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Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player

Elena Parilina

Saint Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., Saint Petersburg 199034, Russia

E-mail Address: e.parilina@spbu.ru

Corresponding author.

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and

Artem Sedakov

Saint Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., Saint Petersburg 199034, Russia

E-mail Address: a.sedakov@spbu.ru

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https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198916400053Cited by:7 (Source: Crossref)

Abstract

The theory of cooperative games with restricted cooperation has been rapidly developing over the last decades. In our study, we present a special game with restricted cooperation — a game with a major player — a modified version of the landlord game presented in Moulin [1988]. Cooperation of players is supposed to be restricted by a communication structure (a star-graph) as well as a coalition structure. We adopt two well-known cooperative allocations — the Myerson value and the ES-value — to the case when there exist restrictions on the cooperation of players and provide their analytical expressions. Additionally, we examine stability of coalition structures using the concept of the Nash equilibrium and formulate conditions guaranteeing such stability for a given coalition structure.

Keywords:

JEL: C71

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