Towards strategy evolution in pedestrian room evacuation
Abstract
Knowing how crowds behave is crucial to understanding pedestrian evacuation. In this work, we study strategy evolution in pedestrian room evacuation using a cellular automaton (CA) model with a spatial game. Agents play the game under certain conditions. While playing the game, they choose one of the three strategies (Patient strategy, Normal strategy and Impatient strategy) according to either fitness or imitation that leads to patient, normal or impatient behavior. Interactions among agents are reflected by the payoffs (related with friction cost) which may depend on agents’ surroundings. Simulation results show how evacuation conditions, agents’ individual actions, and friction cost affect strategy evolution in pedestrian room evacuation. It is found that cooperation exists both in emergency situation and relatively nonemergency situation, but appears more in the latter one. The imitation action has negative impacts either on the evolution of Normal strategy in relatively nonemergency situation or on the evolution of Patient strategy in emergency situation. In addition, uniform evolution phenomena are observed in the evacuation process, despite different composition of initial agents.
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