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Firm size has been empirically found to be strongly positively related to capital structure. This paper investigates whether a dynamic capital structure model can explain the cross-sectional size–leverage relationship. The driving force that we consider is the presence of fixed costs of external financing that lead to infrequent restructuring and create a wedge between small and large firms. We find four firm-size effects on leverage. Small firms choose higher leverage at the moment of refinancing to compensate for less frequent rebalancings. Their longer waiting times between refinancings lead to lower levels of leverage at the end of restructuring periods. Within one refinancing cycle, the intertemporal relationship between leverage and firm size is negative. Finally, there is a mass of firms opting for no leverage. The analysis of dynamic economy demonstrates that in cross-section, the relationship between leverage and size is positive and thus fixed costs of financing contribute to the explanation of the stylized size–leverage relationship. However, the relationship changes sign when we control for the presence of unlevered firms.

This paper addresses the following question: Are banks special firms that can achieve their goals only with high leverage, above and beyond what is considered acceptable for industrial corporations?

This question is related to the issue of the cost of capital and how it is affected by leverage. If we accept the Modigliani–Miller (M&M) theorem (1958), then the capital structure is irrelevant for both the cost of capital and the value of the bank. Specifically, the M&M hypothesis argues that higher levels of equity capital reduce bank leverage and risk, leading to an offsetting decline in banks’ cost of equity capital. Hence, we ask the question whether banks are special firms such that M&M theorem does not apply to banks.

We show that M&M propositions cannot be applied for banks primarily because of explicit guarantees and subsidies that provide incentives for increasing leverage. Then, some of the risk faced by the bank is transferred at no cost to the providers of these guarantees and subsidies, giving banks the incentive to increase leverage as much as they can. We show that under perfect market conditions, when risk is fairly priced, this opportunity vanishes.

We study policies that regulate executive compensation in a model that jointly determines executives’ effort, compensation and firm leverage. The market failure that justifies regulation is that executives are optimistic about asset prices in states of distress. We show that shareholders propose compensation packages that lead to socially excessive leverage. Say-on-pay regulation does not reduce the incentives for leverage. Regulating the structure of compensation (but not its level) with a cap on the ratio of variable-to-fixed pay delivers the right leverage. However, it is more efficient to directly regulate leverage because restricting the variable compensation impacts managerial effort more than if shareholders are free to design compensation subject to a leverage constraint.

The integration of two merging firms takes time to complete, and synergy gains from a merger can be captured only after the firms go through a costly and often lengthy post-merger integration period. This paper presents a dynamic model of capital structure for the target firm and the acquirer to examine the effects of the integration period on acquiring firms’ financing behavior around mergers. The model generates predictions that provide rational (non-behavioral) explanations for documented empirical evidence regarding leverage dynamics around mergers. When anticipating a longer and costlier integration period, acquiring firms strategically plan ahead by choosing a lower leverage prior to and at the time of the merger, and gradually lever up as the post-merger integration process nears completion. Deals with longer integration periods are financed with a larger fraction of equity. The model also implies that acquiring firms optimally time takeovers of underleveraged firms that experience negative shocks to their earnings.

Does policy uncertainty affect productivity? Policy uncertainty creates delays on decision-making as firms await new information about prices, costs, and other market conditions before committing resources. Such delays can have real consequences on firms’ productivity and corporate decisions. We find that economic policy uncertainty has a negative impact on firm-level productivity. We further show that the negative impact is alleviated by firms’ high cash holdings or prior committed irreversible investments. These findings are robust to various specifications.