Narrow Results

This article analyzes different cultures of corruption with regard to their evolutionary stability, i.e. their ability to annihilate small disturbances in the equilibria between corrupt and noncorrupt agents. The article starts with the development of an evolutionary model of the interactions between corrupt and noncorrupt citizens and functionaries of the state, which is subsequently explored by formal analyses and computer simulation. It turns out that zero-corruption is always evolutionarily stable, whereas pervasive corruption displays only conditional evolutionary stability and thus is empirically rare. Between these two extremes there is organized bureaucratic corruption, which is in most cases quasi-stable with fluctuations around an equilibrium representing the coexistence of corrupt and noncorrupt agents. Empirical analyses of corruption data from 89 countries seem to corroborate these theoretical insights.

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, there has been an almost complete intellectual triumph of the twin principles of marketization (understood here as referring to the liberalization of domestic markets and freer international mobility of goods, services, financial capital and perhaps more arguably, labour) and democratization. A paradigm shift of this extent and magnitude would not have occurred in the absence of some broad consensus among policymakers and (sections of) intellectuals around the globe on the desirability of such a change. There seems to be a two-fold causal nexus between marketization and democracy. The first is more direct, stemming from the fact of both systems sharing certain common values and attitudes. But there is also a second more indirect chain from marketization to democracy, which is predicated via three sub-chains (i) from marketization to growth, (ii) from growth to overall material development welfare and (iii) from material development to social welfare and democracy. We examine each of these sub-links in detail with a view to obtaining a greater understanding of the hypothesized role of free markets in promoting democracies. In the later part of the paper, we examine the socio-economic outcomes governing the quality of democracy in a specifically Indian context.

Corruption is widespread in Bangladesh. According to a report of the international watchdog Transparency International, during 2001–2005, Bangladesh was the most corrupt country in the world. How to combat corruption in Bangladesh is now an important agenda for both international donor agencies and the government. Using game theory, this paper proposes that a successful reduction in corruption to a tolerable level in the government sector depends on a reduction in both incentives to and opportunities for corruption by government employees, and this can be done by raising salaries and introducing strong punishment simultaneously. To introduce an effective and strong punishment system, independent, and strong anti-corruption bodies and strong commitment from political leaders are the essential conditions.