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E-POINTS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION

EZIO MARCHI

Chacabuco 218, Goday Cruz, Mendoza 5501, Argentina

https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198906001193Cited by:0 (Source: Crossref)

Abstract

In this paper we characterize a general existence theorem concerning E-points for n-persons extensive games with complete information. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of such E-points.

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E-POINTS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION

Abstract

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