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Indonesia, Southeast Asia's most populous state and its largest economy, was deeply affected by the economic crisis of 1997–1998. Its economic contraction in 1998, of over 13%, was the sharpest among all four crisis-affected East Asian economies. This followed three decades of virtually uninterrupted, rapid economic growth. The country's economic crisis was accompanied by regime collapse, resulting in the departure of then President Suharto after 32 years of authoritarian rule. This paper examines the country's socioeconomic development in the decade since the crisis, in the context of the earlier growth, and the very different institutions of economic governance operating under the new democratic regime of weakened central authority and many more economic policy actors. The main conclusions are that growth and macroeconomic stability have been restored surprisingly quickly, but that microeconomic policy and the investment climate are less predictable.

This paper first provides a brief review of the global financial tsunami. It then explains why the quantitative easing in the US and the unique characteristics of the Asian property markets have contributed to the formation of property bubbles in some Asian economies. Thereafter, it discusses the possibility of a bursting of property bubbles in Hong Kong, Singapore or another Asian economy a few years from now, and highlights that the bursting of the property bubble in that economy could trigger severe corrections of property prices in this region through the contagion effect. After pointing out that the implied crisis could be more severe than that during the Asian Financial Crisis, it (i) discusses policies that could mitigate the damages of the potential crisis and (ii) draws important lessons and conclusions that could pre-empt similar disasters in the future.

Due to rigid rules, incomplete institutions and concentration on short-run fiscal discipline, economic and institutional diversity and insufficient reforms caused the progressive segmentation of the Eurozone. Insufficient integration process is due to lack of trust among member countries and the need to keep a hard budget constraint of national budgets to avoid uncontrolled inflationary pressure and moral hazard. Although understandable in the short run, this situation is causing serious economic and social costs and damages to the development of vulnerable countries. The paper enquires possible solutions to this dangerous stalemate, that could also provide useful suggestions for other countries.

This paper investigates the impact of foreign bank entry on Thai domestic banks by using panel data on 17 domestic commercial banks from 1990 to 2002. The study examines different factors affecting bank performance, including changes in the foreign ownership of banks, financial regulations, and market structure. The results show that an increase in the presence of foreign banks has led to a rise in overhead expenses, a decline in profits, and an increase in the interest spreads of domestic banks. In the short run, increased competition from foreign banks seems to have negative effects on domestic banks.

This work aims to inspect the common debate about the implication of derivative instruments in amplifying the last financial crisis. To reach this goal, the study chooses a sample of banks entirely from emerging countries — over the whole period 2003–2011 — in which we examine the impact of derivatives simultaneously on performance, risk and stability during the ordinary period “the pre-crisis period”, 2003–2006, and the unstable period “the crisis and post crisis period”, 2007–2011. The regressions are estimated by generalized methods of moments (GMM) as developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The major conclusion reveals that only swaps can be considered as implicated in the intensification of the last financial crisis. Therefore, the rest of derivatives instruments cannot be responsible in the amplification of the recent financial crisis. Indeed, the widespread idea accusing all derivatives to be in part responsible of the intensification of the last financial crisis should be revised.

In this paper, we compare the performance of Islamic stock indices (ISI) and conventional stock indices (CSI) from FTSE, DJ, MSCI, S&Ps and Jakarta series using common risk-return metrics. The sample consists of 64 ISI and CSI, and covers the period from 2002 to 2017. The majority of the stock indices are from the Pacific Rim countries’ stock markets. Additionally, we employ the GARCH-M model to examine the impact of past volatility on spot returns. Findings suggest that the ISI are less sensitive to the average market movements compared to the CSI, but surprisingly offer similar raw returns suggesting primary support for the low risk-high return paradox. On further examination, results reveal that M², Omega, Sharpe and Treynor measures indicate that ISI underperform CSI while Jensen’s alpha and Sortino ratio put ISI ahead of CSI. Moreover, findings show that pre-crisis winners (CSI) were losers during the 2008 crisis but subsequently recovered and ended up with higher returns than ISI. Findings also show that the previous volatility of stock returns can be potentially used for predicting future returns.

This chapter examines the impact of COVID-19 news in the USA on the volatility of financial markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) zone. We examine the effect of surprises from financial markets announcements relating to new, confirmed, and death cases of COVID-19 in each country in the sample. We use the GARCH (1.1) specification by incorporating the surprise component in the estimated model during the period from January 1, 2019 until December 31, 2020. The empirical findings show that the evolution of the daily returns and volatilities of the stock indexes of the MENA zone used in our research shows very significant peaks in particular in the first three months of 2020 during the most significant spread of the COVID-19 epidemic. We show that the announcements of new cases of COVID-19 in the United States (NCUSA) have a significant impact on the Lebanon stock index and on Tunisia’s stock index. Announcements of confirmed cases (CCUSA) of COVID-19 present a relative and insignificant impact on all stock market indices of the MENA zone used in our research. Finally, the announcements of the death cases of COVID-19 in the United States (DCUSA) have a significant impact on the stock market index of Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. This chapter is the first to examine the effect of surprises from financial markets announcements relating to new, confirmed, and death cases of COVID-19 on the volatility of financial markets in the MENA zone.