Service Time and Pricing Decisions in Online Retailing with Drop-Shipping and Guaranteed Service Framework
Abstract
Many online retailers have adopted drop-shipping as their main order fulfillment strategy. Against this backdrop, this paper studies the service time and pricing decisions in an online retailing system in which the single retailer is served by either monopolistic or duopolistic suppliers. The suppliers are dominant in the Stackelberg game. We employ the guaranteed service framework to model the intricate relationship between service time and inventory. The model stipulates that the delivery of online orders must be completed within guaranteed service time. The equilibrium service times and prices are derived for both cases of monopolistic and duopolistic suppliers. In addition, we systematically analyze the impact of operational and market factors on service time, respectively, and rich insights have been obtained. Interestingly, we find that the presence of competition does not necessarily lead to more rapid delivery service. Suppliers in the duopoly market tend to adopt a price-based competitive strategy, i.e., they are better off by lowering price at the expense of longer service time, especially for the new entrant. However, as competition intensifies to some extent, suppliers are recommended to leverage on more responsive service to maintain or expand the customer base.
