Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research

This paper studies a competitive Hotelling-style market with two symmetric banks that decide the pricing and location of their automated teller machines (ATMs). Two different systems are considered: An unregulated model wherein banks are allowed to set surcharges, and a regulated model in which surcharges are banned. We derive equilibrium outcomes and compare them in the two systems, and find that banks always maintain a certain distance between ATMs. That distance is larger, indeed maximized, under the regulatory scheme. We also show that, surprisingly, banks always perform better in the regulated model, while consumers may be worse off.

Costs of many items drop systematically throughout their life-cycles, due to advances in technology and competition. Motivated by the management of service parts for some high-tech products, this paper studies inventory decisions for such items. In a periodic review setting with stochastic demand, we model the purchasing costs of successive periods as a stochastic and decreasing sequence. Unit selling price of the item is determined as some mark-up of the purchasing cost and, hence, will change over time as well. We consider two specific mark-up models: (1) purchasing cost plus constant-dollar-amount mark-up, and (2) purchasing cost plus constant-percentage mark-up. To maximize the total discounted expected profit, we derive conditions under which myopic policies are optimal for the systems.

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.

The Internet is becoming increasingly important as a sales channel. Thus, most large retail firms have adopted a multi-channel strategy that includes both web-based channels and pre-existing offline channels. In this paper, we consider joint pricing and inventory/production decision problems for members in a monopoly two-stage dual-channel retailer supply chain. For a dual-channel retailer, pricing in one channel will affect the demand in the other channel. This subsequently affects the retailer's replenishment (ordering) decisions, which have an impact on the producer's inventory/production plans and wholesale price decisions. It is clear then that pricing decisions and inventory/production decisions are interacting in each member of the supply chain and among the members in the chain as well. In this paper, we analyze joint pricing and inventory/production problems under three scenarios by incorporating intra-product line price interaction in the EOQ model. We show that a unique equilibrium exists under certain realistic conditions. We also provide numerical results that offer insights for pricing strategies for the dual-channel retailer supply chain and for product design for different channels.

We model the impact of information visibility in a two-level supply chain consisting of independent retailers who share upstream supply. The manufacturer supplies similar products to the two retailers and each retailer serves its independent end market. Retailers face one period of demand and satisfy the demand by ordering in the first period or back-ordering some of the demand and satisfying it in the second period. The wholesale price in the second period is decreasing in the total order size across the two retailers in the first period. This decrease in wholesale price captures the market learning effect of aggregate orders that has been extensively documented in empirical literature. We use a game-theoretic framework to investigate the ex-ante incentives for retailers to share their private demand information. We show that: (1) retailers have no incentives to share information about their private values when equilibrium order quantities are interior, i.e., the order size is between zero and the demand; (2) partial information sharing may be the equilibrium strategy for retailers when equilibrium order quantities are binding on the demand. Finally, numerical examples are provided for illustration. This paper thus identifies conditions under which different levels of information sharing may be the equilibrium outcomes in a supply chain.

With the rapid expansion of global business, newer suppliers with cheaper but possibly unreliable technologies have entered the marketplace to win orders from buyer firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. We model the procurement problem as a Nash game where the buyer has to allocate its purchases between an expensive but reliable supplier, and a cheaper but unreliable supplier. The suppliers specify prices for different proportions of the order awarded to them. Our analysis shows that, when perfect information is available about the reliability level of the unreliable supplier, the Nash equilibrium is a sole-sourcing allocation and that the supplier selection decision depends on the reliability and cost differentials between the two suppliers. In addition, we model the case when the buyer and the reliable supplier have limited information about the reliability of the unreliable supplier. Even in such an asymmetric scenario, the buyer's equilibrium allocation is a sole-sourcing outcome, but depending on system conditions either a separating or a pooling equilibrium is possible. An interesting insight into the effect of information asymmetry is that it can result in higher or lower profits/costs for the channel partners (compared to the perfect information case). As such, the buyer may even benefit from information asymmetry regarding unreliable supplier due to its impact on the degree of competition between the two suppliers.

Operational decisions of a monopolist firm affect expected social welfare, a fact typically ignored by OM models. Specifically, the price selected directly affects the consumer surplus, which has to be added to firm's profit to find the social welfare. We assume an uncertain, price-sensitive, demand. Production capacity is selected at the outset, but the price is chosen after demand uncertainty realized itself. This model was proposed by Van Mieghem and Dada (1999), but we extend it to other demand functions. We then compute the resulting consumer surplus. Finally, we consider such issues in a decentralized supply chain with revenue sharing.

In this paper, we investigate joint optimal capacity investment, pricing and production decisions for a multinational manufacturer who faces exchange rate uncertainties. We consider a manufacturer who sells its product in both domestic and foreign markets over a multiperiod season. Because of long-lead times, the capacity investment must be committed before the selling season begins. The exchange rate between the two countries fluctuates across periods and the demand in both markets are price dependent. Our model considers three scenarios: (1) early commitment to price and quantity with central sourcing, (2) postponement of prices and quantities with central sourcing, and (3) local sourcing. We derive the optimal capacity and the optimal prices for each scenario, and investigate the impact of the exchange rate parameters and the length of the selling season. We observe that while the price and production decisions in the domestic market are independent of the exchange rate under early commitment and local sourcing scenarios, the exchange rate between two countries directly impacts these decisions under the postponement setting. We identify thresholds and gain insights on capacity and production costs, exchange rate movement, and selling season length for the choice of entering a foreign market under all scenarios.