Management of Transboundary Water Resources under Scarcity

The following sections are included:

• CONTENTS
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• FOREWORD
• ABOUT THE EDITORS
• ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
• INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION

The supply of renewable natural water available in a sustainable fashion in the Jordan River Basin (JRB), comprising Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority (PA), will soon drop below 100 cubic meters (m³) per person per year. Drawing on recent technological progress and policy innovations, a comprehensive policy to address the region’s water problems in the long run is offered. The policy has a dual goal: to satisfy the needs of a growing population (domestic, irrigation, and industry) and to preserve important environmental amenities, including restoration of the lower Jordan River (LJR) and stabilization of the Dead Sea. The gap between natural water supplies and the basic needs of the growing population will be closed by conservation and desalination; at the same time, all domestic water will be recycled and will be available for reuse in irrigation and environmental restoration. Over time, the supply of recycled water that should be allocated for environmental restoration (accounting for the compensation of irrigators) will suffice to partially restore the LJR and contribute to the stabilization of the Dead Sea. The analysis is relevant in a wide range of real-world situations, where satisfying the basic needs of a growing population and preserving environmental amenities become critical.

This chapter assesses ex-ante the Rogun Dam project in Tajikistan and examines different possibilities of water allocation between the riparian countries and trade-offs across competing uses for water resources. A hydro-economic optimization model is used in the chapter to quantify the impacts of dam operations on energy production and irrigation water availability. The chapter finds that the economic impacts of the dam depend on its operation. Under the case of sustained cooperation, loss of the downstream countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, could be insignificant from the construction of Rogun Dam by the upstream country, Tajikistan. However, any unilateral diversion of water in the upstream for increased hydropower benefits may lead to a larger loss for downstream countries. This justifies for a strong need for trust and cooperation among the riparian countries over managing water infrastructural resources and for achieving sustainable growth.

Using a partial equilibrium optimization model, we evaluate the performance of existing and future dams in the eastern Nile River basin (ENRB) for countries consisting of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. On top of unilateral allocation, we also propose three alternative water rights arrangements (WRAs) with and without intraregional water rights trade and internalizing the resource degradation externality. We found that the social planner would assign the Nile River water for economic sectors and basin countries that could generate more than $10 billion, the highest economic benefit to the region regardless of initial WRA. Unilateral use of Nile water would benefit Ethiopia and Sudan, but it would reduce the economic benefit for Egypt, a country that has relatively efficient irrigated agriculture. In addition, the proposed WRAs and trade could lead to efficiency, recovering up to 99% of the social planner’s outcomes. Allocate-and trade could also be cost-effective alternative to raise around $680 million for short- to medium-term abatement investment that can be used for reducing or eliminating resource degradation problem.

Using the notion of externality games with issue linkage, this chapter demonstrates the advantages of issue linkage for the Mekong region in achieving a more efficient, more stable basin agreement. In a game that includes the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) States and China, it is shown that the LMB states can benefit more from issue linkages. In particular, linking issues of water flow to the Lower Mekong with issues of regional trading will increase likelihood of regional cooperation.

The 1906 Convention and the 1944 Treaty establish the distribution of surface water of the Rio Grande (RG), Colorado, and Tijuana Rivers between the United States and Mexico. Neither of these treaties addresses groundwater management. Only Minute 242 to the 1944 Treaty, regulates salinity for groundwater. Specifically, Minute 242.5 establishes that there is a lack of “conclusion by the Governments of the United States and Mexico for a comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border areas.” The lack of regulation has contributed to overdraft and degradation of the water quality in several aquifers along the US–Mexico border. Recommendations for an institutional and legal framework under an umbrella agreement, addressing water bank as allocation tool, attempt to fill the legal vacuum of international and interstate groundwater management in the US–Mexico border region. In addition, these recommendations can be adapted to other transboundary basins around the world.

This chapter is a highly abridged version of the EcoPeace Proposal for a water agreement between Israel and Palestine. It presents the design for an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians to share water in a physically realistic, ecologically sustainable, and socially equitable manner. Existing arrangements are, at best, inadequate and, in some cases, counterproductive. The proposal relies upon ongoing monitoring and mediation to achieve equitable and sustainable use at the most local level possible. The proposal also argues that an agreement on water can be reached now, before resolving the full range of issues required in a Final Status Agreement between Israel and Palestine.

Disagreements or full-fledged disputes continue to exist in international river basins even after the establishment of river basin organizations (RBOs) — originally often established to solve, mitigate, or prevent such disputes. However, research on transboundary river basin management as well as empirical evidence from basins around the world suggests that RBOs do make a difference by providing mechanisms for dispute resolution. This chapter asks whether and how RBOs engage in the solution of disputes that arise over water resources in transboundary basins. The chapter provides an overview of the global distribution of different RBO conflict-resolution mechanisms and analyzes in greater detail two conflict cases: the Mekong and the Nile rivers. While the findings reveal that the existence of specific conflict-resolution mechanisms does not necessarily influence the effectiveness of dispute resolution, RBOs as a whole do matter in addressing water-related conflicts through a range of mechanisms beyond pure dispute-resolution mechanisms, including the provision of forums for negotiation and exchange, data and information, or notification procedures.

Spain and Portugal have established cooperation mechanisms to manage their shared water resources in order to avoid any potential conflict. Cooperation is clearly reflected in the 1998 Albufeira Convention, which provides a legal framework to regulate all transboundary basins between both countries to protect surface water and groundwater, as well as the aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems that depend on them for the sustainable use of water resources. The 1998 Albufeira Convention establishes as one of the uses of the Tagus Basin Gthe transfer of water interbasin such as the Aqueduct Tagus-Segura (ATS). According to this Convention, the management of water uses and the right to use water shall be addressed to guarantee the sustainable use of water that is already established. The ATS is a use guaranteed and protected under international water law. The analysis of the ATS in the context of the international legislation to mitigate water scarcity, and droughts provides the strategies to promote resilience to climate change and the impacts of drought conditions in the society in a sustainable manner while ensuring the fundamental rights.

Both the Fergana Valley in Central Asia and the Lower Jordan River Basin are international hotspots in water management. The irrigation and land use systems in both basins have seen important changes during the last century and the economic, social, and political stability in those regions depends largely on the availability and fair distribution of the basins’ water resources. How these water resources are managed depends in many ways on the different institutional settings and their adaptation capacities. In both regions, path dependencies, resulting from the construction of major water engineering projects (MWEPs) and existing institutional settings, constrain the introduction of integrated water resources management (IWRM) within a transboundary context. Those constraints can only be lifted by the introduction of adaptive and participative instruments.

The Jordan River, one of the world’s most famous, has been reduced to a little more than a drainage ditch after years of neglect. However, given its rich heritage and environmental importance, rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River (LJR) brings with it the potential for significant cultural, ecological, and economic benefits. This regional benefits study estimated the magnitude of the economic benefits Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis may achieve from river restoration. The study used different nonmarket valuation techniques to help identify the scale of benefits that can be derived from various rehabilitation scenarios, addressing both flow magnitude and water quality. The results identify several positive-sum outcomes from rehabilitation of the LJR, especially from a regional perspective. As such, it points to the potential for rehabilitation of the river to provide shared benefits and common interests among parties in a region more typically characterized by political conflict and stalemate.

The following section is included:

• INDEX