Narrow Results

South Korea launched electricity reform in the 1990s but had continued to struggle with instituting an effective free market. In order to bolster economic growth, the development of the electricity industry has long been a fundamental issue for the state. The case in Korea is distinctive because it is part of a large-scale privatization project as the political regime had just shifted to democracy. The state spun off and corporatized the state-owned power enterprise with very limited privatization. The Korean government has chosen to control the power companies as the largest shareholder. Nonetheless, the reform process was suspended in 2004 without encountering major problems. This has created a major puzzle for analysts: why did the reform result in this outcome? I argue that as a politically driven reform project, power reform in Korea was destined to fail. The economic and social responses elicited by reform implementation all contributed to the failure of the power reform. This paper describes the dynamics of Korea’s electricity reform and details the industrial restructuring during the reform. It examines the political logic of the reform and how it shaped the power industry and in turn led to a stalled agenda. The paper concludes with a discussion of the broader implications for the roles of the state, industrial policy, and state-business relations.

After undergoing a series of mass demonstrations during the past three decades, including the 2016–2017 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, many commentators in South Korea are confident that their country has become a land for what Karl Marx called “free men.” Korean citizens are portrayed as being ready to participate in voluntary political associations and collective actions and to pursue their interests in the public sphere. However, the data are showing the opposite to be true: citizen participation in public-sphere activities has substantially decreased since the mid-2000s, while the government has managed to improve or at least maintain its political responsiveness during the same period. Explaining the unnoticed background to this imbalance, this essay sheds light on the myth of the benefactor state in Korean democracy, arguing that this has emerged because neoliberalism has not only placed an increasing number of people in precarious positions but also neutralized them politically. The Korean government has capitalized on this situation to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable administrative capacity to take care of precarious people. By investigating the period of Park’s presidency (2013–2017) and the current rule of President Moon Jae-in (2017–), this essay shows how the myth of the benefactor state has emerged and created a unique cycle of Korean democracy.

In the past few decades, post-democratization politics in South Korea have witnessed an upsurge in authoritarian nostalgia, called the “Park Jung-hee syndrome.” This paper examines the origins of public nostalgia for the authoritarian dictator by putting two theoretical arguments, i.e., the socialization thesis and the system output thesis, to an empirical test. This paper utilizes the 2010 Korea Democracy Barometer from the Korea Barometer and the 2010 and the 2015 Korean National Identity Survey from the East Asia Institute. The empirical analysis of the South Korean case strongly supports the political socialization argument, suggesting that citizens’ yearning for Park Jung-hee is not merely an outcome of the negative evaluations of the democratic governments’ performances. Rather, their authoritarian nostalgia is in large part an outcome of their political socialization during the Park dictatorship. The analysis implies that, although a resurgence of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization South Korea is not expected to derail the country’s route to democratic deepening, it may continue to be a main source of political division in partisan and electoral politics in the future.

“Middle powers,” variously defined, have served relevant and significant roles in the post-WWII regional and global orders, facilitated by structural conditions of “long peace” among great powers and proactive leadership by and among creative middle powers. Within the complex Asia-Pacific security order, “middle powers” such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea have had the “space” to engage the non-like minded and advance multilateralism with security guarantees from the US. However, Beijing and Washington today are eliminating this space and its associated choices for middle-power diplomacy by increasingly characterizing their rivalry as a confrontation of “existential threats” between incompatible “civilizations” and securitizing trade and technology. China and the US are each selectively ignoring or purposely eroding key aspects of a rules-based international order. This paper highlights the dilemmas of South Korea, Australia, and Canada, middle powers who have found themselves individually and collectively “stuck” facing contradictory global and regional policy choices.

The idea that a change of government can alter the foreign policy orientation of a state is nothing new in international relations. This paper presents a preliminary investigation into the causal linkages between domestic political regime changes and foreign policy restructuring in Malaysia and South Korea. It assumes that regime changes allow for a greater propensity for the recalibration of foreign policy interests. Since the effectiveness of any bilateral cooperation depends on successful formulation and implementation, this paper dissects the transition, convergence and challenges in bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Both Mahathir Mohamad and Moon Jae-in saw a necessity to diversify economic partners that had resulted from the policies of previous administrations. While the basic elements of their foreign policy remained the same, both Malaysia and South Korea reevaluated their policies with regard to the international issues affecting their domestic interests. While relations had once been transactional at best, the convergence of the Look East Policy (LEP) 2.0 and the New Southern Policy (NSP) advanced bilateral relations for 22 months until the collapse of Mahathir’s government in 2020.

This study aims to examine South Korean middle power diplomacy discourses using premodern Korea’s diplomatic thinking-cum-practice of sadae (serving the great) as a heuristic device. It is argued that current discourses of South Korea as a middle power resonate with sadae because they strive to secure the existing liberal international order led by the West and the United States. It also argues that it is both necessary and healthy for South Korean middle power diplomacy studies to denaturalize its self-evident faith in the existing liberal international order—a not universal but particular order among several possible others in history—with South Korea celebrating and appropriating liberal values. This would prepare South Korean middle power diplomacy research to tackle uncertainty, difference, and pluralism in global politics while producing more responsible and responsive scholarship in international relations.