The Taiwan Independence Movement In and Out of Power

The following sections are included:

• PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Movement Government Framework
• Literature Review
• Summary

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The Taiwan Independence Movement and the DPP from Movement to Political Party to Government
• Differentiating the DPP Government's Two Support Bases at the Aggregate Level
• The Correlations between Individuals' Dissatisfaction with the DPP Government's Performance and Their Support for the DPP and the TIM
• The Changing Party Composition of the TIM's Support Base and the DPP's Weakened Monopoly on Taiwanese Nationalism
• Summary

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Evolution of the DPP Government's Strategies: From Concession to Confrontation, 2000–2004
• Evolution of the DPP Government's Strategies: From Confrontation to Radicalization, 2004–2008
• Data, Operationalization and Hypotheses
• Method and Results
• The Radical Strategy and Fondness of Chen
• Summary

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The Anatomy of the Radical Strategy
• A Double-Edged Sword of the Radical Strategy
• Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly review the movement government framework proposed in Chapter 1, then discuss how the framework helps inform the analysis of the lower popular support for the DPP, and on the other hand, how the case study of the DPP government may sophisticate the framework as well, and finally, discuss how this case study and the movement government framework may contribute to the literature of state-movement relations theoretically and the DPP's future development empirically.

The following sections are included:

• The DPP's Quick Recovery from the 2008 Electoral Defeats
• Tsai Ing-Wen and the Two Pro-Independence Factions in the DPP
• Erasing Chen's Negative Legacy with Reforms in the DPP
• Signs of Revival with Consecutive Electoral Victories
• Proposing a New Agenda for Taiwan but More Challenges Ahead

The following sections are included:

• The Ma Administration's Mid-term “Exam” Concluded with Positive Implications
• KMT's Lackluster Victory
• DPP's Cheerful Defeat
• Future Challenges to the Two Parties

The following sections are included:

• Ma's Stability Card Defeats Tsai's Social Justice Card
• Important Background to the 2012 Elections
• Campaigns and Platforms
• Post-Election Challenges for Ma and the DPP

The following sections are included:

• Three Lines of China Policy in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
• Loss of Core Supporters on China Policy Since 2012
• The Three DPP Heavyweights and the Last Mile

Following the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) overwhelming defeat by the Kuomintang (KMT) in both the legislative and the presidential elections in Taiwan in early 2008, it was hard to imagine that the DPP could restore its popular support in just two and a half years. The DPP's second administration of 2004–2008 was widely viewed as an unpopular one. Towards the end of that term, the DPP was severely criticized not only by various opposition forces such as the KMT, but also by a large group from within the DPP. Scholars and pundits have already identified the failures of former President Chen Shui-bian 陈水扁 and his administration which led to their defeat in the 2008 elections, including the administration's dissatisfactory economic performance, supposedly owing to its close-door China policy, the corruption scandals surrounding President Chen and his family members, increased ethnic conflicts and social instability, and the deterioration in Taiwan– US relations caused by Chen's radical and provocative pro-independence policies…

The following sections are included:

• REFERENCES
• INDEX