Value Solutions in Cooperative Games

The following sections are included:

• Foreword

• Contents

The following sections are included:

• Superadditive Games in Coalition Function Form

• The Core

• Shapley Value

• The Nucleolus

• A Comparative Perspective

• Chapter Summary

The following sections are included:

• Nontransferable Utility Games

• Zeuthen's Solution

• Nash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining Power

• Variable-Threat Bargaining

• Nash Bargaining and Nash Equilibrium

• Unequal Bargaining Power

• Chapter Summary

The following sections are included:

• Preliminaria

• TU Games in Partition Function Form
  • Symmetry
  • Superadditivity
  • Efficiency
  • Successor Function

• NTU Games in Partition Function Form
  • Superior Games
  • Example: A Common-Property Resource
  • Example: A Cartel with Differentiated Products

• Chapter Summary

The following sections are included:

• Shapley's “Algorithm”

• Maskin's Proposal

• An Extended Shapley Algorithm

• Some Examples
  • An Illustrative Example
  • A Game with Strong Positive Externalities
  • A Game with Mild Positive Externalities
  • A Game that is not Superadditive
  • The Enigma Game
  • An Exceptional Public Goods Game
  • A Game with an Optimal Scale
  • A Game with Increasing Returns to Scale

• Chapter Summary

The following sections are included:

• Excess

• The Nucleolus

• Uniqueness

• Characterizing the Core

• The Intermediate Case and Proper Games

• Extended Core

• Superior Games

• The Example of a Common-Property Resource

• The Example of a Cartel

• Summary and Conclusions

The following sections are included:

• Bargaining Power Games

• Examples

• The Relation of this Model to Some Predecessors

• Matching Games and Bargaining Power

• Bargaining Power NTU Games in Partition Function Form

• Reflections

• Summary

The following sections are included:

• A Brief Digression on the Noncooperative Stage of a Biform Game

• Bargaining Power Biform Games

• Biform Games and Externalities

• Some Examples from the Recent Literature
  • Brandenburger and Stuart (2007)
  • Chatain and Zemsky (2007)

• Biform Games and Job Matching

• A Corporate Governance Game

• Biform Games and Bargaining Power: Summary

The following sections are included:

• A Primer for Cooperative Games in Extensive Form

• Further Examples

• An Example with Demographic Change

• A More General Discussion

• Chapter Summary and Conclusions

The following sections are included:

• An Overview of the Model

• FCS Games
  • Considerable Solutions in FCS Games
  • The Core

• Determination of the Feasible Condition Structures

• A Coalition for Production and Sale
  • A Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady State
  • Optimality within the Coalition
  • Bargaining Power

• Competition and Monopoly

• Separations

• Chapter Conclusion

The following sections are included:

• References

• Index