Narrow Results

We refute a physical model, recently proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf], to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be fundamentally flawed because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates not only the wave equation but also the second law of thermodynamics, the principle of detailed balance, Boltzmann's energy equipartition theorem, and Planck's formula by implying infinitely strong blackbody radiation. We deduce the correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA's experimental interpretation is incorrect too.