Research PaperFree Access

Transient Attacks Against the VMG-KLJN Secure Key Exchanger

Shahriar Ferdous

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5960-822X

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77841-3128, USA

E-mail Address: ferdous.shahriar@tamu.edu

Corresponding author.

Search for more papers by this author

and

Laszlo B. Kish

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8917-954X

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77841-3128, USA

Óbuda University, Budapest, Bécsi út 96/B, Budapest, H-1034, Hungary

E-mail Address: laszlokish@tamu.edu

Search for more papers by this author

https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219477524500081Cited by:0 (Source: Crossref)

Abstract

The security vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz, and Gingl (VMG) Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) key exchanger, as presented in the publication “Nature, Science Report 5 (2015) 13653”, has been exposed to transient attacks. Recently an effective defense protocol was introduced (Appl. Phys. Lett. 122 (2023) 143503) to counteract mean-square voltage-based (or mean-square current-based) transient attacks targeted at the ideal KLJN framework.

In this study, this same mitigation methodology has been employed to fortify the security of the VMG-KLJN key exchanger. It is worth noting that the protective measures need to be separately implemented for the HL and LH scenarios. This conceptual framework is corroborated through computer simulations, demonstrating that the application of this defensive technique substantially mitigates information leakage to a point of insignificance.

Communicated by Boris M. Grafov

Keywords:

References

1. C. E. Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28 (1949) 656–715. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
2. Y. Liang, H. V. Poor and S. Shamai, Information theoretic security, Foundations Trends Commun. Inform. Theory 5 (2008) 355–580. Crossref, Google Scholar
3. L. B. Kish, Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson (-like) noise and Kirchhoff’s law, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178–182. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
4. A. Cho, Simple noise may stymie spies without quantum weirdness, Science 309 (2005) 2148–2148. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
5. L. B. Kish, The Kish Cypher: The Story of KLJN for Unconditional Security (World Scientific, New Jersey, 2017). Link, Google Scholar
6. L. B. Kish and C. G. Granqvist, On the security of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) communicator, Quant. Inform. Proc. 13 (2014) 2213–2219. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
7. L. B. Kish, D. Abbott and C. G. Granqvist, Critical analysis of the Bennett–Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise scheme, PLoS One 8 (2013) e81810. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
8. H. P. Yuen, Security of quantum key distribution, IEEE Access 4 (2016) 7403842. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
9. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing, in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Computer Systems and Signal Processing, Vol. 1 (Bangalore, India, December 10-12, 1984), pp. 175–179. Google Scholar
10. S. Sajeed, A. Huang, S. Sun, F. Xu, V. Makarov and M. Curty, Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett. 117 (2016) 250505. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
11. H. P. Yuen, Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution, Proc. SPIE 8899 (2013) 88990J. Crossref, Google Scholar
12. O. Hirota, Incompleteness and limit of quantum key distribution theory. Available online arXiv:1208.2106. Google Scholar
13. N. Jain, E. Anisimova, I. Khan, V. Makarov, C. Marquardt and G. Leuchs, Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography, New J. Phys. 16 (2014) 123030. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
14. I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer and V. Makarov, Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system, Nat. Commun. 2, 349 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms1348. Google Scholar
15. L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination, Nat. Photon. 4 (2010) 686–689. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
16. I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, V. Scarani, V. Makarov and C. Kurt-siefer, Experimentally faking the violation of Bell’s inequalities, Phys. Rev. Lett. 107 (2011) 170404. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
17. V. Makarov and J. Skaar, Fakes states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols, Quant. Inform. Comput. 8 (2008) 622–635. Web of Science, Google Scholar
18. C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov and G. Leuchs, After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem, New J. Phys. 13 (2011) 013043. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
19. L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography, Opt. Express 18 (2010) 27938–27954. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
20. N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov and G. Leuchs, Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett. 107 (2011) 110501. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
21. L. Lydersen, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols, J. Mod. Opt. 58 (2011) 680–685. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
22. L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar and V. Makarov, Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination, New J. Phys. 13 (2011) 113042. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
23. L. Lydersen, V. Makarov and J. Skaar, Comment on “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography”, Appl. Phys. Lett. 98 (2011) 231104. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
24. P. Chaiwongkhot, K. B. Kuntz, Y. Zhang, A. Huang, J. P. Bourgoin, S. Sajeed, N. Lütkenhaus, T. Jennewein and V. Makarov, Eavesdropper’s ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence, Phys. Rev. A 99 (2019) 062315. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
25. G. Gras, N. Sultana, A. Huang, T. Jennewein, F. Bussières, V. Makarov and H. Zbinden, Optical control of single-photon negative-feedback avalanche diode detector, J. Appl. Phys. 127 (2020) 094502. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
26. A. Huang, R. Li, V. Egorov, S. Tchouragoulov, K. Kumar and V. Makarov, Laser-damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Appl. 13 (2020) 034017. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
27. A. Huang, Á. Navarrete, S.-H. Sun, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Curty and V. Makarov, Laser-seeding attack in quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Appl. 12 (2019) 064043. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
28. V. Chistiakov, A. Huang, V. Egorov and V. Makarov, Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light, Opt. Express 27 (2019) 32253. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
29. A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov and J. Skaar, Comment on “Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks”, Laser Phys. Lett. 16 (2019) 019401. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
30. A. Huang, S. Barz, E. Andersson and V. Makarov, Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography, New J. Phys. 20 (2018) 103016. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
31. P. V. P. Pinheiro, P. Chaiwongkhot, S. Sajeed, R. T. Horn, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus and V. Makarov, Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography, Opt. Express 26 (2018) 21020. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
32. A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu and V. Makarov, Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states, Phys. Rev. A 98 (2018) 012330. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
33. H. Qin, R. Kumar, V. Makarov and R. Alléaume, Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. A 98 (2018) 012312. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
34. S. Sajeed, C. Minshull, N. Jain and V. Makarov, Invisible Trojan-horse attack, Sci. Rep. 7 (2017) 8403. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
35. P. Chaiwongkhot, S. Sajeed, L. Lydersen and V. Makarov, Finite-key-size effect in commercial plug-and-play QKD system, Quantum Sci. Technol. 2 (2017) 044003. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
36. A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré and V. Makarov, Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption, IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52 (2016) 8000211. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
37. V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull and S. Sajeed, Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage, Phys. Rev. A 94 (2016) 030302. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
38. S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus and V. Makarov, Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch, Phys. Rev. A 91 (2015) 062301. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
39. N. Jain, B. Stiller, I. Khan, V. Makarov, C. Marquardt and G. Leuchs, Risk analysis of Trojan-horse attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems, IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron. 21 (2015) 6600710. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
40. M. G. Tanner, V. Makarov and R. H. Hadfield, Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors, Opt. Express 22 (2014) 6734. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
41. A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen and V. Makarov, Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112 (2014) 070503. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
42. Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, J. Skaar, V. Makarov and I. Gerhardt, A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector, Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85 (2014) 013108. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
43. See https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Quantum-Key-Distribution-QKD-and-Quantum-Cryptography-QC/ for information about why NSA does not support the usage of QKD or QC to protect communications. Google Scholar
44. S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré and V. Makarov, Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing, Phys. Rev. A 91 (2015) 032326. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
45. R. Mingesz, Z. Gingl and L. B. Kish, Johnson(-like)-noise-Kirchhoff-loop based secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges of two to two thousand kilometers, via model-line, Phys. Lett. A 372 (2008) 978–984. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
46. L. B. Kish, Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-noise scheme, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 20 (2013) 191–204. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
47. L. J. Gunn, A. Allison and D. Abbott, A new transient attack on the Kish key distribution system, IEEE Access 3 (2015) 1640–1648. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
48. G. Vadai, Z. Gingl and R. Mingesz, Generalized attack protection in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise key exchanger, IEEE Access 4 (2016) 1141–1147. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
49. G. Vadai, R. Mingesz and Z. Gingl, Generalized Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors, Sci. Rep. 5 (2015) 13653. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
50. S. Ferdous, C. Chamon and L. B. Kish, Comments on the “generalized” KJLN key exchanger with arbitrary resistors: Power, impedance, security, Fluctuation and Noise Lett. 20(1) (2021) 2130002. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
51. S. Ferdous, C. Chamon and L. B. Kish, Current injection and voltage insertion attacks against the VMG-KLJN secure key exchanger, Fluct. Noise Lett. 22 (2023) 2350009. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
52. C. Chamon, S. Ferdous and L. B. Kish, Random number generator attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange protocol, Fluct. Noise Lett. 21 (2022) 2250027. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
53. L. B. Kish and C. G. Granqvist, Comments on “A new transient attack on the Kish key distribution system”, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 23 (2015) 321–331. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
54. L. B. Kish and C. G. Granqvist, Random-resistor-random-temperature Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (RRRT-KLJN) key exchange, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 23 (2016) 3–11. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
55. L. B. Kish and T. Horvath, Notes on recent approaches concerning the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise based secure key exchange, Phys. Lett. A 373 (2009) 2858–2868. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
56. J. Smulko, Performance analysis of the “intelligent Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure key exchange”, Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450024. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
57. R. Mingesz, L. B. Kish, Z. Gingl, C. G. Granqvist, H. Wen, F. Peper, T. Eubanks and G. Schmera, Unconditional security by the laws of classical physics, Metrol. Meas. Syst. XX(1) (2013) 3–16. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
58. T. Horvath, L. B. Kish and J. Scheuer, Effective privacy amplification for secure classical communications, EPL 94 (2011) 28002. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
59. Y. Saez and L. B. Kish, Errors and their mitigation at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange, PLoS One 8 (2013) e81103. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
60. R. Mingesz, G. Vadai and Z. Gingl, What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise key exchange? Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450021. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
61. Y. Saez, L. B. Kish, R. Mingesz, Z. Gingl and C. G. Granqvist, Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange, J. Comput. Electron. 13 (2014) 271–277. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
62. Y. Saez, L. B. Kish, R. Mingesz, Z. Gingl and C. G. Granqvist, Bit errors in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange, Int. J. Mod. Phys. Conf. Ser. 33 (2014) 1460367. Link, Google Scholar
63. Z. Gingl and R. Mingesz, Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise secure communication system, PLoS One 9 (2014) e96109. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
64. L. B. Kish and R. Mingesz, Totally secure classical networks with multipoint telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-like noise, Fluct. Noise Lett. 6 (2006) C9–C21. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
65. L. B. Kish, Methods of using existing wire lines (power lines, phone lines, internet lines) for totally secure classical communication utilizing Kirchoff’s Law and Johnson-like noise, (2006), Available online https://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0610014. Google Scholar
66. L. B. Kish and F. Peper, Information networks secured by the laws of physics, IEICE Trans. Fund. Commun. Electron. Inform. Syst. E95–B5 (2012) 1501–1507. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
67. E. Gonzalez, L. B. Kish, R. S. Balog and P. Enjeti, Information theoretically secure, enhanced Johnson noise based key distribution over the smart grid with switched filters, PLoS One 8 (2013) e70206. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
68. E. Gonzalez, L. B. Kish and R. Balog, Encryption key distribution system and method, U.S. Patent # US9270448B2 (granted 2/2016), https://patents.google.com/patent/US9270448B2. Google Scholar
69. E. Gonzalez, R. Balog, R. Mingesz and L. B. Kish, Unconditionally security for the smart power grids and star networks, 23rd Int. Conf. Noise and Fluctuations (ICNF 2015), 2–5 June, Xian, China, 2015. Crossref, Google Scholar
70. E. Gonzalez, R. S. Balog and L. B. Kish, Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges, Entropy 17 (2015) 2010–2014. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
71. E. Gonzalez and L. B. Kish, Key exchange trust evaluation in peer-to-peer sensor networks with unconditionally secure key exchange, Fluct. Noise Lett. 15 (2016) 1650008. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
72. L. B. Kish and O. Saidi, Unconditionally secure computers, algorithms and hardware, such as memories, processors, keyboards, flash and hard drives, Fluct. Noise Lett. 8 (2008) L95–L98. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
73. L. B. Kish, K. Entesari, C.-G. Granqvist and C. Kwan, Unconditionally secure credit/debit card chip scheme and physical unclonable function, Fluct. Noise Lett. 16 (2017) 1750002. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
74. L. B. Kish and C. Kwan, Physical unclonable function hardware keys utilizing Kirchhoff-law-Johnson noise secure key exchange and noise-based logic, Fluct. Noise Lett. 12 (2013) 1350018. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
75. Y. Saez, X. Cao, L. B. Kish and G. Pesti, Securing vehicle communication systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol, Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450020. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
76. X. Cao, Y. Saez, G. Pesti and L. B. Kish, On KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks, Fluct. Noise Lett. 14 (2015) 1550008. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
77. L. B. Kish and C. G. Granqvist, Enhanced usage of keys obtained by physical, unconditionally secure distributions, Fluct. Noise Lett. 14 (2015) 1550007. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
78. L. B. Kish, Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson (-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based security, Fluct. Noise Lett. 6 (2006) L57–L63. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
79. H. P. Chen, M. Mohammad and L. B. Kish, Current injection attack against the KLJN secure key exchange, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 23 (2016) 173–181. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
80. M. Y. Melhem and L. B. Kish, Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 26 (2019) 607–616. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
81. M. Y. Melhem and L. B. Kish, A static-loop-current attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system, Appl. Sci. 9 (2019) 666. Crossref, Google Scholar
82. M. Y. Melhem and L. B. Kish, The problem of information leak due to parasitic loop currents and voltages in the KLJN secure key exchange scheme, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 26 (2019) 37–40. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
83. F. Hao, Kish’s key exchange scheme is insecure, IEE Proc. Inf. Secur. 153 (2006) 141–142. Crossref, Google Scholar
84. L. B. Kish, Response to Feng Hao’s paper “Kish’s key exchange scheme is insecure”, Fluct. Noise Lett. 6 (2006) C37–C41. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
85. L. B. Kish and J. Scheuer, Noise in the wire: The real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson (-like) noise based secure communicator, Phys. Lett. A 374 (2010) 2140–2142. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
86. L. B. Kish and C.-G. Granqvist, Elimination of a second-law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system, Entropy 16 (2014) 5223–5231. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
87. M. Y. Melhem, C. Chamon, S. Ferdous and L. B. Kish, Alternating (AC) loop current attacks against the kljn secure key exchange scheme, Fluct. Noise Lett. 20(3) (2021) 2150050, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219477521500504. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
88. H.-P. Chen, E. Gonzalez, Y. Saez and L. B. Kish, Cable capacitance attack against the KLJN secure key exchange, Information 6 (2015) 719–732. Crossref, Google Scholar
89. M. Y. Melhem and L. B. Kish, Man in the middle and current injection attacks against the KLJN key exchanger compromised by DC sources, Fluct. Noise Lett. 20(2) (2021) 2150011, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219477521500115. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
90. L. J. Gunn, A. Allison and D. Abbott, A directional wave measurement attack against the Kish key distribution system, Sci. Rep. 4 (2014) 6461. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
91. H.-P. Chen, L. B. Kish and C. G. Granqvist, On the “cracking” scheme in the paper “a directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott, Metrol. Meas. Syst. 21 (2014) 389–400. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
92. H.-P. Chen, L. B. Kish, C.-G. Granqvist and G. Schmera, Do electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? What does physics say?, Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
93. L. B. Kish, Z. Gingl, R. Mingesz, G. Vadai, J. Smulko and C.-G. Granqvist, Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn–Allison–Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system, Fluct. Noise Lett. 14 (2015) 1550011. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
94. P. L. Liu, A complete circuit model for the key distribution system using resistors and noise sources, Fluct. Noise Lett. 19 (2020) 2050012. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
95. P. L. Liu, Re-examination of the cable capacitance in the key distribution system using resistors and noise sources, Fluct. Noise Lett. 16 (2017) 1750025. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
96. P. L. Liu, A key agreement protocol using band-limited random signals and feedback, IEEE J. Lightwave Tech. 27 (2009) 5230–5234. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
97. C. Chamon and L. B. Kish, Perspective — On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security, Appl. Phys. Lett. 119 (2021) 010501. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar
98. C. Chamon, S. Ferdous and L. B. Kish, Deterministic random number generator attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure key exchange protocol, Fluct. Noise Lett. 20(5) (2021) 2150046, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219477521500462. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
99. L. B. Kish, Time synchronization protocol for the KLJN secure key exchange scheme, Fluct. Noise Lett. 21 (2022) 2250046. Link, Web of Science, Google Scholar
100. S. Ferdous and L. B. Kish, Transient attacks against the Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger, Appl. Phys. Lett. 122 (2023) 143503. Crossref, Web of Science, Google Scholar