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Do Political Institutions and Culture Jointly Matter for Financial Development? A Cross-Country Panel Investigation

Deepraj Mukherjee

Kent State University at Stark, North Canton, OH 44720, USA

E-mail Address: dmukherj@kent.edu

Corresponding author.

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and

Nabamita Dutta

University of Wisconsin La Crosse, La Crosse, WI 54601, USA

E-mail Address: ndutta@uwlax.edu

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https://doi.org/10.1515/gej-2012-0028Cited by:4 (Source: Crossref)

Abstract

This article investigates the role of political institutions and culture in creating an efficient financial infrastructure for a country. It further delves into this relationship and addresses the question: do both types of institutions mentioned above affect financial development of a country, jointly? Our findings support the established notion in the literature that institutions matter for financial development. We show both these types of institutions – political institutions and culture – jointly promote financial development. Further, our result stresses that these two types of institutions behave as complements – the presence of efficient political institutions augment the effectiveness of culture and, thus, financial development is enhanced. Our results are robust to various proxies of institutions and alternate estimation models.

Keywords:

References

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