Narrow Results

Globalization enhances efficiency and economic growth and expands the domain of personal contact and communication. Nonetheless, globalization has also evoked discontent because of claimed social injustice. The relation between globalization and social justice therefore merits attention, in order to identify whether justifications for discontent are present and, if there are reasons for discontent, to establish whether globalization should be blamed.

In this paper, we attempt to shed light on whether Japanese households are rational or if their behavior is influenced by culture and social norms by examining their saving and bequest behavior. To summarize our main findings, we find that Japan’s household saving rate showed great volatility, was often low and even negative and was high only during the 25-year period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s (if we exclude the war years) and that we can explain the high level of, and trends over time in, Japan’s household saving rate via various socioeconomic and policy variables. This seems to suggest that the Japanese are not a saving-loving people and that their saving behavior is not governed by culture and social norms. Moreover, the bequest behavior of the Japanese suggests that they are less altruistic toward their children and less reliant on their children than other peoples, suggesting that the alleged social norm of strong family ties in Japan is largely a myth, and that the Japanese do not appear to be appreciably more concerned about the continuation of the family line or the family business than other peoples, suggesting that the influence of the “ie” (family) system is apparently not so pervasive either. However, we argue that these findings do not necessarily mean that culture and social norms do not matter.

It is a basic consensus that culture affects savings, but the empirical evidence is inadequate. This paper investigates the relationship between culture and savings by using the Hofstede cultural indices, and macro data across 48 countries over the period 1990–2013. The results show that country-fixed effects are highly significant, even if traditional variables are controlled for. We discover that culture can explain much of these individual effects and thus is very important in explaining differences in savings across countries. We use the method of Relative Importance Analysis (RIA) to measure the relative importance of the various cultural dimensions in affecting saving rates. We find that culture-related variables are among the most important saving determinants, along with other variables more commonly used in the economics literature, such as economic growth, social security, and demographics.

Prior studies on the relationship between culture and discretionary disclosure fail to account for concurrent managerial incentives to reveal private information to the capital market. Our study extends the literature by investigating whether these managerial incentives offset the cultural influence on managers’ discretionary disclosure decisions. To this end, we exploit a setting in which managers have the discretion to influence both the quantity and quality of disclosure and can thereby either conceal or reveal private information. For a sample of European firms, we find that despite incentives to reveal private information, managers’ culturally determined preference for secrecy leads them to provide a low quantity as well as a lower quality of disclosure. Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks and demonstrate the relative importance of cultural influence on discretionary disclosure decisions.

This study tests the effect of unbalanced power distance (PD) (i.e., Hofstede’s cultural dimensions PD index) and individual stock price crash risk. We examine the stock price behavior of listed firms in 37 countries from 2004 to 2016 and use multivariate analyses to document that societal PD is important in explaining firms’ propensity to release accounting information. This propensity suggests a psychological tendency regarding timing management, particularly for bad news. As countries with large PD prefer to keep things under control, the result is fewer unexpected stock price crashes during the long windows between election events. However, because large-PD countries focus their markets on maintaining temporary peace before and during periods of political events (i.e., national elections), crash risk increases after the political event window. Consistent with these predictions, we find that in large-PD countries, companies generally have less incentive to hide negative information and thus generate stock price crashes. This situation is substantially changed during the postpolitical windows, when firms and ways of spreading information are more controlled by the government. Our findings suggest that formal mechanisms alone are insufficient to explain the behaviors of corporate disclosure that are entangled with informal instruments.

Synopsis

The research problem

This paper explores the association between postmaterialistic culture and corporate tax-avoidance behavior.

Motivation

Although corporate tax avoidance is prevalent, the degree of tax avoidance varies across countries. Previous studies have suggested that national culture is associated with the level of tax avoidance (e.g., corruption culture in [DeBacker, J., Heim, B. T., & Tran, A. (2015). Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 122–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.009], and societal trust in [Kanagaretnam, K., Lee, J., Lim, C. Y., & Lobo, G. J. (2018). Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance. Review of Accounting Studies, 23(4), 1588–1628. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-018-9466-y], among others). Unlike prior studies focusing on longstanding cultural factors, this paper examined the association between corporate tax avoidance and an important current culture trend, i.e., postmaterialistic culture.

The test hypotheses

There is no association between postmaterialistic culture and corporate tax avoidance.

Target population

Various stakeholders that care about corporate tax avoidance including the government, policymakers, investors, auditors, and firm managers.

Adopted methodology

Linear Probability Model and Ordinary Least Squares regressions.

Analyses

We examined the association between postmaterialistic culture and corporate tax-avoidance behavior. We used a proprietary dataset of China tax audits spanning the 2011–2014 period and tested the moderating effect of tax enforcement. We also examined the external validity of our results using a cross-country sample from 21 countries over the 1993–2014 period.

Findings

Using a proprietary dataset of China tax audits, we found that firms owned by investors from countries with higher postmaterialism values were less likely to engage in tax-avoidance behavior in China. In addition, we found some evidence that the negative association between postmaterialism and tax avoidance is more pronounced when tax enforcement is stronger, indicating that national culture and formal institutions act as complements. To check the external validity of our main results, we further used a cross-country sample from 21 countries over 22 years. The evidence from the cross-country sample was consistent with the findings obtained from the China tax audits setting.

Synopsis

The research problem

In this study, we investigated the relationship between future-time reference (FTR) in languages and goodwill impairment.

Motivation

Previous studies on goodwill have focused mainly on firms’ economic and reporting incentives in single-country settings using economic theories. There have been recent calls for more research on goodwill accounting across countries (d’Arcy and Tarca, 2018), and greater use of behavioral theories in goodwill accounting studies (Amel-Zadeh et al., 2021). In response, we applied the linguistic relativity hypothesis to a new and highly significant area of future-oriented behavior (impairment decision) to explain cross-country variations in goodwill impairment reporting.

The test hypotheses

We hypothesized that firms in countries that use weak-FTR languages have higher levels of (and greater quality) goodwill impairment than those in countries that use strong-FTR languages.

Target population

We used a sample of 15,179 firm-year observations taken from firms reporting under IFRS across 21 countries for the fiscal years 2005–2018.

Adopted methodology

We used Tobit regressions, logit regressions, mixed-effects modeling, and propensity score-matching analyses for robustness.

Analyses

We tested the relationship between FTR in languages and (a) goodwill impairment decisions, (b) goodwill impairment amounts, and (c) abnormal goodwill impairments. We repeated our main analyses using several subsamples, different measures of FTR, and alternative regression specifications.

Findings

In line with the linguistic relativity hypothesis, our findings indicate that managers who speak weak-FTR languages are more willing to bear the costs of their impairment decisions in the present and are less motivated to shift current impairment into future accounting periods. In contrast, speakers of strong-FTR languages tend to delay the recognition of current impairments to future periods to reduce their anxiety about the negative effects of current impairment decisions. Findings from further analyses indicate that firms in weak-FTR countries report lower abnormal goodwill impairment, thereby bringing impairment levels closer to their normal optimal levels. Our inferences are robust to alternative samples, different measures of FTR, and alternative model specifications.

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.