Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies

We assess the role of financial reforms and liberalization in Korea's financial crisis, which erupted in late 1997. We first examine financial reforms carried out since the early 1980s and their effects on corporate financing as well as on the current account. We then analyze policy issues associated with the current financial crisis. Our main conclusion is that the crisis is due in no small measure to the unbalanced nature of Korea's financial reforms — extensive external liberalization combined with inadequate internal liberalization. The massive inflow of foreign capital associated with external liberalization exacerbated the over-investment problem that already existed in the 1970s. The inefficiencies of Korea's manufacturing corporations and financial institutions mutually reinforced each other, producing a vicious cycle of ever lower productivity of capital. The key to Korea's recovery thus lies in successful restructuring of both its financial and corporate sectors.

In this paper we report returns for initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and investigate some characteristics found in other countries to affect returns, specifically offer size, firm age, and industry grouping. For a sample of 104 IPOs during the 11-year period 1987 through 1997, we find average initial returns of 22.69 percent. We do not find that offer size, firm age, or industry groupings affect IPO underpricing and conclude from our findings that underwriters who price Philippine IPOs face different regulatory policies, contractual mechanisms, market conditions than those present in other markets.

In the present study the variance-ratio test developed by Lo and MacKinlay (1988, and 1989) is applied to monthly stock index returns of five Asian markets that are in different stages of development. The markets examined are Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. Although previous studies have examined the efficiency issues of the markets in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Taiwan, the empirical evidence is often contradictory. The current study looks at the efficiency issues of these markets over a sufficiently long period of time (November 1986 — December 1995) using more appropriate methodology and type of data. Also, this study is the first to provide new evidence on an emerging market in Asia — Bangladesh. Results reported in this study indicate that the index return series of all the sample markets except Sri Lanka do follow a random walk.

This paper presents a stochastic financial model from which one can derive the optimal reserves ratio for stabilizing price level. It is shown that the optimal reserves ratio is a function of the structure of unanticipated shocks to liquid asset market and high-powered money market. An important policy implication, drawn from my model, suggests that it may help for the stabilization of price level if a lower level of the reserve requirements was adopted by the central bank when the shock exists solely in liquid asset market. An application of the presented model to the financial assets in Taiwan suggests that the optimal reserves ratio for stabilizing price level is approximately 5.7717 per cent in the case of the 2-SLS estimation, and 4.2442 per cent in the case of the SUR estimation, below the weighted average of actual 7.7575 per cent up to the end of 1997. The empirical findings further suggest Taiwan's monetary authority would thus have to accept a lower level of the reserve requirements in order to reduce the price fluctuations.

Quantitative estimates show that India's nuclear tests caused important economic damage to India and its neighbors, Pakistan and China. Pakistan's tests caused further economic damage to all three countries. In response to India's tests, India's stock market fell by 7.26 percent, Pakistan's by 10.59 percent and China's by 2.70 percent. In response to Pakistan's tests, India's stock market fell by another 5.57 percent, Pakistan's by 16.82 percent and China's by 3.93 percent. Overall, the two countries' tests caused India's stock market to fall by 12.83 percent, Pakistan's by 27.41 percent and China's by 6.63 percent. Some argue that going nuclear increased India and Pakistan's national security and their international political standing. In the financial markets' opinion, these tests caused major reductions in both countries' economic security, and harmed China's economic security. The tests had no important effects on the Group of Ten countries' stock markets; thus, the tests' economic effects seem for the moment of be confined to southern Asia.

This research attempts to uncover the presence of various stock market seasonalities on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX). We find that most of the seasonal effects exist on the JSX, except for the January effect. There is a day-of-the-week effect with low Tuesday and high Friday returns. The "twist" effect is confirmed with a negative Tuesday return following a market decline in the previous week. The Tuesday "Rogalski" effect is present, with Tuesday return being positive in the month of January and negative for the other months. The monthly, turn-of-the-month, turn-of-the-year and pre-holiday effects are also confirmed in recent sub-periods after the reforms of the JSX in 1988.

This paper documents the differences between best efforts and firm commitment U.S. IPOs and looks for evidence of the Sherman (1992) market feedback theory. A probit model of the contract choice is estimated. Best efforts offerings are shown to be, on average, smaller offerings from smaller, younger companies, many of them start-ups. They have higher average initial returns and a higher variance of initial returns, and they are less likely to include shares sold by insiders. The data is consistent with the implications of the market feedback theory.

This paper discusses financial policy as it relates to the Asian financial crisis. The paper is divided into three parts. First, I discuss some of the concrete measures taken by the ROC government in the face of the financial crisis. Second, I would like to outline our continuing efforts at financial reform. Finally, I conclude with some comments on what we may expect in the days to come, along with some general conclusions.