Narrow Results

Modern resource markets are globalized, which gives significant advantages to countries that own these resources. The proceeds from the sale of resources to global markets can serve as a financial phase for the implementation of important government development programs for a country. The paper examines the influence of the economic and political aspects of globalization on the export operations of the OPEC and OPEC+ member countries. A statistical study of the dependence of export volume dynamics on the KOF Globalization Index and its components was carried out, which made it possible to quantitatively assess the impact of political and economic globalization on OPEC countries’ exports by developing a mathematical model that would describe the relationship of these indicators. The OPEC and OPEC+ countries were grouped depending on those components of the globalization indicator that affect export volumes, that is, according to the level of countries’ involvement in globalization.

In this paper we study the natural resource curse by analyzing the cross-regional sample from Kazakhstan. Our focus is to understand if the institutional quality within the country explains the resource curse. Using the data for 14 regions in Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2010 and employing various panel data approaches, we find that the institutional quality is not a determinant of the resource curse as institution changes very slowly within the country over time. This statement surely contradicts with previous resource curse literatures that utilized cross-country sample counting the fact that institutions vary across countries. Instead here, we argue that the resource curse within the country arises as a result of commodity price volatility.

For a country long-renowned for its abundant natural resources, Myanmar in recent years has accorded less priority and attention to this sector. Agriculture (including forests and fisheries) still employs much of the workforce and provides livelihoods for the rural population, but yet it does not get the inputs including the investment that it requires. What has resulted is a weak and inadequate response to urgent circumstances not only in an important economic sector but also in environmental, conservation and sustainability concerns and affecting a large population segment and strata. Millions of the rural workforce have become migrant workers in neighbouring countries. The economy as a whole is still buoyed up by natural gas exports, construction, and service industries. But these favour mostly urban areas and populations; for the extensive rural economy, road-building and electricity alone will not halt the downward slide. Many studies have been done on natural resource management and conservation, but policies where they exist are hampered by weak state capacity, corruption and the persistence of armed conflict. There has been advocacy for shared management of natural resources but together with the lack of political will, there is still a long way to go. China’s role in illegal logging, gold-dredging, and jade mining have been pointed out, but these are secondary to that country’s focus upon strategic infrastructure. Central to the picture is the “style” of governance by the Myanmar state, particularly the incumbent government. A paternalistic neglect of local views, mistrust of civil society, and very centralised decision-making exacerbate the situation. The private sector continues to be dominated by crony capitalists who keep to their rentier, extractivist practices. Ending the armed conflict and attending to displaced populations are critical issues to be sure, but using these as excuses is not going to be enough. A more plural, open, and inclusive approach to the business of government is the only way Myanmar can meet its overwhelming challenges. The present centralised, hierarchical, and bureaucratic business-as-usual will not work. Neither will mass party mobilisations, which are a thing of the past. A drastic re-think is desperately required.

Corruption has traditionally been wildly rampant in the energy sector and its effects have proved to be extremely dramatic. For decades energy companies have perpetrated corrupt practices with impunity to obtain from the local governments the green light to construct intrusive energy infrastructures, which have the potential of causing serious damages to a country’s environment and social fabric. This illicit way of carrying out business activities has been de facto tolerated by governments for a long time. It affected particular developing nations, causing the so-called “resource curse”. Then, almost unpredictably, over the course of last two decades, significant and increasingly determined efforts have been devoted to fighting against such a criminal phenomenon. It is well established that the role that transparency plays within such a grim scenario is fundamental. This chapter will examine the intimate relationship between the lack of corporate transparency and corruption, and analyze the most important legal instruments that have been developed to encourage a transparent way of conducting business activities in the energy sector at the international, regional and domestic level. Then, will also focus on the recent Trump’s administration decision to nullify the US transparency rules for the extractive industries analyzing the scope of its potentially dramatic consequences.