State and Secularism

The following sections are included:

• Preface

• Contents

• List of Contributors

A project on state and secularism in Singapore must, it seems, inescapably create a canvas upon a palimpsest. In these opening remarks, I am going to talk less about the state in the title than about the very division of the secular from the religious…

It is often thought, not just by religious people, that secularism is opposed to religion. This view is based on a failure to distinguish between different versions of secularism. Perspectival secularism is indeed hostile to religion. It provides a comprehensive outlook, a way of looking at the world, which is an alternative to religious perspectives in that it finds no place for the God of traditional religions or the afterlife. The secular perspective regards itself as superior to all religious outlooks, which will eventually disappear. It is this claim of perspectival secularism that religious believers strongly resist. But state secularism is a different view that defines the proper functions and limits of the state. It does not seek to eliminate religion, but to confine its scope and application in various ways and for various reasons. Some of the advocates of state secularism are themselves religious. Historically and conceptually, religion and state secularism have been, or can be, allies. Both religious and secular perspectives can provide support for state secularism, while continuing to compete within the limits set by the demands of state secularism.

As Asia modernizes, it is evolving new values, cultures and institutions to meet the demands of a new social order. The process entails tapping into its own cultural and intellectual heritage which includes the universal values of its religions. At the same time, it must not close its mind to the experiences of other societies. On the issue of dealing with religious matters in a plural society, there is much to learn from the European experiences. It is a process of cultural cross-fertilization.

In this paper, working within the Rawlsian conception of liberalism, I accomplish the following. First, I propose a definition of the secular in terms of the principle of state neutrality towards comprehensive accounts of the good, of which religion is a token. Second, I argue that the norm of toleration within the constraints of political liberalism must be produced by the state if we are to make sense of reasonable pluralism that contributes to the making of the overlapping consensus that legitimates the state. This act of production, I proceed to claim, is to be understood in terms of a call for reasonableness that is drawn out in cosmopolitan terms. In other words, the production of cosmopolitan citizens, in this view, becomes a necessary ingredient of political liberalism. I end my remarks by indicating the relationship between cosmopolitanism and secularism within the dynamics of political liberalism.

This chapter presents the outline of a political account of the early liberal conception of secularism or the separation of church and state. It aims to show that the liberal conception of the secular state should be seen as part of a comprehensive effort undertaken by thinkers associated with the Enlightenment to transform radically the traditional view of relations between state, society, and religion.

While the multiculturalism of the European Union often leads it to be considered a primarily secular enterprise, the precise nature of this secularization should be examined in sufficient detail. A historicist strategy, secularization articulates itself differently according to context, and while there are good grounds for believing (and, as with all statements about the future, we can only believe — or not) that increasing educational levels and multiculturalism itself will relativize religious absolutes, a secularism of a historical materialist sense is not yet observable. The essence of the European project, as it is evolving in the 21st century and whether it has yet reached the highest levels, is the necessity for critical conviction, for an open debate which holds fast to a certain idea of Europe — President of the European Commission Jacques Delors' “soul for Europe” perhaps—but which continuously keeps it available for nuancing and critique. This should, of course, be clear from the trajectory of the European Union as an enterprise, southwards and eastwards (if occasionally, as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis, to the northwest, to Iceland), to a once Ottoman, now partially Russian sphere of influence. As such, expansion leads to a self-questioning, a krisis, of European values; the nature of the Union's approach to secularism will also be refined and new critical convictions will emerge.

As with so many categories employed in Western intellectual discourses, applying antithetical concepts of secularism and religiosity to understand China causes all kinds of problems. Attitudes and ideas associated with religious faith are common in the politics of China from ancient times. Yet, we should not jump to the conclusion that this is another example of the pre-modern mixing of church and state to be remedied by modernization. For “religions” in China may be quite different from the monotheistic religions that came to dominate the West, and that have framed the discussions about secularism and the state in political philosophy. By those standards, Chinese religions — especially if Confucianism is included as is regularly done — are quite secular in outlook. This paper explores the anomalous relation between the concepts of the sacred and the secular that complicates the Chinese sense of religiosity, and how this in turn complicates the relationship between Chinese religion and politics, both past and present.

Secularism in Europe is a living concept defining itself according to principles that have to be re-affirmed regularly in a variety of ways and reflecting the special history of each country. The secular transformation of the state in Europe has led to four major systems defined by the political status they give to religions. But, in spite of the variety of systems of secularity in Europe, the same questions seem to appear everywhere. When looking closely at each legal system, one discovers that there is a community of aspirations and a basic corpus of rights.

This chapter focuses on the French laïcité system. Laïcité is akin to universalism, which is the essence of the republic, and defines a larger goal than secularism itself Secularism only means transferring the powers of political and social regulation to civil authorities. It does not necessarily imply an equal status for all philosophical options or beliefs. Recent years have shown a renewal of conflicts about the status of religions in Europe: tribunals have been asked to ban books or movies because people felt their religious beliefs were insulted. There are many reasons for that phenomenon. The end of communist regimes in eastern Europe and the policy of the Vatican under Pope John Paul II have led to a renewal of the Catholic Church there. At the same time, the growing influence of Islam has brought new questions about the separation of the public and the private spheres. Political and judicial answers to those questions lead to the questioning of the identity of Europe itself at a time of globalization.

This paper looks at how various pluralistic states grapple with the relationship between law and religion. Between the two extremes of purely theocratic states, where a religion's divine text forms the blueprint for the state's constitution and general law, and the atheistic secular fundamentalism of communist states, lies a wide range of regimes that seek to accommodate religious diversity. After all, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that every person “has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and most constitutions provide for the freedom of religious worship. Drawing from examples in the British Commonwealth and elsewhere, the paper examines the various models of accommodation and cooperation that have emerged and considers the reasons for their relative successes and failures.

The Vedic faith — which should not be equated with the sum total of the popular versions of Hinduism we see today — is by nature a pluralistic vision that accommodates a variety of spiritual quests and manifestations. The emphasis here is on spiritual values rather than religious elaborations and prescriptions. The Vedas do not recognize the hegemony of the priestly class. The Vedas do not see truth and justice as the monopoly of any class, caste or race. It is quintessentially a universal vision that sees the whole of the human species as comprising one family. In that respect, it is also in harmony with the vision in the Bible that sees creation as originating from the divine source and all humankind, therefore, belonging together in the plan of God.

India became a secular democratic republic for a number of reasons. First, the freedom fighters were mainly inspired by the ideals of freedom, democracy and secularism, and hence they saw to it that India remains a secular democracy where all its citizens enjoy basic rights. Second, the partition of India on a religious basis meant the leaders resolved not to allow religion to be associated in any manner with affairs of the state. Third, India is a bewilderingly diverse society, though Hindus constitute its majority.

However, religious minorities are worried about their religions and cultures in the midst of an overwhelming Hindu majority. Thus, Nehru and other leaders provided constitutional guarantees for the religious and cultural rights of minorities.

Though the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court often protects these rights, there are many problems in practice. The practical politics is dominated by majoritarianism, and minorities feel deprived of their security. Communal violence often breaks out, and the police and bureaucracy often ignore secular ideals and have been heavily influenced by the communal ideology of the Sangh family — a Hindu religious rights family.

This chapter deals with these problems and discusses how Indian secularism can overcome them.

When Pakistan came into being, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) presented a patently secular idea of nation–building without mentioning the word “secular.” The Islamists mounted a concerted campaign against secularism, declaring that it was the anti-thesis of Islamic faith. They wanted to make Pakistan an Islamic state in which the Shariah would be supreme: all laws would be consonant with the Shariah. They did not overrule democracy, pluralism or the idea of human rights, women's rights and minority rights, but argued that Islam had its own approach to pluralism and the rights of women and non–Muslims. They were able to advance their project during the time of General Zia-ul-Haq. This study will analyze the implications of the anti–secular rhetoric in terms of its actual impact on democracy, pluralism, human rights, women's rights and minority rights.

With a Muslim population of 130 million, Bangladesh is the third largest Muslim-majority country and has the fourth largest Muslim population in the world; yet, it has retained a fairly tolerant and secular character for most of her history. Although there have been occasional drifts towards religious extremism, the secular character has never been threatened seriously. The newly independent Bangladesh in 1971 incorporated secularism as one of the four principles on which the constitution of Bangladesh was based. When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding leader of Bangladesh, and his regime were removed in a military coup in 1975 (less than four years after the country's independence), the new military government of General Zia which took control after months of instability removed both the principles of socialism and secularism from the constitution. The military government in Bangladesh sought to introduce not only a neo-liberal economic policy, but also introduced Islam into the body politic, thus shaping the political process. The military regime brought religion to the national politics to win the support of the religious right. Bangladesh politics continues to be embroiled over the secularism/religion divide. What role does the modern state play in resolving the apparent conflict between religious and secular ideologies, especially when the state itself has been de–secularized? Does broader socio–economic progress limit or enable the state's role as an adjudicator? This chapter will explore both the complex processes of global and local/national politics in exploring this transformation and continued tension.

It has been often argued that Islamization from the top was a tactic initiated by the late President Anwar al-Sadat to counteract the opposing secular and leftist forces.

Islamization in Egypt started from the top. Islamization proceeded alongside the liberalizing of the economy, a major component of Sadat's shifting allegiance away from the Soviet Union and a socialist economy, to the United States. Sadat, the champion of a liberal laissez-faire economy, introduced the Islamic shariah law into the constitution. Islamists were given much more freedom under Sadat. Religious television programs multiplied, and the construction of mosques was allowed as a tax exemption. Later, secularism came under strong attack because most of the corrupt Arab regimes fought their Islamic opponents under a secularist banner. This claim of “secularism” to oppose the “dark” Islamists is just a semblance, however, since doses of religiosity have been injected into all cultural and political spheres in recent years. Religion has been incorporated in the modern Arab state with most Muslim countries adopting shariah law within their legal systems.

By its nature, Pancasila, the Indonesian state ideology, is secular. It was formulated and implemented with the confident belief that only through an open and pluralist state can Indonesian unity be fully achieved. Eventually, this has become the basis of Indonesian citizenship. Pancasila is a feature of cultural and political identity. However, this has been challenged by the emergence of Islamic political ideology. It has appeared on two fronts: in the politico-legal area, and in the transformation and the expansion of fatwa. Consequently, it leads to tension between a secular interpretation of state ideology and Islamic political ideology. The fate of what constitutes an Indonesian depends on the interplay of these two tendencies.

One central issue in Malaysian politics is the contestation over Islam's political role. It has given rise to two forms of statist Islam sponsored respectively by the dominant ruling Malay party, UMNO, and the oppositional Islamic party, PAS. This chapter will delve into the history and politics of this contestation and examine its ramifications on Malaysian multicultural society. At the peak of this contestation, leaders of the ruling UMNO have declared Malaysia to be an “Islamic state.” This is, however, contested by secular political actors and constitutional experts. Contestation over the role and place of Islam in society has also spilled over into civil society, with the surfacing of numerous ethnic altercations over cultural rights issues such as apostasy and religious conversions. This chapter will examine the aborted attempt by civil society actors to form an Inter–Faith Commission in 2005 and explore its social and political ramifications. The chapter argues that the route to a multicultural secular practice of recognizing the “equal worth” of citizens remains stymied in a contested political moment with democracy serving as the most significant and enabling conditionality for progressive change.

China has been de-secularizing since the early 1980s when the government shifted from a policy of suppressing religion to one of co-opting and controlling it. As a central player in re-defining the state–religion relationship, the state has been more tolerant of religion while also more effective in managing it. This chapter will review the management system put in place by the Chinese government, highlighting how this system allows for a nationwide religious revival on one hand while maintaining a firm grip on politically threatening religious movements on the other. It will also discuss how factors such as the central–local relationship, the changing economy and society, and the international environment have shaped the state–religion relationship in China, examining the reviving folk religions and each of the five institutional religions—Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam.

Turkey is the only secular Muslim country which wants to be a part of a non-Muslim union, the EU. Turkish secularism is confusing to outside observers, in particular to the Europeans, and poses a problem in its integration into the EU. Turkish secularism is usually compared to French secularism. Yet there are major differences between them. The only parallel that can be found in the world to Turkish secularism is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Chinese-style secularism where the state controls religion. The present political tensions in Turkey should be analyzed in the light of this phenomenon. The current main political cleavage in Turkey is not between Islamists and secularists, but between advocates of Western-style democratic secularism and advocates of the authoritarian-style secularism. The latter are against the Western-style democratic secularism and therefore against the EU.

This chapter analyzes the discourse and practices of Singapore's nation-state as a kind of civil religion, identifying in particular their “religion-like” elements that have played a part in securing the People's Action Party (PAP) government's political legitimacy since the country attained independence in 1965. The chapter locates the evolution of Singapore's civil religion within a public sphere defined by a “pragmatic” mode of secularism and the contradictory tendencies of transactional and transformational modes of leadership that the government, endeavoring to secure the economic and moral bases of its authority, has tried to control.

The following sections are included:

• Index