Narrow Results

Construction procurement is a key business where price negotiation is commonly required to reach final contractual agreement. However, even simple negotiations often result in infeasible agreements. The uncertain and limited supplier information as well as complex correlations among various factors affecting supplier behaviors make the contractor difficult to decide the appropriate offer price (OP) and vice versa. This study proposes a novel Fuzzy Bayesian Game Model (FBGM) for improving the prediction effectiveness of negotiation behaviors. The performance of the proposed FBGM was evaluated in the case where an agent uses the counter-OP of an opponent to learn the negotiation strategy of the opponent. The validation analysis shows that the sequential updating process of FBGM significantly improves the estimation ability of negotiators. The proposed model also gives a comprehensive view of negotiation scenarios by considering all possible negotiation cases. Using FBGM, negotiators can apply flexible strategies to optimize their own profit with a reasonable negotiation time.