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We examine the impact of pandemics on equilibrium in an integrated epidemic-economy model with production. Two types of technologies are considered: a neo-classical technology and one capturing the notion of time-to-produce. The impact of a shelter-in-place policy with and without layoffs is studied. The paper documents adjustments in interest rate, market price of risk, stock market and real wage as the epidemic propagates. It shows the qualitative effects of a shelter-in-place policy in the model are consistent with the patterns displayed by the stock market and real wage during the COVID-19 outbreak. Puzzles emerging from the analysis are outlined.

We develop an equilibrium model for market impact of trades when investors with private signals execute via a trading desk. Fat tails in the signal distribution lead to a power law for price impact, while the impact is logarithmic for lighter tails. Moreover, the tail distribution of the equilibrium trade volume obeys a power law. The spread decreases with the degree of noise trading and increases with the number of insiders. In case of a monopolistic insider, the last slice traded against the limit order book is priced at the fundamental value of the asset reminiscent of the Kyle models in continuous time. However, competition among insiders leads to aggressive trading, hence vanishing profit in the limit. The model also predicts that the order book flattens as the amount of noise trading increases converging to a model with proportional transactions costs with non-vanishing spread.

In a recent article [4], we have developed a market model where an insider trades using future information on the value of the underlying, through these trades it creates an effect on the drift of the underlying model. We find points of partial equilibria. That is, when the filtration is fixed the chosen portfolio is optimal, leads to finite utility of the insider and prices are semimartingales in their own filtration. In this article, we treat two explicit examples in detail. The first is an insider which has a medium term effect on the price. The second is an insider which has a long term effect on the price with memory effects. These examples were quoted in [4] but no details were given.

Utility indifference pricing is an effective method for investors to construct a strategy in an incomplete market. In fact, if an investor can trade a random endowment under the criteria shown by utility indifference pricing, they can devise financial contracts that are optimized according to their preferences. However, because it does not have the direct implication of equilibrium, the value of the random endowment given by indifference pricing is not necessarily the same as the market price. In this study, we attempt to derive the equilibrium of random endowment under the framework of indifference pricing. However, letting the utility function be of exponential type means that any trade involving random endowment will not appear in equilibrium. Thus, we show that non-zero trade in equilibrium appears by introducing uncertainty in a model, which is one of the sources of market incompleteness.