously, military parades have been conducted on the occasion of the anniversaries (particularly the tenth anniversaries)of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

30 September 2015 marked a new beginning in Chinese politics — the start of a new era in Xi Jinping’s authority. On this day, the State Council hosted a dinner celebrating the 66th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. In contrast to the past, when retired senior leaders were invited to join current leaders to partake in a celebrative banquet, most of China’s previous leaders were absent this time.

On 12 October 2015, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo approved a new edition of the Party disciplinary document. Compared to the previous version introduced on 28 February 2004 under General Secretary Hu Jintao, this version under Xi Jinping features a few new don’ts.

The children of veteran communists who held high-ranking offices in China before 1966 (the first year of the Cultural Revolution) are commonly called "princelings." There are princelings by birth — sons and daughters of former highranking officers and officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — and princelings by marriage.

In the most sweeping military reshuffle since the 1950s, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping is creating an army that is loyal to no one but himself.

China’s stocks have tumbled in recent weeks. On 12 June 2015, Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (SSEC) closed at 5166.35 points, the highest since 18 January 2008. Yet on 3 July, the SSEC shed 1481.99 points, losing almost 29 percent of its recent high and more than $2.8 trillion of value (i.e. ten times of Greece’s annual GDP).

As in the past, in the aftermath of the irrational overreaction to China’s stock market crash in recent weeks, experts have come out to soothe nervous investors by offering big picture stories. One such voice is Nicholas R. Lardy, the author of Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Another is Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state who was responsible for opening China’s door to the West in the 1970s.

To the surprise of economists, China’s economy is still going strong. China’s GDP in the third quarter of 2015 increased 6.9 percent compared to the same period of 2014. Although this is the first dip below seven percent growth since the first quarter of 2009, when growth slowed to 6.2 percent, the figure was slightly better than expected.

One of the major reform policies introduced by the Fifth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2015 was the universal relaxation of the one-child policy: any married couples who already have one child may now have a "second-born child." On the surface, it seems that this was a major step forward toward the relaxation of the controversial "one-child policy." But upon further scrutiny, there are a few problems.

During her visit to Beijing in late August 2015, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice met with Liu He (刘鹤), the chief of the General Office of the Leading Small Group for Financial and Economic Affairs within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). That begs the question: who is Liu He and why did Rice meet with him?

Contrary to the idea of “a new type of great power relationship” defined by mutual respect, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, China and the United States have been recently engaged in a war game over the South China Sea.

Beijing must have been seriously embarrassed with the resounding defeat of its proposal for "political reforms" in Hong Kong on 18 June 2015. The National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) in Beijing made a decision on 31 August 2014 for Hong Kong to choose its next chief executive in 2017 through direct elections. The proposal eventually put before Hong Kong’s Legislative Council was all but identical to the NPCSC decision, to the dismay of pro-democrats.

On 7 November 2015, Ma Ying-jeou (马英九), officially identified as Taiwan’s “leader”, met with Xi Jinping, the “leader” of mainland China, in Singapore. This historic meeting was the first of its kind in the history of China.

Shortly after Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), the candidate of Taiwan’fs Democratic Progressive Party, was elected the president of the Republic of China on 16 January 2016, Xinhua News Agency published a commentary on the election.

There have been a number of theories about the sudden cancellation of the Beijing performances of the Moranbong Band, an all-female music group from North Korea whose members were handpicked by the country’s supreme leader Kim Jong-un (金正恩).

Lieutenant General Wang Ning (王宁), newly appointed commander of the People’s Armed Police of the People’s Republic of China, and Lieutenant General Miao Hua (苗华), newly appointed political commissar of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, have at least two things in common.

By her new appointment as director of the Central United Front Department, Madame Sun Chunlan seems to have been demoted. As a former party secretary of Tianjin (one of the four centrally administered municipalities) and a member of the Politburo, she has apparently moved down to become the head of this central department with little power and prestige.

The recent appointment of Lieutenant General Zhou Xiaozhou (周小周) as deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region has been widely regarded as a sign of the rise of princeling generals in Chinese politics.

Chen Jining (陈吉宁), China’s new minister of environmental protection, is a rising star in Chinese politics. He is on track to become a vice-premier of the State Council in 2018 for four reasons.

Wang Xiaohong (王小洪), newly appointed vice-mayor of Beijing, and Deng Weiping (邓卫平), new secretary of the Party Disciplinary Commission of the Public Security Ministry, have at least one thing in common. They both worked in Fujian for a long time, and both of them worked for Xi Jinping.

Wang Zhengwei (王正伟), head of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was recently concurrently appointed deputy head of the Central United Front Department. His appointment tells us three things about Chinese politics.

Since Xi Jinping took power in November 2012, a new Tsinghua Clique has risen in Chinese politics. In contrast to members of the old Tsinghua Clique, who just happened to be graduates of the same university (such as Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), Huang Ju (黄菊), and Wu Guanzheng), members of the new Tsinghua Clique have strong personal ties with one another.

On 4 May 2015, it was announced that Li Xi (李希), governor of Liaoning, had been appointed as party secretary of Liaoning, replacing Wang Min (王珉). Li’s appointment is noteworthy because of his connection to Xi Jinping via his local leadership experiences in Shaanxi, Xi’s home province.

General Fan Changlong (范长龙), who since November 2012 has served as the first vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, is very likely to retire in two years. Born in May 1947, he will turn 70 in May 2017 and, according to custom, will exit the CMC at the 19th National Party Congress in the fall of that year. The question is, who will be his successor.

Admiral Sun Jianguo (孙建国), the head of the Chinese delegation to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is very likely to become China’s next navy commander in 2017. He would be the right person with the right credentials and at the right time.

The location of the headquarters of the Nanjing Military Region must have good fengshui (风水) as those who are fortunate enough to have stayed here for any period of time in the past have had good prospects for future promotions.

On 31 July 2015, one day after Guo Boxiong, a former vice-chairmanof the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo member, was expelled from the Party and handed over for a court martial, the Central Military Commission held a ceremony awarding ten military officers the rank of full general.

One week after the sudden dismissal of Zhou Benshun, party secretary of Hebei, for “serious violations of Party discipline and state law” on 24 July 2015, it was announced that Zhao Kezhi, party secretary of Guizhou, had been appointed party secretary of Hebei.

In China, today’s hero could be tomorrow’s villain. Just look at the events in Chongqing over the past 15 years.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has recently acquired a new nickname: Grandpa Xi (Xi Yeye, 习爷爷) instead of Uncle Xi (Xi Dada, 习大大), as he is known in Chinese media. This upgrade is appropriate because those who address Xi as “grandpa” are elementary school students. What is more interesting, given China’s recent history, is that the new nickname is a part of the title for a new song praising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader.

The date 3 July has no significance in Chinese calendar except for one minor point — it is the birthday of Bo Xilai, former Politburo member and party secretary of Chongqing. He celebrated his 66th birthday in jail. Once an internationally renowned politician with high ambitions, he is very likely to spend the rest of his life in Qincheng Prison (a special jail for former high-ranking officials of the Chinese Communist Party).

The date 26 December 2015 would have been Mao Zedong’s 122nd birthday. A crowd gathered in Shaoshan, Mao’s birth place, to celebrate his birthday under the watchful eyes of the armed police. Although he is the founding father of the People’s Republic of China, Mao remains a controversial figure in China.

For some Chinese, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is no longer relevant. Instead of “our country” (wo guo, 我国), this country has become “your country” (ni guo, 你国) for them.

Ever since the publication of David Shambaugh’s controversial essay “The Coming Chinese Crackup” on 6 March 2015, China scholars have been debating the demise of communist rule in China. Shambaugh made two basic points in the essay: the end-game of communist rule in China has begun and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures have accelerated the demise of the Party’s rule in China. His critics hardly challenged his first point but mostly disagreed with him on his second point.

The following sections are included:

• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• INDEX