The Singapore Economic Review

This paper examines to what extent macroprudential policies in the Turkish banking sector affected the functioning of depositor discipline. Our results suggest that depositors’ responses for poor bank performance get stronger after the 2008 crisis, when various macroprudential measures were implemented to preserve financial stability. In the aftermath of the crisis, bank behavior toward depositors also alters. Ahead of the crisis, banks did not significantly respond to the discipline exerted by depositors, however, banks begin offering higher rates to curb deposit withdrawals afterwards. Our findings suggest that the implementation of macroprudential tools seem to have a positive impact on financial stability, since, in the post-2008 period, regulatory supervision have been more firmly assisted by the market.

We extend the work of Bernanke and Kuttner [(2005). What explains the stock market’s reaction to federal reserve policy? Journal of Finance, 60, 1221–1257] by examining the impact of monetary shocks and policy tools on aggregate stock returns as well as the stock returns of financial institutions during the recent period of quantitative easing (QE) in the US. Specially, we test for the effectiveness of a major non-conventional monetary policy tool, the use of special asset purchase programs by the Federal Reserve, in impacting the financial markets. Estimates from vector auto-regression (VAR) analyses show that the impact of both unexpected and expected monetary shocks on aggregate stock returns is magnified several times during periods of QE. In addition, traditional monetary policy tools, like the Federal Funds rate, have no impact on aggregate stock returns, neither leading up to, nor during QE, while our non-conventional policy measure does appear to have some impact. In an extension of our results, we find that unexpected monetary shocks have an increased marginal impact on the stock returns of financial firms during QE. In addition, the stock returns of financial institutions have significant reactions to both changes in non-conventional monetary policy tools and announcements surrounding non-conventional policy actions.

Since the start of the global financial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has faced exceptional challenges in fulfilling its price stability mandate, marking the start of a new era of monetary policy-making for the eurozone. This paper reviews the ECB’s evolving response from mid-2007 to early-2015, showing how it combined the standard tool of adjusting its policy interest rates with non-standard passive and active balance-sheet measures, accompanied by a forward guidance of its intended monetary stance. Altogether, the ECB stayed focused on price stability while fulfilling the two classical roles of lender of last resort to resolve money market tensions and market maker of last resort to repair monetary transmission. Addressing the many challenges was complicated by the nexus between fragile banks and vulnerable governments, the ensuing financial fragmentation and the complex institutional and political structure of the eurozone. Looking ahead, the new reinforced European financial architecture could make the ECB’s monetary policy task of maintaining price stability for the eurozone easier to accomplish.

We survey the possible costs of the unconventional monetary policy measures undertaken by major central banks after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. We argue that these costs are not easily discernable in the new Keynesian (NK) model, which defines a theoretical framework for monetary policy. First, the costs may result from the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures on the intensity of restructuring and the persistence of uncertainty (which increased after the outbreak of the crisis). However, neither of these processes is considered in the new Keynesian model. Second, costs may be generated not only by distortions in the choices made by economic agents but may also be a result of the decisions made by governments, particularly in terms of the fiscal deficit level. However, the new Keynesian model does not consider the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures on the quality of fiscal policy. Without carefully considering the costs, there is a significant risk that unconventional monetary policy measures could become a conventional response to recurrent crises.

In this paper, we propose a two-country, two sector monetary union DSGE model with housing. One of the countries is calibrated to represent the Spanish economy while the other one is the rest of the European monetary union. First, we illustrate how looser credit conditions coming from the Euro area, together with increases in housing demand, lead to an increase in house prices and credit in Spain. Then, we analyze to what extent, macroprudential policies could have avoided the excess in credit that triggered the financial crisis in Spain. We find that a countercyclical loan-to-value (LTV) rule that mainly responds to house prices would have mitigated the credit boom in Spain. These results can also be applied to other countries facing similar problems in the housing sector and thinking about implementing macroprudential policies.

Global financial integration intensified in the period leading up to the Great Financial Crisis, as was witnessed by the growth of cross-border banking, capital flows, and gross external capital positions. For small, open economies (SOEs) that have lifted restrictions on capital movements, global financial integration seems to have undermined the scope for independent monetary policy, even if these countries had adopted a flexible exchange rate regime. Monetary policy transmission was weakened through the interest rate channel, as long-term rates in SOEs became increasingly correlated with long rates in large, advanced countries. The exchange rate channel was unstable, however, with exchange rates diverging from fundamentals as uncovered interest rate parity failed to hold over relevant periods and capital flows were volatile. These tendencies can contribute to monetary and financial instability when they interact badly with other economic and financial risks that can face small, open, and financially integrated economies. This was the case in Iceland. A fundamental rethinking of policy frameworks and tools has been underway in SOEs in the wake of the crisis. Potential policy instruments include foreign exchange intervention, enhanced prudential rules on foreign exchange risks, macroprudential tools, better alignment of fiscal and monetary policy, and even selective capital flow management tools.

This paper provides an analysis of policy responses to the Global Financial Crisis by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Given its unique position as a major commodity exporter with a large population, Nigerian authorities utilized a mixture of policies including reductions in the monetary policy rate and capital reserve requirement, lending through the expanded discount window, money market interbank transactions guaranty and limitations on deposit money banks’ (DMBs) foreign exchange net open positions. CBN also rolled over margin loans that were extended to equity investors. As a result the country weathered the financial crisis with limited damage and recorded positive growth rates between 2008 and 2010.

This study examines the role of financial integration in determining the relationship between the real exchange rate (RER) and economic growth in East Asian countries. It hypothesizes that a competitive RER could play a greater role in promoting economic growth in countries with a low degree of financial integration. A growth model was specified using a RER misalignment index and its interaction terms with financial integration as explanatory variables. Different proxies for financial integration were employed to verify the interaction. The empirical results demonstrate the significance of the interaction terms and largely validate the hypothesis. This result demonstrates that a competitive RER policy is not a general solution for economic growth and its effectiveness could largely depend on a country’s degree of financial integration.

This paper discusses the implications of overconfidence when it affects a monetary policy maker. We consider two forms of overconfidence: the illusion of precision and the illusion of control. Incorporating them into a standard New Keynesian framework, we consider the optimal term length of a central banker and examine how it depends on the types and degrees of overconfidence. In particular, we show that the legal mandate should always be lengthened when these two types of biases increase by the same percentage magnitude.

The paper analyzes the effectiveness of intervention and of signals on future intervention on the foreign exchange market of an emerging market (EM) facing large capital flows. A model of strategic interaction between speculators and the Central Bank shows the speculative demand curve to be downward sloping under greater uncertainty about fundamentals, which is common in EMs. Tests with Indian data confirm a stable speculative demand curve. The domestic currency appreciates when net dealer demand is positive. Intervention influences exchange rate levels and volatility. Anticipated intervention decreases dealer turnover, so expectations are stabilizing and signals on future intervention effective.

Using Chinese firm level data for 2003–2012, this paper determines the factors that drive firms to switch from single bank loan providers to multiple bank loan providers. The results show that large firms are more likely to switch from single to multiple lending relationships. This study finds that medium size and small firms of high quality are more likely to have a single borrower relationship while large and high quality firms are more likely to have multiple bank relationships. Increasing market competition decreases the probability of single bank-firm relationship.