Prophecy: Ben-Gurion and the Ascendency of China

Introduction

Among the few Israeli leaders who revealed an interest in Asia, none comes even close to David Ben-Gurion, former prime minister and the primary founder of Israel. Although he was hardly involved in the actual issues of diplomatic relations with Asian countries, his interest derived from intellectual curiosity and extensive reading, which led not just to exceptional familiarity with Asian history, philosophy, and religion but, primarily, to sharp perceptions and unique prophetic vision, especially about China. Long before anyone else, Western or even Eastern, he anticipated the rise of Asia, notably of China and India — and the decline of the imperialist powers, not just Great Britain but notably the Soviet Union and the gradual weakening of the United States. In today’s perspective, it is significant that he assigned a future leading role to China, an authoritarian government, rather than to India, a democracy.¹

Unlike most other Israelis, his interest in Asia originated in the 1930s, initially with regard to India. In a speech dated August 22, 1930, at a British Empire Workers’ Conference, Ben-Gurion enthusiastically supported India’s struggle for independence led by Gandhi — in the context of the West against the East. “This is not just India’s war,” he told his audience. “All the Eastern people, from one end of Asia to another, successively shake off the yoke of the West and the big question, on which the fate of the world may depend, is: if the emergence and liberation of the East would come by war or peacefully?” His answer, unequivocal, pointed to non-violence, cooperation (primarily among the workers), and consent. Asia, he said, regarded as backward, ignorant, and feeble, had been colonized by Europe, and considered more advanced, civilized, and powerful. “Yet the Asian nations still preserve and keep ancient cultural and spiritual treasures that maybe one day may enlighten all humanity.”²

His interest in Asia continued along these lines after the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. Responding to India’s recognition of Israel on September 17, 1950, Ben-Gurion called it “the most important recognition after that of the United States and the Soviet Union.”³ In his introduction to the Israel Government Yearbook 1952, Ben-Gurion underlined Asia as the home of “the two most numerous races in the world the races of China and India, [that] between them making up almost one half of the entire humankind, and great not only numerically but also in their ancient and original civilizations which have endured for thousands of years, without ebb or interruption, to this day.” He went on to say that of the Asian countries which recently (1947 and 1949) won their freedom, “once again two great and ancient nations, China and India, stride out into independence. Their weight in the scales of humanity is increasing and is likely to tip those scales more yet hereafter.”⁴

Aware that almost none of the Asian classics had been translated into Hebrew, in May 1952 Ben-Gurion initiated a series of world classics, including masterpieces of Indian and Chinese literature. It took years to organize this project, which began to be implemented only in the late 1950s. In 1960, the first Chinese classic was published in Hebrew: Confucius Analects, one of the Four Books.⁵ Mencius, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Dream of the Red Chamber were translated later. This is, perhaps, the only case of a prominent statesman who was not only interested in Asian classics, but also took measures to promote their publication and distribution. In 1953, Ben-Gurion, who called Asia “the homeland of human civilization,” pointed yet again to its forthcoming rise and to the decline of European hegemony. Casting off the yoke of Europe, he predicted, that Asia was on the right course to occupy the place it deserved in terms of its size, population, and spiritual legacy; the weight of these two great and ancient peoples of China and India (“almost half of the human race”), “is growing and increasing in the scales of humanity and may increase even more in the coming days.”⁶

Ben-Gurion’s appreciation of China and the prospects of its growing international role, and his interest, yet marginal involvement, in promoting Sino-Israeli relations, were not reciprocated by Beijing: “the first Israeli government...headed by Ben-Gurion was extremely opposed to the Soviet Union, peace, and the people.”⁷ By that time (December 1953) Ben-Gurion had left the government, but in early November 1955, when he rejoined the government, Beijing had already rejected official relations with Israel.⁸ While the prospects of relations with China diminished, in the following years he became even more interested in Asia in general and India and Burma in particular.

Throughout his life, he continued to appreciate India’s rich literary and religious contributions, and praised notable Indian figures, including Buddha, Rama Krishna, and Mahatma Gandhi. Initially, he admired Nehru, described as “the only ruler in this great continent that maintains real democracy in his country.”⁹ Soon disappointed by Nehru’s refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, Ben-Gurion — who still recognized India’s importance in Asia — became disillusioned about India’s leaders. “As long as Nehru exists, we have no chance to improve relations with India,” he stated on March 16, 1961, and called Minister of Defense Krishna Menon “Israel’s enemy.”¹⁰ In a 1964 interview, following Nehru’s death on May 27, Ben-Gurion reiterated his frustration:

No longer in power, Ben-Gurion was undoubtedly aware that, despite its rejection of official diplomatic relations, India willingly acquired Israeli weapons in its confrontation in 1962 with China, and in 1965 and 1971 with Pakistan.¹² However, always looking forward and basically optimistic, Ben-Gurion concluded: “I am sure that friendship between India and Israel will grow, for we can learn much from each other. It is a pity only that the beginning has been delayed.”¹³ When he died, on December 1, 1973, India still did not have diplomatic relations with Israel but on January 29, 1992, India finally agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, yet only five days after, and probably because, diplomatic relations had been established with China.

Forecasting China’s Potential

Although he occasionally compared Asia’s two giants, Ben-Gurion’s interest in China emerged later, in the late 1950s. By that time the prospects of diplomatic relations with China had practically evaporated,¹⁴ and given that he had not been involved in the exchanges about diplomatic relations with China anyway, his interest in China reflected a universal and multilateral outlook rather than a particular and bilateral one. To be sure, Ben-Gurion held his own views on China, which were different (as on many other issues) from those of Foreign Minister — and later Prime Minister — Moshe Sharett, who succumbed to Washington’s pressure and blocked Israeli relations with China.¹⁵ For Ben-Gurion — who had left the government in late 1953 — this was a mistake, but by that time he was less interested and less influential in the China issue in the narrow sense. Instead, he became interested in the China issue in the wider sense, based on his belief that the key to Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations is not in Israel, nor in China, but in the United States. Put differently, until Washington corrected its colossal error and established relations with China, Israel would be unable to do so.

Speaking at a command center of the Israel Defense Forces in November 1956, he said that the liberation of tens and hundreds of millions colonized Asian peoples was the most important global factor, emphasizing that “while now there are two mighty powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, perhaps in a few years there will be two other great powers, China and India.”¹⁶ Over time, Ben-Gurion perceived China as more important and powerful than India. In a 1958 letter to then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Ben-Gurion noted the difference between East and West and the enormous power available to each side, “and especially I do not ignore the possible impact of Communist China.”¹⁷ By that time, before the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Ben-Gurion had already felt China’s importance but was not yet sure about the nature of its “impact” and international direction. Writing in 1959, he believed that the Cold War would not turn into a Hot War, “although it is still unclear where Communist China, the huge global power, reinforced after the Second World War, is heading.... Would China persevere in its friendship and alliance with its Russian neighbor, or, when the time will come, would try to expand into the vacant territories of its ally and prompt the Soviet Union to join the Western World? This question is still wrapped in the mist of the future.” Whatever China’s choice, Ben-Gurion considered it a “great power.”¹⁸

In his introduction to the Government Yearbook 1961, Ben-Gurion, for the first time, provided a detailed survey of Chinese history and philosophy, saying that “there is no doubt that mighty China, with almost one quarter of human kind... will not be dragged by the Soviet Union and will take its own course....”¹⁹ In 1961 Ben-Gurion did not have to make any predictions about the Sino-Soviet conflict. Cracks had been visible already in 1959, and in July-August 1960 Moscow evacuated all its civilian and military specialists from China.²⁰ But then, he made predictions on issues he could not have known at that time, and no one could even imagine, which were realized long after his death.

He added that China “is now exerting vigorous efforts to catch up with the scientific and technological advancement of the Soviet Union, and the rate of its development since the establishment of the communist regime is much faster than Russia’s rate of development under the communist regime since 1917, and some predict that it will succeed in being equal to Russia in the coming ten years.”²² In the meantime, Ben-Gurion perceived China’s reservations about Moscow’s intention to improve relations with the West, and, barred from the United Nations, “could not easily reconcile to finding itself out of business.”²³

Two years later he elaborated this perception and, for the first time, related the issue of China-Israel relations to the international situation and primarily to the United States, views he had probably held before, but never said:

Although Sino-Israel relations had never been at the top of his agenda, he was aware of the importance of forming relations with China. Indeed, he said, “China does not even recognize Israel, but we should exert ourselves and find ways to the leaders of the Chinese people that undoubtedly would head the Asian continent and perhaps the world in 20 years.”²⁵ By that time (1963–1964) Ben-Gurion began to expose his ideas on China and the United States — articulated heretofore mainly in Hebrew and directed mostly at an Israeli audience — to the outside world, primarily to Washington. At the invitation of the California Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in 1963 Ben-Gurion repeated his prediction in a lecture on “World Democracy”: “I believe that in the next 20 years [1983] China would be the first power in the world, not just because of her size (approximately one billion people), but also because of [her] knowledge, military power, and international influence.... It is without doubt a more important and stable factor than India.”²⁶

No Sustainable World Peace Without the People’s Republic

In 1963, Richard Godwin, director-general of the U.S.-initiated International Peace Corps, met Ben-Gurion in Israel. While Godwin elaborated on President Kennedy’s difficulties in Cuba and South America, Europe, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, Ben-Gurion interrupted him, saying:

Godwin was surprised and underscored Beijing’s hostility and belligerency to the West, and especially to the United States, but Ben-Gurion dismissed his surprise. He briefly recounted the history of Chinese communism and pointed to China’s threat perception, primarily with regard to Taiwan, fed by the violence of their revolution. “However,” he went on, “if President Kennedy would be smart enough to begin launching significant relations with People’s China, and to make it clear to its leaders that he would be ready to contribute to its stabilization and economic consolidation and provide China with technological assistance — China’s communist leaders would consider it the end of their struggle for the recognition of and legitimization of their rule, and the readiness of America to form normal relations with them, through mutual respect and despite contradictory regimes and social conceptions.”²⁸

Godwin remained unconvinced, pointing at China’s radical revolutionary rhetoric and extreme communist ideology, and uncompromising hostility to the West in general and the United States in particular. Relying on the Russian and Soviet precedents, Ben-Gurion replied that as the Soviets accepted coexistence with the Capitalist West, the Chinese phase of revolutionary fermentation would pass much quicker than in the USSR. Unlike the Soviets, he added, China does not threaten the United States and the West geographically and militarily in confrontation regions, or along borders. “The Chinese are a wise and smart people and after their regime is no longer threatened, they will start building their economy and industrialize their country, and, for this, they would be very much in need of information and technology, which they can obtain in the West much more than in the USSR — of course on the basis of “give-and-take” and mutual respect.” He added that China and the Soviet Union still face historical confrontations over territories annexed by Russia, which, to some extent, are much more acute than discords and clash of interest between the United States and the West. China is also concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World. “Therefore, it is clear that if President Kennedy would act to change the balance of hostility and the potential balance of power in the world — he must exert himself and find ways to communicate with China. By this, he would serve not only the interest of the US and the free world — but also the real interest of People’s China.” Godwin was shocked and asked Ben-Gurion: “What do you want me to do about it?” and Ben-Gurion replied: “Give my regards to President Kennedy and tell him about my thoughts about China.” Later, Godwin said: “Ben-Gurion is an extraordinary personality, visionary and original, but I think that on the China issue — he went too far and his attitude is absolutely unrealistic.... He is really dreaming.”²⁹

This was also the conclusion of Sargent Shriver, Kennedy’s brother-in-law and head of the U.S. International Peace Corps, who met Ben-Gurion in August 1963 and January 1964 in Israel. He was given the same advice:

Reportedly, Shriver did not believe his ears, let alone the possibility of creating meaningful communication with China that would entail practical results. He expressed his doubts to Ben-Gurion. It is unclear to what extent Kennedy was aware of Ben-Gurion’s views about China, but by the time he was assassinated in November 1963, initial indications of a changing U.S. and, consequently, international attitudes toward China had begun to sprout.

One of the notable triggers of this change, as well as a reconfirmation of Ben-Gurion’s views on China, was Paris’s recognition of Beijing, and the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations in January 1964. This was the first Western country to establish relations with China in ten years.³¹ On May 23, 1964, Ben-Gurion wrote a letter to Charles de Gaulle, commending him on his diplomatic recognition of the PRC. He began the letter with a compliment: “In the last few months you did something to which I attach a first-rate political importance: you formed friendly relations with China. For a long time, it has seemed to me that America is making a big mistake by practically ostracizing China and blocking its way to the UN, so that China, with 700 million people is allegedly represented by Chiang Kai-shek, who does not represent but himself.”³² He went on to tell de Gaulle that the year before (1963) he sent a written lecture to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in which he underlined “the fatal error America committed in its relations to Communist China.” He repeated his predictions about the Sino-Soviet conflict whose essence, he believed, had little to do with ideology but had originated in the territories plundered by Russia, “that China, whether royal, republican, or communist, does not forget and would never forget.”³³ He then reiterated that within 20 years China would catch up with Russia. “Although Russia has atomic weapons capable of destroying China — or another country, it is not impossible that such weapons will be found in China in the next ten or 20 years.”³⁴ Ben-Gurion could not have known that when he wrote these words, China already had an atomic weapon, first tested 5 months later, in October. Needless to say, he could not have known de Gaulle’s considerations for establishing official relations with the PRC,³⁵ but, instinctively, he must have known and, moreover, believed, that this was the right thing to do, not only in view of French and European interests but also long-term strategic objectives of Israel and the United States.

In a special interview shortly after the French recognition of China, Ben-Gurion said that “very much of our peace hopes depend on China, because the China problem directly affects Soviet behavior. The Soviets cannot march toward coexistence with the West [...] because they are afraid of China’s response,” and therefore try to win Arab goodwill “primarily at the expense of Israel. So here, you can see how the China problem directly affects our peace prospects in the region.” He then sighed lightly and smiled: “For a long time I walk with “Sino-mania” — I was one of the first who accorded decisive weight to the resolution of the China problem, years before de Gaulle.”³⁶ And then he went on:

Prophet of China-U.S. Rapprochement

By that time, Ben-Gurion had become more forthright in his appreciation of China on the one hand, and his criticism of the United States on the other. He underlined that, unlike the other “people’s republics,” established by external forces, Communist China, established by indigenous forces, was not really a member of the Soviet bloc, let alone the Warsaw Pact, and managed to defeat the Kuomintang corrupt armies and government, supported by the United States. He mentioned that at the Versailles Peace Conference following World War I, President Wilson while proclaiming “self-determination,” surrendered to the European colonialists and agreed to transfer former German concessions in Shandong to Japan, instead of returning them to China, where they had belonged. Furthermore, established in 1945 after World War II, the United Nations organization, Ben-Gurion noted, admitted 12 communist countries, whose combined population was half of China’s — but the People’s Republic of China was rejected [by Washington which backed the tiny Republic of Taiwan as the representative of “China”]. Ben-Gurion called it

He reiterated that “there is almost no doubt that within one generation [the Chinese people] will catch up not only with the Soviet Union, but also with the most advanced nations in our time, and if there are deep historical reasons to the quarrel between China and the Soviet Union... there is no true reason to justify the quarrel between the United States and China, except for the different regime.” But, he went on, the different regime should not delay the Americans from providing hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to communist countries, and to cooperate with Russia for the sake of world peace — either under Republican administrations or Democratic ones.³⁹

During 1964, Ben-Gurion held a series of talks with Moshe Pearlman, an English-born Israeli writer, published in early 1965 in a book which included his most detailed views about China thus far.⁴⁰ Asked what should be done toward world peace, he replied instantly: “Undoubtedly, the single major step would be recognition of Communist China by the United States and acceptance of China into the United Nations.”⁴¹ He then tried to understand the reasons for Washington’s hostility to China, a communist government that had defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s pro-American government; joined an alliance with the Soviet Union; claimed Taiwan; and allegedly threatened Southeast Asia. Washington, he said, managed to cope with similar, and even identical problems, related to other countries with which it had established diplomatic relations, and which were “allowed” to join the United Nations — notably, but by no means only, the Soviet Union. Ben-Gurion provided a short history of the emergence of communism in China, independently of the Soviet Union, unlike most other so-called “satellites” whose “communism” had been imposed by Moscow. By the time this book had been published, the Sino-Soviet conflict could no longer be hidden. Moreover, more and more countries, not just Asian and African but also Western, the most recent was France, recognized China. Since this implied that they no longer recognized Taiwan as “China,” they implicitly did not accept the folly that Taiwan could continue representing China in the UN.

Put differently, Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward China reflected not only principles and values but also practicalities. It involved using improved relations with China as a means to reduce Cold War tensions, to accomplish the limited ban on nuclear weapon testing, and even to make U.S.-Soviet rapprochement easier. “But I find it hard to believe that such efforts can succeed so long as the Chinese giant is blackballed.” Summing up his views about the Chinese, Ben-Gurion said:

Later in 1965, Ben-Gurion gave a long interview to Bayne, a member of the American University Field Staff, in which he extensively talked about China.⁴⁴ Ben-Gurion began by assessing Kennedy:

Ben-Gurion’s promotion of Sino-U.S. relations was based not only on the particular importance of China itself but also on the Soviet factor and the implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict for world peace. He implied that the United States and China had common interests against the Soviets. In fact, China is not America’s enemy. “America was the only big country in the 19th century which did nothing against China as some European countries did. On the contrary, America helped China even in the war. General Marshall was there to bring together Chiang Kai-shek with the Communists. He was not against the Communists.”⁴⁵ As he saw it, the United States should not, and perhaps could not, confront China and the Soviets simultaneously. Russia was the real enemy of both. Moscow, which still held Chinese territories (something that China would never forget) was actually afraid of China and this was one reason why global arms reduction would never be accomplished. Asked about the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Ben-Gurion replied: “It was a great achievement. But again, there is China. China did not sign it. The bulk of it is that all the atomic powers take part in it, but one of the greatest of them does not take part.” He thought that “after ten or 20 years [the Chinese] will have as good a bomb as the Russians have.” In fact, precisely 10 months earlier, on October 16, 1964, China had detonated its first atomic bomb.

In 1966, he still argued that the fact that Chiang Kai-shek represented China in the UN was a perversion of the law and an international error. And, at the beginning of a two-volume book he published in 1969 he reiterated: “in Asia the Chinese giant had been liberated, destined to become the mightiest (and perhaps the most developed) in the world in the last quarter of the twentieth century.”⁴⁶ In an interview in 1970, Ben-Gurion again predicted that China would one day become a great power, even though that might take 8, 10, 12 or 14 years. Then he went on:

Ben-Gurion repeated and expanded these views in a letter to Kenneth Triem (July 17, 1970). His belief that China would not be just a great power, but the greatest, reflected his perception of the U.S. slow process of decline, especially against the background of its failure in Vietnam.⁴⁸ Still, in a January 4, 1972, letter to Ogden Reid, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel (1959–1961), he wrote that Western rapprochement with China is a major step to accomplish future world peace.⁴⁹

Conclusion

From the late 1960s, Ben-Gurion’s predictions on China began to be realized, primarily in the global arena, notably in Sino-U.S. relations, but also concerning Israel. In those years Washington and Beijing began to resume their relations, leading in October 1971 to the PRC’s admission to the United Nations (and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council) at the expense of Taiwan, and to U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in January 1979, as Ben-Gurion had anticipated. Although Beijing still rejected diplomatic relations with Israel, despite Israel’s vote for China’s admission to the UN, Ben-Gurion never lost his optimism about Sino-Israeli relations. In 1966, he lamented that Israel did not have many friends in the world, while its enemies had powerful friends like China, which in his view, had belittled the strategic importance of Israel, a small Jewish state with only 2.5 million inhabitants surrounded by millions of hostile Arabs. Ben-Gurion continued to make it clear that China’s hate of Israel was motivated by its efforts to win over the Arabs. “I have no ground to suppose that the Chinese hate us.”⁵⁰ Asked about the implications of improving U.S.-China relations following President Nixon’s visit in February 1972, Ben-Gurion said: “I was always for rapprochement with China.... Israel wants throughout the years to form relations with China – but, to my regret, China did not comply with us.” He was also asked whether the United States “sold” Taiwan to reach an agreement with China and whether it could be concluded that the United States would change its attitude also to other small countries (hinting at Israel) in order to “get along” with the big. Ben-Gurion replied: “Taiwan, to my knowledge, was not yet “sold.”⁵¹ “Not yet” are the most significant word in this sentence, implying that ultimately it would be. Less concerned about Taiwan (then still under Chiang Kai-shek, strongly criticized by Ben-Gurion who died in December 1973, a year and a half before Chiang), Ben-Gurion was primarily concerned about the implications for Israel, and “warned against an excessive reliance on a friendly state, close and strong as it may be.”⁵² As in the case of Taiwan, he meant the United States, based on his own experience: he had defied Washington’s objections when proclaiming the State of Israel on May 14, 1948.

Paradoxically, possibly unknowingly, and certainly implicitly, he used a key element in Mao Zedong Thought: “the theory of contradictions.” Distinguishing between “antagonistic” (or principal) contradictions, and “non-antagonistic” (or secondary) contradictions, Mao insisted on the “correct handling” of these contradictions that is, identifying the first, the principal, on which all the others (the secondary) depend.⁵³ Ben-Gurion realized that whatever blocks there were on the way to Sino-Israeli relations, related either to Israel or to China, they were of secondary significance, meaning that it would be pointless to try to solve them.⁵⁴ Instead, it should be essential to concentrate on the principal block (or contradiction) — namely the United States (which, according to him, had prevented Sino-Israeli relations in the early 1950s). In 1963, he wrote a letter to David Haochen, Israel’s Minister to Burma in the 1950s, who had eagerly promoted relations with China, telling him that his papers further convinced him “that a way should be found to China, and that the US should be brought to change its attitude to this huge country whose influence in the world would inevitably grow year by year.”⁵⁵ Once this problem is solved, all other blocks disrupting Sino-Israel (in fact Asian-Israel) diplomatic relations, will be removed. This is precisely what has happened since the early 1990s. As long as the United States considered China a partner (especially against Moscow), Sino-Israeli relations became friendly and cooperative. But as long as Washington began to consider China a rival, even an enemy (which Ben-Gurion, had he been alive, would regard as stupid and, moreover, self-harming), Sino-Israeli relations have also deteriorated, mainly because of U.S. pressure on Israel not only to stop its military relations with China but also limit its technological, scientific, and economic exchanges.⁵⁶ To improve Sino-Israeli relations, as well as promote world peace, Ben-Gurion would have insisted that Washington should revoke its hostility to China.

Notes