Management of Carbon Emissions via a Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Game
Abstract
This study examines an environmental management strategy to effectively cap greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in an electricity market. To do so, we model a stochastic impulse two-person, nonzero-sum game between a power plant, a representative of electricity production within a country whose primary aim is to maximize profits, and government who is motivated to minimize the social and environmental cost of pollution. We assume that the power plant’s competitive price is equal to the marginal cost whilst the government’s running cost is linear. When the uncontrolled output of GHG emissions evolves as a Geometric Brownian motion, we provide a more dynamic and robust depiction of the interplay between government and the energy sector. We provide solutions to the impulse control problem derived via the quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs). We then present a sufficiency criterion for the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the optimal policy. Ultimately, our use of short-run price competition characterized by strategic supplies for renewable and fossil resources and inclusion of endogenous constraints on production capacity provides a more robust model and an effective framework for the development of policy that allows governments to meet emissions targets whilst guaranteeing energy supply.
