China's Japan Policy

The following sections are included:

• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Author
• List of Tables

This book is an analysis of the PRC leaders' formulation of their Japan policy and an attempt to explain it within the framework of their overall foreign policy. It concentrates therefore, on their conceptualization of international developments and their rationale at every shift and turn in their Japan policy. Attempts are also made to analyze the Japanese leaders' perceptions of international developments…

The following sections are included:

• The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Peace Settlement with Japan
• Towards a More Independent Japan Policy and the Initiation of People's Diplomacy
• The Decline of Soviet Support for the PRC's Japan Policy
• A Re-definition of the PRC's Japan Policy
• The Failure to Achieve a Breakthrough in the Early 1960s
• The Impact of the Vietnam War, the Revival of Japanese Militarism and the Cultural Revolution on China's Japan Policy
• Summary and Overview

A satisfactory understanding of the PRC's policy towards a particular country in a certain period cannot be grasped without an adequate comprehension of the PRC's overall foreign policy framework in that period. This chapter, therefore, attempts to analyze the PRC's foreign policy framework after the Cultural Revolution.

In Chapter 1, it was argued that the PRC's policy towards Japan was closely related to its analysis of the world situation, especially to the evolution of its relations with the Soviet Union and the US. In the “leaning to one side” era in the early 1950s, the PRC and the Soviet Union closely co-ordinated their Japan policies, but as differences between the two Communist countries gradually emerged, the PRC was forced to deal with Japan without Soviet support. After 1958, the Chinese leaders decided to normalize Sino-Japanese relations on an overall basis, rejecting the step-by-step approach. A breakthrough appeared likely in the early 1960s, but it never materialized. Progress in Sino-Japanese relations was subsequently affected adversely by the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution…

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The Unshakable Position of Sato and his China Policy: 1968–1969
• The Gathering Storm
  • In the LDP
  • The Japanese business world
• The PRC and the Opposition Parties in Japan
• The PRC's Re-definition of its United Front Policy in Japan
• The Emergence of the United Front and Sato's Counter-measures
• Growing Support for the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations in Japan
• The Turning of the Tide — The “Nixon Shocks” and the Shifting Emphasis of the PRC's United Front Policy
• Some Observations
• The Successful Operation of the PRC's United Front Strategy in 1972

The following sections are included:

• The Formulation of the Demands
• Legal Interpretations of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of September 1972
• The Compromise Over the Taiwan Question
• An Analysis of the PRC's Bargaining Strength in September 1972
• The Shelving of the Diaoyutai Islands Issue
• The Bypassing of Other Issues
• The Questions of the Revival of Japanese Militarism and Anti-Hegemony

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
  • The consolidation of bilateral ties and the Taiwan question
• The PRC's Handling of the Unresolved Bilateral Issues
• The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and the Anti-Hegemony Issue
• Competition Between the PRC and the Soviet Union for Japan
  • Tipping the scale against the Soviet Union: Approval of the US–Japan alliance and mobilizing the united front

In the preceding chapters we saw how the PRC's Japan policy was a closely integrated part of its overall foreign policy framework in the post-Cultural Revolution era. At the Ninth National Congress of the CPC in April 1969, the two dominant themes in the Chinese leadership's analysis of the world situation were the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism and social imperialism, and that between imperialist and social imperialist countries. In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, a successful united front against the two superpowers required the participation of Japan; and in the exploitation of the contradiction between the two superpowers, Japan too carried weight that could significantly tip the scale against either of them…

The signing of an eight-year private trade agreement between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan on February 16, 1978 envisaging exchanges between 1978 and 1985 of goods worth US$10 billion each way and the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship on August 12, 1978 have perhaps provided us with landmarks on which basis we can make some observations regarding the PRC's Japan policy, in the 1970s, especially in the period since the fall of the “Gang of Four”. Since the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in April 1969, the two dominant themes in the PRC leaders' analysis of the world situation have been the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other hand and that between imperialist and social imperialist countries. As the country with the third largest gross national product (GNP) in the world, Japan evidently is a significant factor to reckon with in the foreign policy formulation of any major country, particularly for one in Asia. In the eyes of the PRC leaders, a united front against the two superpowers will be much strengthened or weakened with or without the participation of Japan; and in the exploitation of the contradiction between the two superpowers, Japan too carries the weight that can significantly tip the scale against either of them. In the post-Cultural Revolution era, the PRC leaders have been able to broaden their united front in Japan to influence Japan's foreign policy-making process in their favour. The most significant feature of the PRC leaders’ united front in Japan in the 1970s has been its gradual expansion from sole reliance on the pro-PRC factions of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and a few small Maoist organizations during the Cultural Revolution to encompass all the opposition parties — with the exception of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the majority of the mass media, the anti-mainstream factions of the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan (LDP), the business world, and finally, almost all mainstream factions of the LDP. Two sets of factors in the domestic political scene in Japan, those that have always existed and those that have emerged only in the 1970s, have facilitated this spectacular broadening of the united front, and they will be analyzed later…

The signing of an eight-year private trade agreement between the PRC and Japan on February 16, 1978, envisaging exchanges between 1978 and 1985 of goods worth US$10 billion each way, and the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship on August 12, 1978, laid the foundation for the PRC's Japan policy in the period after the fall of the Gang of Four…

The following sections are included:

• The Chinese Leaders' Assessment of the Changing International Environment
• Military Threat
• Mutual Perceptions
• The Issues of Taiwan, the Diaoyutai Islands and South Korea
• Economic Relations
• Conclusion: Parallel Adjustments to the International Environment

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Changes in the International Environment and Japan's Attempts to Strengthen Security
• Domestic Factors Contributing to the Rising Influence of the Right-wing Forces in Japan
  • Changes in the domestic political spectrum
  • The Japanese bureaucracy
  • The Japanese media
• PRC's Response to the Difficulties in Sino-Japanese Relations
• Conclusion

Due to historical legacies in Sino-Japanese relations, including the absence of a satisfactory apology to the Chinese people for the Japan's war atrocities, the related history textbook issue in Japan's secondary schools, the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese political leaders, and the territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as well as the exclusive economic zones in the East Asia Sea, People's Republic of China's (PRC) rising nationalism has been mainly directed at Japan, making it difficult for the Chinese leadership to engage in negotiations with its Japanese counterpart pertaining to agreements on mutual concessions.

The following sections are included:

• Bibliography
• Index