Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity

The following sections are included:

• Contents

• Preface

• Contributors

Burma or Myanmar? The introduction of new English nomenclature for the country (and for other places within it) by Burma's military leadership has been controversial, not because of the names per se, but because the two sets of names have come to symbolize two diverging national identity trajectories for the country: one democratic and federalist, one militarily enforced hierarchical unity. The resulting cleavage has greatly complicated national political and economic development.

Democratization studies now highlight potentially derailing problems such as warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflict. In Myanmar, where ethnic tension runs deep, the risks are especially great. Political reformers should work with the grain of the military junta's planned 2010 general elections and pay close attention to nation building.

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic conflict and civil war since independence in 1948, exposing it to one of the longest-running armed conflicts in the world. Ethnic minorities have long felt marginalized and discriminated against. Minority rights were further curtailed after the 1962 coup. Ceasefires were negotiated with most of the ethnic armies after 1989, but the latter retained their arms and much of their autonomy. The SPDC has been keen to disarm the ethnics and incorporate their armies into border guard units, but the latter have resisted (with Chinese support) and the issue remains unresolved.

Burma's succession of military leaders has shared an indifference to the welfare of its people, whether the Burman majority or the minority ethnic groups, with the result that poverty, disease, and illiteracy have become part of a pervasive humanitarian crisis. Western human rights groups have attempted to alleviate the crisis but the SPDC has limited their efforts, suspecting them of turning the people against the regime.

Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma's founding leader General Aung San and winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, is probably the most famous Burman in the world — yet for some 15 of the last 21 years she has been in jail or under house arrest. The iconic leader of the National League for Democracy, Burma's erstwhile democratic opposition party, she is a charismatic leader who has never held governmental office. This chapter seeks to analyze her leadership role dispassionately and to discuss her political future after the election.

This article examines the internal dynamics of the Burmese military, focusing on struggles at the top level. It will explore the nature of and reasons for the struggles and assess the implications, especially for the current political impasse and possible changes in the future.

For reasons never clearly explained, in November 2005 Burma's SPDC suddenly moved the administrative capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana, a small city (ca. 100,000) in the jungle some 200 miles (320 km) to the north, near which they constructed a new capital named Naypyidaw (royal city). This chapter explains why they did so, with what likely political, cultural, and fiscal consequences for the country.

Burma's recent emergence as a significant regional exporter of natural gas brings with it the promise of transforming the country's finances. Redeeming this promise, however, will require wholesale reform of Burma's fiscal and financial arrangements. Such reforms are as yet not in prospect. This chapter explores the financial potential of Burma's gas exports, the danger that they could yield a “resource curse”, and the extent to which the state“s fiscal demands undermine the country's economic progress.

Conventional wisdom has it that Myanmar is a pariah nation, isolated from globalization. But that is a considerable oversimplification. Aside from the fact that official figures fail to take into account the country's enormous underground trade, Rangoon has since 1990 taken significant steps to open its economy. But this has been a selective opening, limited to economically and strategically complementary trade partners.

The question of whether Burma is becoming a “client state” of China is frequently raised in media and scholarly writings. Although Sinophobic military top brass in Burma have never trusted China's overpowering influence, and in recent years have tried to diversify and reduce dependence on its northeastern neighbor, China's political and diplomatic protection remains indispensable for the regime's survival. Burma may fancy indirectly balancing against China by reaching out to the new US administration. However, this would be difficult unless the U.S. abandons its long-standing demand for political reform in Burma. This paper explains a possible new trend in China's foreign policy toward Burma, which attempts to resolve tension between China's rising role with increasing international responsibilities and multiple interests and its irrelevant non- interference foreign policy. This newly modified policy is now put to the test as China has to respond to the military regime's harsh handling of ethnic minority groups along Sino-Burma border.

Though India and Burma shared a colonial identity, they have since independence had a more complicated and divergent relationship. Burma looks to India to counterbalance China's overweening influence, an interest India shares and has been happy to abet. But India has been less successful in its quest for cooperation in boundary pacification and counterinsurgency measures or in fully satisfying India's burgeoning resource needs.

Though Burma joined ASEAN with high hopes in 1997, the union has been a mutually disappointing one. Burma has not enjoyed the influx of FDI and general economic windfall it expected from joining, and ASEAN has been repeatedly embarrassed by SPDC human rights abuses. Yet there have also been benefits: the junta was inspired to release Aung San Suu Kyi (at least for a while) and to set forth the 7-step “roadmap” to constitutional government, while ASEAN became a more comprehensive regional organization and has augmented its diplomatic toolkit to deal with intransigently dissident members. How this uneasy relationship fares amid the 2010 elections remains to be seen.

In order to have a successful national identity — one capable of facilitating a successful national developmental trajectory — a country needs a felicitous combination of an inclusive political structure, an integrated (but reasonably tolerant) national culture, and a respected international status. Which of these elements Burma is endowed with and which ones are missing and why? These are some of the questions explored in this concluding chapter.

The following sections are included:

• Index