Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research

In industrial 4.0 era, many advanced technologies, such as blockchain, advanced robotics, additive manufacturing, the Internet of Things, machine learning, and artificial intelligence, have received considerable attention in industry and academia. In real practice, such technologies have been implemented by firms, and they play an important role in increasing the operational efficiency of the firms as well as the whole supply chain through Operational Research (OR) methods. Thus, it is critical to consider the impacts of advanced technologies on supply chain management with OR applications. This special issue explores new practices and applications of technology-driven supply chain management in Industry 4.0. This editorial note summarizes the discussions on applications of different technologies in supply chains. Moreover, we list important future research directions based on contributed papers.

Today, supply chain operations have entered the Industry 4.0 era. Technologies, such as blockchain, big-data, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing and cloud-computing, are all hot topics. Motivated by their importance, in this paper, we conduct a review of the closely related literature in the well-established mainstream operational research (OR) journals. From our research, we first examine the OR literature on Industry 4.0 related studies. Then we classify the technology-operations-related literature into three major categories, namely, information technologies for supply chain operations, technologies for sustainable operations, and technologies for production operations. Various less popular areas on technology-driven operations in supply chains, namely, technology licensing and outsourcing (TLO), online data, and risk, finance and security (RFS), are also examined. From the reviews, we identify the major research gaps. After that, we establish a future research agenda. We believed that this paper lays the foundation for further OR studies on technology-driven supply chain management in the Industry 4.0 era.

Frequent problems of counterfeiting have spawned consumer demands to monitor the entire supply chain. The application of blockchain technology with anti-counterfeiting and traceability can improve the reliability and authenticity of product information and eliminate consumer doubts about product quality. Furthermore, based on the transparency of blockchain technology, brand suppliers can independently obtain the market demand information through information sharing. This paper introduces a consumer suspicion coefficient to illustrate the application of blockchain technology in the supply chain. Considering product authenticity verification and information sharing, we study the optimal pricing and product quality decisions in a two-level supply chain under the following three scenarios: (1) no blockchain technology, a traditional supply chain, and no information sharing (case TN); (2) no blockchain technology but a traditional supply chain with information sharing (case TS); and (3) a supply chain based on blockchain technology (case BT). We find that when the consumer suspicion coefficient increases, consumers will have limited faith in the authenticity of the product, which will affect the retailer’s optimal decision and profit. By comparing the equilibrium results of several cases, we also find that demand information sharing by the retailer may not achieve a win-win outcome in a decentralized channel in the absence of blockchain technology. Under demand information sharing based on blockchain technology, however, if the consumer suspicion coefficient exceeds a certain threshold, the brand supplier and retailer can achieve a win–win outcome. In addition, the extended models reveal that in a centralized supply chain, regardless of the state of market demand, blockchain technology can always improve product quality and retail price and optimize supply chain profit.

The supply chain of shipping logistics services is an important branch of logistics service supply chain. To ensure the effective operation of the supply chain and to solve problems such as asymmetric information, difficult data quality assurance, and uncontrollable transportation in shipping logistics services, blockchain technology are proposed to reduce information interaction problems. In view of the factors of information sharing and customers’ sensitivity to information quality, a tripartite evolutionary game model with the shipping company, the port and the freight forwarder as the research objects was established, and the cooperative decision making of node companies was discussed before and after the application of blockchain technology. Theoretical derivation and data analysis show that ports and freight forwarder in the supply chain of shipping logistics services dominated by shipping companies are less affected by information sharing and customers’ sensitivity to information quality. With the increase in the application of blockchain technology, when customers have lower expectations for information quality, shipping companies are more willing to cooperate actively. The willingness to cooperate actively between ports and shipping companies is increasing faster than when blockchain technology is not used. Therefore, shipping companies should encourage the active use of blockchain technology to reduce the degree of information sharing between ports and freight forwarder and the influences of customer expectations on shipping companies.

Copycat issues and unreliable purchasing agents have challenged cross-border consumption and hurt the brands and online platforms significantly. We explicate a setting in which a platform orders from a brand, then sells and competes with the purchasing agents in an overseas market. Worried about the copycat issues, consumers undertake risk when purchasing from both platforms and agents. The blockchain adoption may help release this uncertainty by purchasing from a platform. We show the values and impacts of this new technology on the platform, brand and consumers. It is interesting to observe that the platform does not always have incentive to adopt blockchain, even if it is costless. In the presence of blockchain, we show that the revenue sharing, two-part tariff and profit sharing contracts can achieve supply chain coordination, but the cost sharing contract fails to do so. In the extended models, we discuss what will happen when the brand decides domestic retail price and the platform links optional information nodes to blockchain.

In this paper, we conduct an incentive study on the adoption of the blockchain technology in a two-period model with retailer’s use of strategic inventory. Without the adoption of the blockchain technology, the retailer has private information regarding the market size. We investigate the retailer’s voluntary signaling decisions via his pricing and strategic inventory decisions. We determine the retailer’s equilibrium price and the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price. Both separating and pooling equilibria are discussed, and the unique lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium is identified. With the adoption of the blockchain technology, there is no information asymmetric between the supply chain members. We find that the manufacturer has the incentive to adopt the blockchain technology when the demand uncertainty is moderate to high, and the retailer has the incentive to adopt the blockchain technology when the demand uncertainty is low or high. When the manufacturer and the retailer have a misalignment in the adoption of the technology, a central planner can help to achieve coordination.

Traditionally, firms often run independent promotional activities to attract consumers and improve their competitiveness. With the rapid development of three-dimensional (3D) printing, also known as additive manufacturing, a growing number of firms in different markets cooperate to conduct cooperative promotion to meet consumer demand. Different from independent promotion, which means that firms promote their products through their individual promotional activities, when they carry out cooperative promotion, in addition to their individual promotional activities, they also carry out a series of cooperative promotional activities to promote their products. For such cross-market cooperation, it is of importance to consider the unit cost of production and the promotion cost to achieve competitive advantage and sustainability of the supply chain. We develop game-theoretic models to investigate the factors that make firms pursue cooperative promotion and how cooperative promotion affects their optimal decisions. We find that whether or not the firms join cooperative promotion mainly depends on the impacts of price, individual promotional activities, and cooperative promotional activities on demand, as well as the unit cost of production. Whether or not firms are willing to make more contribution to cooperative promotion depends on the difference between the efforts of individual promotional activities and cooperative promotional activities. In addition, as the consumer demand for the product increases, the firms will also increase their investments in cooperative and independent promotional activities. Moreover, as the unit cost of production and the impact of cooperative promotional activities on demand change, pursuing cooperative promotion is not necessarily more profitable than pursuing independent promotion.

This paper describes the interaction between major and auxiliary container transport carriers (MCs and ACs) by using evolutionary game theory models, enabling them to cooperate and share information under sufficient penalties and incentives. The MCs are generally logistics service integrators, mega shipping companies, and port authorities, which affect the regulations and technology innovation much, while the ACs are rest carriers and logistics service providers. Evolutionary games are used to study the cooperative behavior between MCs and ACs in the shipping industry. As indicated by analytical studies, the cooperation between MCs and ACs will be invalid without introducing blockchain technology for adequate supervision. In peak season, an evolutionary equilibrium incurs between MCs and ACs under cooperation or non-cooperation behavior strategies. However, in off-seasons, the evolutionary equilibrium is unique in which both parties choose not to cooperate. When introducing blockchain technology for supervision, the carriers will cooperate in peak and off-seasons. Besides, through a simulation analysis of the established models, the results show that the introduction of blockchain technology can enable carriers to form cooperative alliances, resolve inefficient operations, and achieve a long-term stable equilibrium strategy. We can also apply the results for reference to the regional shipping industry.

Component suppliers and manufacturers in a supply chain have long faced different dilemmas. The component supplier intends to adopt new technologies to reduce production costs, but the new technologies usually require significant investment costs. The encroachment into retailing can bring more revenue to manufacturers, but the significant costs of establishing and maintaining direct channels and the potential conflicting interests with the retailer might discourage the manufacturer’s encroachment. This study aims to address these dilemmas facing the component supplier and manufacturer by investigating an interesting scenario in which they both can obtain benefits. Within the given context, the manufacturer’s encroachment increases the order of the components, which motivates the supplier to make more technological investments to reduce production costs. The reduction of component costs enables suppliers and manufacturers to reduce the wholesale prices of components and final products. In this case, the manufacturer’s encroachment can benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer. This study is one of the first to investigate how the interaction between the manufacturer and supplier helps solve their respective dilemmas and provide benefits to the whole supply chain. Additionally, we extend the literature on manufacturer encroachment on retailers by considering supplier investment in cost-reduction production.

Online-to-Offline service platforms are rising with the development of e-commerce and the increasing need for service. Taking the hospitality and tourism industries as typical examples, this paper considers a platform service supply chain, where a leading hotel is responsible for offline service, and a following platform is in charge of pricing, online service, and advertising investment. Three decision modes (i.e., decentralized, cost-sharing, and integrated) for the platform service supply chain are investigated. We derive the optimal service levels for the hotel and the platform, advertising investment, and retail price in each mode. Our analyses indicate that perceived service quality and brand image vary over time, and they gradually converge to a steady-state. The cost-sharing mode can be achieved if the hotel can obtain enough profit per unit. Once the cost-sharing mode is achieved, it can help improve perceived service quality and brand image, which further increases both the hotel and the platform’s profits. However, the integrated mode generates the best-perceived service quality, brand image, supply chain performance, and the lowest price.

The development of emerging technologies, such as advanced information system, social media, and blockchain, has significantly changed consumers’ behaviors in relation to online purchase. Having access to the historical price information, consumers are able to compare the current price with the historical prices and may raise fairness concerns in the comparison process. We investigate the impacts of consumers’ fairness concerns on retailers’ pricing strategies in a two-stage model. We show that when the retailer uses uniform pricing strategy, consumers’ fairness concerns induce the retailer to decrease product price. As a consequence, the market demand expands and the retailer’s profit reduces. When the retailer adopts multi-stage pricing strategy, we find that consumers’ fairness concerns are not always harmful to the retailer’s profit. Under certain conditions, the retailer can benefit from consumers’ fairness concerns. Particularly, the product price in the first period increases, but the price in the second period and the market demand could be increased or decreased, depending on the situations.

This paper focuses on the impact of radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology adoption on supply chain coordination. We consider a three-tier supply chain consisting of one supplier, one transporter and one retailer with centralized and decentralized decision-making. Considering the factors of RFID tag cost and product freshness, two scenarios — with RFID and without RFID — are analyzed. In the decentralized supply chain, a revenue-sharing contract is established to explore each partner’s decisions on ordering quantity, wholesale price and profits. The results show that (1) the tag cost of RFID has different effects on the pricing decisions, ordering quantity and profit of an FPSC, and if the amount of transportation time compression increases, the range of the tag cost’s boundary value will be wider when adopting RFID technology; (2) when the members of an FPSC choose the optimal wholesale price, optimal initial fare and appropriate revenue-sharing coefficient, the FPSC can achieve a win–win result; and (3) the amount of transportation time compression has a positive correlation with the expected profit of the supplier, transporter and retailer but has a negative correlation with loss of the product.