International Journal of Machine Consciousness

Whole brain emulation aims to re-implement functions of a mind in another computational substrate with the precision needed to predict the natural development of active states in as much as the influence of random processes allows. Furthermore, brain emulation does not present a possible model of a function, but rather presents the actual implementation of that function, based on the details of the circuitry of a specific brain. We introduce a notation for the representations of mind state, mind transition functions and transition update functions, for which elements and their relations must be quantified in accordance with measurements in the biological substrate. To discover the limits of significance in terms of the temporal and spatial resolution of measurements, we point out the importance of brain region and task specific constraints, as well as the importance of in-vivo measurements. We summarize further problems that need to be addressed.

I outline some recent developments in the field of neural prosthesis concerning functional replacement of brain parts. Noting that functional replacement of brain parts could conceivably lead to a form of "mind-substrate transfer" (defined herein), I briefly review other proposed approaches to mind-substrate transfer then I propose a framework in which to place these approaches, classifying them along two axes: top-down versus bottom-up, and on-line versus off-line; I outline a further hypothetical approach suggested by this framework. I argue that underlying technological questions about mind-substrate transfer, there is a fundamental question which concerns our beliefs about continuity of identity.

Whole brain emulation aims to re-implement functions of a mind in another computational substrate by carefully emulating the function of fundamental components, and by copying the connectivity between those components. The precision with which this is done must enable prediction of the natural development of active states. To accomplish this, in vivo measurements at large scale and high resolution are critically important. We propose a set of requirements for these empirical measurements. We then outline general methods leading to acquisition of a structural and functional connectome, and to the characterization of responses at large scale and high resolution. Finally, we describe two new project developments that tackle the problem of functional recording in vivo, namely the "molecular ticker-tape" and the integrated-circuit "Cyborcell".

Whole brain emulation (WBE) has been, for a long time, the subject of interest for many science fiction productions and a subject for debate for many philosophers. This is one of the reasons why many mainstream scientists have remained skeptical about a scientifically sound approach to it. Whole brain emulation might be considered more complex than it actually is because of all the philosophical and methodological issues that people have been pointing out in the last decade. However, not everything that every brain and computer scientist had ever said needs to be taken into account when designing a realistic brain emulation system. In this paper I would like to give a brief overview of the relevant research for WBE coming from the neurosciences and how it can be combined with other disciplines in order to achieve the goals of WBE.

The goal of uploading a human mind into a computer is far beyond today's technology. But exactly how far? Here I review our best cognitive and neuroscience model of the mind and show that it is well suited to provide a framework to answer this question. The model suggests that our unique "software" is mainly digital in nature and is stored redundantly in the brain's synaptic connectivity matrix (i.e., our Connectome) in a way that should allow a copy to be successfully simulated. I review the resolution necessary for extracting this Connectome and conclude that today's FIBSEM technique already meets this requirement. I then sketch out a process capable of reducing a chemically-fixed, plastic-embedded brain into a set of tapes containing 20 × 20 micron tissue pillars optimally sized for automated FIBSEM imaging, and show how these tapes could be distributed among a large number of imaging machines to accomplish the task of extracting a Connectome. The scale of such an endeavor makes it impractical, but a version of this scheme utilizing a reduced number of imaging machines would allow for the creation of a "Connectome Observatory" — an important tool for neuroscience and a key milestone for mind uploading.

Neuronanorobotics, a promising future medical technology, may provide the ultimate tool for achieving comprehensive non-destructive real-time in vivo monitoring of the many information channels in the human brain. This paper focuses on the electrical information channel and employs a novel electrophysiological approach to estimate the data rate requirements, calculated to be (5.52 ± 1.13) × 10¹⁶ bits/sec in an entire living human brain, for acquiring, transmitting, and storing single-neuron electrical information using medical nanorobots, corresponding to an estimated synaptic-processed spike rate of (4.31 ± 0.86) × 10¹⁵ spikes/sec.

The Terasem Mind Uploading Experiment is a multi-decade test of the comparability of single person actual human consciousness as assessed by expert psychological review of their digitized interactions with same person purported human consciousness as assessed by expert psychological interviews of personality software that draws upon a database comprised of the original actual person's digitized interactions. The experiment is based upon a hypothesis that the paper analyzes for its conformance with scientific testability in accordance with the criteria set forth by Karl Popper. Strengths and weaknesses of both the hypothesis and the experiment are assessed in terms of other tests of digital consciousness, scientific rigor and good clinical practices. Recommendations for improvement include stronger parametrization of endpoint assessment and better attention to compliance with informed consent in the event there is emergence of software-based consciousness.

A research study that obtained questionnaire data via mobile communications from 3,267 residents of all 50 US states illustrates how personality capture can be accomplished in a manner suitable for later emulation inside a virtual world or comparable computer system by means of artificial intelligence agents calibrated to match the personality profiles of specific people. This was the most recent step in a research project that had already developed methods for computer administration of massive questionnaires, and it focused on one of the most prominent models of personality, the so-called Big Five dimensions. The key innovation of mobile data collection will allow efficient personality capture at low cost in effort to the individual, and thus with greater ultimate accuracy because of the very large number of diverse measures that can be obtained. Factor analysis of the data shows how it is possible to develop a flexible system for aggregation of measures that can be adapted to emulation across a changing array of environments.

What does it mean for one mind to be a different version of another one, or a natural continuation of another one? Or put differently: when can two minds sensibly be considered versions of one another? This question occurs in relation to mind uploading, where one wants to be able to assess whether an approximate upload constitutes a genuine continuation of the uploaded mind or not. It also occurs in the context of the rapid mental growth that is likely to follow mind uploading, at least in some cases — here the question is, when is growth so rapid or discontinuous as to cause the new state of the mind to no longer be sensibly considerable as a continuation of the previous one? Provisional answers to these questions are sketched, using mathematical tools drawn from category theory and probability theory. It is argued that if a mind's growth is "approximately smooth", in a certain sense, then there will be "continuity of self" and the mind will have a rough comprehension of its growth and change process as it occurs. The treatment is somewhat abstract, and intended to point a direction for ongoing research rather than as a definitive practical solution. These ideas may have practical value in future, however, for those whose values favor neither strict self-preservation nor unrestricted growth, but rather growth that is constrained to be at least quasi-comprehensible to the minds doing the growing.

The progressing cyborgization of the human body reaches its completion point when the entire body can be replaced by uploading individual minds to a less vulnerable and limited substrate, thus achieving "digital immortality" for the uploaded self. The paper questions the philosophical assumptions that are being made when mind-uploading is thought a realistic possibility. I will argue that we have little reason to suppose that an exact functional copy of the brain will actually produce similar phenomenological effects (if any at all), and even less reason to believe that the uploaded mind, even if similar, will be the same self as the one on whose brain it was modeled.

The potential for the near-future development of two technologies — artificial forms of intelligence, as well as the ability to "upload" human minds into artificial forms — raises several ethical questions regarding the proper treatment and understanding of these artificial minds. The crux of the dilemma is whether or not such creations should be accorded the same rights we currently grant humans, and this question seems to hinge upon whether they will exhibit their own "subjectivity", or internal viewpoints. Recognizing this as the essential factor yields some ethical guidance, but these issues need further exploration before such technologies become available.

Drawing on Charles Stross's recent trans-humanist, science fiction novel, Accelerando, I argue that phenomenology can play an important supplementary role in arguments for the hypothesis of extended cognition — the view that the mind might sometimes extend beyond the skull. In their initial arguments for this hypothesis Clark and Chalmers [Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. [1998] "The extended mind," Analysis58(1), 7–19], deliberately downplay the role of phenomenology, emphasizing third person, functionalist reasons for it. However, passages from Stross's novel suggest that feasible, extra-cranial cognitive technology will have dramatic effects on phenomenology. Such "trans-human" phenomenology will likely eliminate intuitive resistance to the hypothesis of extended cognition, thereby supporting functionalist arguments for it. Although this is not sufficient to establish that consciousness itself might extend beyond the skull, I also argue that any view on which consciousness supervenes on the functional properties of the nervous system, like Chalmers, D. [1996] The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, New York) and Baars, B. [1988] A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK); Baars, B. [1997] In the Theatre of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, New York); Baars, B. [2002] The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence, Trends in Cognitive Science6, 47–52; Baars, B. [2003] How brain reveals mind: Neuroimaging supports the central role of conscious experience, Journal of Consciousness Studies10, 100–114, must accept this possibility.

Transhumanists tend to have a commitment to materialism and naturalism but nonetheless pursue goals traditionally associated with religious ideologies, such as the quest for immortality. Some hope to achieve immortality through the application of a technology whereby the brain is scanned and the person "uploaded" to a computer. This process is typically described as "transferring" one's mind to a computer. I argue that, while the technology may be feasible, uploading will not succeed because it in fact does not "transfer" a mind at all and will not preserve personal identity. Transhumanist hopes for such transfer ironically rely on treating the mind dualistically — and inconsistently with materialism — as the functional equivalent of a soul, as is evidenced by a carefully examination of the language used to describe and defend uploading. In this sense, transhumanist thought unwittingly contains remnants of dualistic and religious concepts.

In this paper, we explore from several angles the possibility, and practicality, of one of the major tenets of the transhumanist movement — the intention to upload human minds to computers. The first part of the paper assumes that mind-uploading is possible and will become quite commonplace in the near (21st century) future a là Ray Kurzweil and cohorts. This assumption allows us to explore several of its problematic implications for personal identity, especially the effects it will have on questions of duty, responsibility, interpersonal relationships, and culpability in the case of crime. In the second part of the paper, we take a deeper and more critical look at whether mind-uploading is indeed metaphysically possible, and offer some neurobiologically-inspired arguments against its feasibility.

The function of the brain is intricately woven into the fabric of time. Functions such as (i) storing and accessing past memories, (ii) dealing with immediate sensorimotor needs in the present, and (iii) projecting into the future for goal-directed behavior are good examples of how key brain processes are integrated into time. Moreover, it can even seem that the brain generates time (in the psychological sense, not in the physical sense) since, without the brain, a living organism cannot have the notion of past nor future. When combined with an evolutionary perspective, this seemingly straightforward idea that the brain enables the conceptualization of past and future can lead to deeper insights into the principles of brain function, including that of consciousness. In this paper, we systematically investigate, through simulated evolution of artificial neural networks, conditions for the emergence of past and future in simple neural architectures, and discuss the implications of our findings for consciousness and mind uploading.

I survey four categories of factors that might give a digital mind, such as an upload or an artificial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modification of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape of hardware growth curves, as well as the ease of modifying minds, are found to have a major impact on how quickly a digital mind may take advantage of these factors.

We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where artificial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly as parts of the biological brain integrate with each other. An exocortex may also prove to be the easiest route for mind uploading, as a person's personality gradually moves away from the aging biological brain onto the exocortex. Memories might also be copied and shared even without minds being permanently merged. Over time, the borders of personal identity may become loose or even unnecessary.