Narrow Results

This paper takes the social unrest in 2019 as a case study and identifies three factors that contributed to the radicalization of social protests in Hong Kong: globalization, digitalization and the U.S. meddling in Hong Kong affairs. First, with the deepening of globalization, the worsening of social-economic conditions had bred populism among the youth. Second, digital technologies and social media platforms also made it easy for young people in Hong Kong to protest in a more covert and radical way. Third, the U.S. support for the Hong Kong opposition leaders added fuel to the radicalization of youth protesters. All these factors finally led to radicalized social protests in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, following the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong SAR, violent activities were largely stopped and social order was gradually restored.

The author, a British academic who was President of the University of Hong Kong between 2014 and 2018, discusses the Belt and Road initiative and the Greater Bay Area plan, particularly focusing on the possible implications for the higher education sector in China and beyond.

The newly released “Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA)” shows that the roles of the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao GBA have gone beyond its original emphasis on regional economic development and now serves higher purposes in fostering the ongoing process of deepening reforms in China, and in meeting the challenges in the Chinese-led “Belt and Road Initiative”. Whereas earlier policy on cross-border collaborations and the previous literature often emphasize “harmonization” and “integration” of the diverse institutions and practices of the constituent cities into one economy, this paper suggests an alternative perspective highlighting the utility of institutional contradictions and diversity contained in the “one country, two system” framework within the GBA. Leveraging the advantages of its more internationalized special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao, the GBA plan would not only benefit this coastal megalopolis, but also stimulate a dynamic mechanism of reform in the whole country.

Many discussions on Hong Kong’s social movements rightfully focus on the internal and external political factors that are influential in shaping the recent political events. This paper examines selective important political deve-lopments related to the subject matter and does not pretend to be comprehensive on the subject matter. While contextualizing Hong Kong’s recent unrest in political events, we are simultaneously also interested to de-privilege political factors as the sole explanation for the social movements and highlight a functional and highly utilitarian reason for the social turmoil, which is that of high housing prices and social disenfranchisement. It was the twin impacts of political changes as well as housing grievances (along with other bread and butter issues) that became a volatile cocktail in concocting the social unrest and public expressions of discontent. The central and local HK governments cannot homogenize a single uniform response to the challenges of globalization, in terms of both clamoring for democratization and economic egalitarianism. This paper therefore argues that there is a differential effectiveness of China’s/HK’s responses to economic globalization’s inequities and addressing the pro-democrat demands.

To understand various ideas/concepts/views about the Sino-Hong Kong (HK) relations, this paper utilizes the case study of their bilateral cooperation in coping with the COVID-19 fourth wave to study the various collaborative strategies applied in managing common challenges like a recurring wave of pandemic outbreak in the setting of Hong Kong. The materials utilized for the paper are updated secondary resources from the mass media due to the ongoing nature of the pandemic at the point of writing. Utilizing interpretive work, this paper compares some features of Sino-HK cooperation with the different schools of thought to suggest different priorities at play when forging bilateral cooperation to meet a common challenge. It also highlights the constant navigation of interests between Lam’s administration and Beijing. Some contours of such bilateral cooperation may even be indicative of how the two governments may cooperate in the future, especially in the issues of common interests and of no-detriment nature.

This paper examines the case studies of three East Asian entities (Thailand, Myanmar and Hong Kong) battling both the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic as well as socio-political unrest simultaneously. While Thailand/Myanmar and Hong Kong are different in geographical/demographic sizes and the former two are sovereign states while the latter is a Special Administrative Region (SAR), they have similar challenges in experiencing cosmopolitan pro-democracy movements (made up of young activists) pitted against the governments determined to maintain control in what political scientists may characterize as illiberal political systems. While Thailand and Myanmar may be much larger in terms of geographical/demographic sizes, much of the recent political activism occurred in the capital city of Bangkok (a city of about 8 million people) and Yangon (also having about 7 million in population and being the former capital of Myanmar before the military elites had moved the capital to Naypyidaw in anticipation of political unrests). In the case of Myanmar, the demonstration and protests have effectively spread nationwide. Both cities are similar in size to Hong Kong that is with approximately 7 million inhabitants. Both Bangkok and Hong Kong are also cosmopolitan cities with high exposure to global commerce, ideas and tourism while Yangon is a fast-developing urban commercial capital city. In terms of ideologies and political systems, both Bangkok and Hong Kong have nominal liberal democratic systems that have limits imposed on political freedoms while Myanmar was liberalizing and democratizing before the military coup on February 1, 2020. These similarities make them suitable candidates for comparative studies, including analyzing their differences in managing the political challenges.

Chinese grand infrastructure projects in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) program are instrumental for Myanmar to bridge the voluminous bottlenecks in transportation and energy infrastructure essential for economic development. However, the high project costs as well as the project design and execution have raised skepticism over their benefits for Myanmar, in particular the economic viability and disruptive impacts for the local ecology and culture. The military coup in February 2021 in Myanmar deepened the skepticism to the Chinese and even outright hostilities to some projects. This paper reviews the broader context of the local receptions to the Chinese investment, drawing upon in-depth fieldwork in Myanmar, and suggests the potentials of leveraging Hong Kong’s managerial and professional experience in enhancing responsible investment in the BRI.

Sitting in the middle of the Indian Ocean and major international maritime routes, Sri Lanka’s strategic geographic location has brought both opportunities and complications to its economic development. In view of the mixed outcome and perceptions of the Chinese investment projects in Sri Lanka, this paper investigates the nuances of both successful and failed experiences in Chinese investment, and the management approach the Chinese project managers have sought to adapt to improve their community engagements and secure public support. While these efforts have not, largely, been effective, we also find little evidence that China has conspired to dominate Sri Lanka. By refuting the sweeping debt-trap argument, we further seek to reflect upon Hong Kong’s possible role in addressing the critical managerial and capacity issues in Sri Lankan investment.