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School of Economics, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, Bangpood, Pakkret, Nonthaburi 11120, Thailand

https://doi.org/10.1142/S021759082246002XCited by:0 (Source: Crossref)

Abstract

Ostracism is one form of real-life punishment mechanism to penalize uncooperative individuals in many societies. This paper aims to test whether ostracism enhances cooperation in the public good experiment by allowing group members to expel others based on the majority voting rule. The study also employed the modified public good experiment to categorize the contributors. The results showed that introducing ostracism increases contribution level by about 45 percentage points on average. However, some participants punished other members, even they contributed less than others or so-called anti-social punishment, suggesting that a third-party punishment may be another solution to sustain cooperation.

Keywords:

JEL: C72, C91, H41

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