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A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198909002376Cited by:1 (Source: Crossref)
Abstract
In this note we provide a neccesary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core of a general structured TU-game which resembles closely the classical condition of balancedness given by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) to guarantee the non-emptiness of the classical core. Structured games have been introduced in Herings et al. (2007a) and more recently, in Herings et al. (2007b), studied in the framework of games with transferable utility. In the latter paper, the authors provide suffcient conditions for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core, but up to now, no necessary and sufficient condition is known.
