In Interpreting China's Development, leading experts on China provide an overview of this growing superpower, highlighting key issues in the country's political, economic and social development.
Underpinned by up-to-date scholarly research yet written in a readable and concise style, this volume of over 40 short chapters offers a very accessible way to understanding the major events and dominant issues that had emerged in China over the last few decades. The essays are grouped under four thematic sections — challenges of governance, growth and structural changes, coping with rising social problems and relations with major powers and neighbours — covering salient topics such as the emerging mode of leadership succession, sustainability of China's high growth, widening inequalities, environmental crisis and the external impact of China's rise.
Non-specialists in particular, should find this volume useful in keeping up with China's fast changing developments.
Sample Chapter(s)
Chapter 1: Responding to Challenges and Problems of Governance (191 KB)
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Only in their fourth year of office and China President Hu Jintao, along with his political partner Premier Wen Jiabao, has already left a distinctive political trademark in China's politics. Right in their first year, Hu and Wen impressed with the dismissal of incompetent senior officials for their mishandling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and their projection of a people-loving image at home and an unyielding leadership image abroad. To cap it all, Hu-Wen's new policy initiatives have even earned a positive term, the Hu-Wen New Deal.
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The Chinese Communist Part (CCP) is a party in transformation. China's “open door” policy and rapid globalisation process in the post-Cold War era have generated increasingly high pressure for changes on the CCP leadership. Once deemed the vanguard of the Chinese State, the CCP's failing ideological appeal, its equally unattractive and clumsy structure, and disillusioned party cadres are increasingly making the Party's sustainability problematic. The CCP now needs to review its continued relevance to the ongoing and fast-changing economic, social and political climates in China. Party reforms appear to be the most logical and urgent choice.
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After a 12-year trial of regulations on civil servants, on 27 April 2005, the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China adopted The Civil Servant Law which took effect on 1 January 2006.
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Beijing's relations with provinces have never been so dynamic, fluid and interdependent as in the past ten years. In central-local relations, local governments were often out of sync with central themes. The biggest challenge for the central government is to rein in local governments without jeopardising economic growth.
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Party-army relations in China under Mao Zedong were highly symbiotic for lack of clear institutional boundaries. This is due to Mao's emphasis on “politics taking command” and “human factors”, but not division-of-labour-based technical expertise. As a result, political alliances and conflicts were largely defined by personalised factions that cut across party-army boundaries. Under Deng Xiaoping, however, clearer party-army boundaries emerged because Deng had allowed for more institutional autonomy, so that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could stay away from politics and pursue technical upgrading. The only caveat is that at the top leadership level such as the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng relied on his personal influence and his pre-1949 Second Field Army comrades to control the army. These enabled him to employ the military against political opponents in the party and from society at critical moments such as the popular rebellion in 1989.
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The economic and political developments in Hong Kong and Macau after the handover of sovereignty (Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999) follow different trajectories. Before the handover, Hong Kong's economy was shining. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the SARS outbreak in 2003 pushed up unemployment rate and welfare expenditure while a fall in tax and land sale revenue undermined the government budget (from a surplus of HK$77 billion in 1997–98 to a deficit of over HK$60 billion in 2002–03).1 Deflation badly hit property market, a powerhouse of Hong Kong economy. Real GDP growth rate dropped from 5.1 percent in 1997 to minus 5.5 percent in 1998, 0.6 percent in 2001 and 1.8 percent in 2002. The economy was unable to rebound until the Chinese government relaxed its control on outbound tourism to its two SARs in mid 2003, fuelling the tourism industry.
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On 1 June 2006, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian made a startling public announcement: he declared he was surrending authority over domestic affairs to his premier, Su Tseng-chang, effective immediately. Why the sudden move to shed part of his job?.
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On 11 October 2005, the 16th Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CPC) concluded its Fifth Plenary Session where a draft proposal for formulating China's 11th Five-Year Programme for National Economy and Social Development was approved. Detailed guidelines were prepared and revised in the following months and later approved at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 10th National People's Congress (NPC) in March 2006.
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China's investment in science and technology (S&T) is steadily increasing. Total Research & Development (R&D) expenditure increased from 34.9 billion yuan in 1995 to 245 billion yuan in 2005, with an annual compound growth rate of about 21.5 percent. Meanwhile, gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP was boosted from 0.6 percent (1995) to 1.34 percent (2005). However, it is still low when compared with developed countries. For instance, the R&D expenditure already accounted for 2.51 percent of GDP in 1995 in the US, and about 3 percent as of overall GDP in Japan in recent years.
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The year 2006 was a significant year for the Chinese banking sector. It marked the fifth anniversary of China's entry into the World Trade Organisation and the last year of China's transition period to fully open its markets. On 11 December 2006, China was obligated to fully open its financial market in line with its WTO commitments of ensuring equal national treatment for foreign banks to engage in the Chinese currency business. This poses a big challenge to China's indigenous banks, as they face not only significantly more intensive competition, but also considerable changes in the regulatory environment.
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Reforming China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been one of the most important objectives for the Chinese authority, and probably the most challenging one. The reforms have gone through roughly two phases with different objectives and measures. In discussing China's SOE reforms, one needs to keep in mind that the government has been extremely reluctant to privatise SOEs on a mass scale, especially those considered as of strategic importance to the economy.
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Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has introduced a series of reform and open-up policies to replace central planning with a “market economy with Chinese characteristics", where growth and efficiency are given top priority. The transition so far has been successful according to major macro-economic indicators. Progress has also been made in poverty reduction and improving people's living standard. However, fast economic growth has caused a number of unwanted side effects. Among others is the widening income gap between the rich and poor, rural and urban areas and across regions. At the same time, a “classless” society of pre-reform China has also begun to stratify as well. In recent years the emergence of a middle class has attracted increasing attention.
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A majority of mainland Chinese who left China over the last decades have chosen to stay in their countries of adoption. For those who have decided to return to resettle on the mainland, they were called “Haigui”, or overseas returnees, a contemporary term used to describe returning graduates, scholars and professionals. Collectively, these returnees can be informally called the “Haigui-pai”.
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Rapid globalisation, the uncertainties posed by a post-Cold War international environment, the rise of China and the momentous shifts in economic and strategic balances in East Asia have transformed the way China and Japan see each other. In China's eyes, Japan is facing prolonged stagnation following four decades of economic boom, and is naturally not as respected as it used to be; China, on the other hand, appears to be on the roll — economically, technologically, militarily and politically — and its weight is growing exponentially in East Asia. Japan's perception of China is greatly coloured by the latter's potential security threat led by a communist regime that Japan has always deemed suspect.
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China's decision in 1992 to establish diplomatic relationships with South Korea was perhaps the biggest challenge to its “good-neighbour policy” (mulin youhao zhengce). The inherent problem was how to achieve a balance between the two Koreas. During this transitional discourse, a de jure and de facto policy was fully in use to complement the good-neighbour policy in the face of changes in not only the Korean peninsula, but also the domestic, regional and global arena. It was only in May 1999 when the North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly President Kim Yong Nam visited Beijing that a normalisation of relationship was declared. With this, China was able to achieve the desired balance in its relationship with both Koreas and overcoming the litmus test of recognising two rival regimes.
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Sample Chapter(s)
Chapter 1: Responding to Challenges and Problems of Governance (191k)