Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics

The following sections are included:

• Dedication
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• Contents

We shall present certain experiments aimed at testing the Markovian nature of the quantum statistical distributions and comment their results, which confirmed the standard quantum interpretation. We shall also show how certain sophisticated experiments that were realized in the framework of quantum optics during the last decade in order to test fundamental effects such as quantum non-locality also lead us to eliminate certain (non-Markovian and non-local) alternatives to the standard quantum theory.

By using the conceptual framework provided by the theory of constrained Hamiltonian systems, we propose a quantum ontology based on two independent postulates, namely the phase postulate and the quantum postulate. The phase postulate generalizes the gauge correspondence between first-class constraints and gauge transformations to the observables of unconstrained Hamiltonian systems. The quantum postulate establishes a faithful correspondence between the observables that allow us to identify the states and the operators that act on these states. According to this quantum ontology, quantum states provide a complete description of all the objective properties of quantum systems.

One of the problems facing any attempt to understand quantum theory is that the theory does not seem to offer an explanation of the way the probabilities arise. Moreover, it is a commonly held view that no such explanation is compatible with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, i.e. that the theory is inherently indeterministic, simply because nature is like that. We propose an abstract formalisation of the observation of a system in which the interaction between the system and the observer deterministically produces one of n possible outcomes. If the observer consistently manages to realize the outcome which maximizes the likelihood ratio that the outcome was inferred from the state of the system under study (and not from his own state), he will be called optimal. The probability for a repeated measurement on an ensemble of identical system states, is then derived as a measure over observer states. If the state of the system is a statistical mixture, the optimal observer produces an unbiased estimate of the components of the mixture. In case the state space is a complex Hilbert space, the resulting probability is equal to the one given by the Born rule. The proposal offers a concise interpretation for the meaning of the occurrence of a specific outcome as the unique outcome that, relative to the state of the system, is least dependent on the state of the observer. We note that a similar paradigm is used in the literature of perception to explain optical illusions in human visual perception. We argue that the result strengthens Helmholtz's view that all observation, is in fact a form a inference.

It is usually asserted that physical theories, in particular quantum mechanics, support a certain view of what the world really is. To such claims I oppose an attitude of epistemological modesty. Ontological statements on the nature of reality, when made on the basis of quantum mechanics, appear unwarranted. I suggest that an epistemic loop connects physical theory grounded in informational notions, and a theory of information developed through a theoretical account of the physical support of information.

In this paper we discuss the problem of representation and experience in quantum mechanics. We analyze the importance of metaphysics in physical thought and its relation to empiricism and analytic philosophy. We argue against both instrumentalism and scientific realism and claim that both perspectives tend to bypass the problem of representation and justify a “common sense” type experience. Finally, we present our expressionist conception of physics.

The Kantian influences on Bohr's thought and the relationship between the perspective of complementarity in physics and in biology seem at first sight completely unrelated issues. However, the goal of this work is to show their intimate connection. We shall see that Bohr's views on biology shed light on Kantian elements of his thought, which enables a better understanding of his complementary interpretation of quantum theory. For this purpose, we shall begin by discussing Bohr's views on the analogies concerning the epistemological situation in biology and in physics. Later, we shall compare the Bohrian and the Kantian approaches to the science of life in order to show their close connection. On this basis, we shall finally turn to the issue of complementarity in quantum theory in order to assess what we can learn about the epistemological problems in the quantum realm from a consideration of Kant's views on teleology.

The aim of the paper is to show that understandability is not a basis for choosing between Bohm's theory and the Many-Worlds interpretation of standard quantum mechanics. Advocates on both sides assert that their preferred account is more understandable than the other. On that score, they are both right. The seeming inconsistency involved in this claim is dissolved when one realizes that they employ different notions of understandability. Moreover, understandability, on either notion, is not an overriding criterion of choice between competing accounts if our aim in developing physical theories is truth.

We describe a model in which the maximal change of state of the system due to interaction with the measurement context is controlled by a parameter which corresponds with the number N of possible outcomes in an experiment. In the limit N = 2 the system reduces to a model for the spin measurements on a quantum spin- particle. This model fits in the hidden measurement approach to quantum mechanics in which quantum probabilities are explained as due to an uncontrollable fluctuation in the measurement process. In the limit N → ∞ the system is classical, i.e. the experiments are deterministic and its set of properties is a Boolean lattice. For intermediate situations the change of state due to measurement is neither ‘maximal’ (i.e. quantum) nor ‘zero’ (i.e. classical). We show that two of the axioms used in Piron's representation theorem for quantum mechanics are violated, namely the covering law and weak modularity. Next, we discuss a modified version of the model for which it is even impossible to define an orthocomplementation on the set of properties. Another interesting feature for the intermediate situations of this model is that the probability of a state transition in general not only depends on the angular distance between the two states but also on the measurement context which induces the state transition. Therefore our models also shed new light on Gleason's theorem and suggest that transition probability maybe is not a secondary concept which can be derived from the structure on the set of states and properties, but instead should be regarded as a primitive concept by its own right for which the measurement context is crucial.

Gilles Deleuze wanted a philosophy of nature in a pre-kantian almost archaic sense. A central concept in his philosophy is ‘multiplicity’. Although the concept is philosophical through and through, it has roots in the mathematical notion of manifold, specifically the state spaces for dynamical systems exhibiting non-linear behaviour. Deleuze was attracted to such mathematical structures because he believed they indicated a break with the dogmatic image of thought (the kind of thought that constrains itself into producing representations of reality conceived as particular things with strict borders, behaving and interacting according to invariant covering laws within space). However, even though it is true that a phase space representation of a physical entity is not a typical materialist picture of reality, it derives from a normal Euclidean representation, and can in principle be reduced to it. We want to argue that the real break happens with the quantum state space, and that Deleuze's typical description of a multiplicity fits even better with the quantum state space.

I focus here on a specific aspect of the “problem of probabilities” in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely the problem of understanding probabilities. Such a task would imply to answer three questions: “What are subjective probabilities?”, “What are objective probabilities?”, and “Why should a rational agent match her subjective probabilities with her estimation of the values of the objective probabilities?” I show how a conception of subjective probabilities as degrees of care (inspired by Hilary Greaves) would answer the first question; and how interpreting quantum weights as proportions of worlds would answer the second question and help answering the third one.

The ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics’ is the thesis that our best scientific theories do not uniquely determine their ontologies. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is famously thought to exemplify this kind of underdetermination: it may be seen as compatible with both an ontology of individual objects and with an ontology of non-individual objects. A possible way out of the dilema thus created consists in adopting some version of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a view according to which the metaphysically relevant aspect of the theory is its structure, not the nature of the objects dealt with. According to OSR, particular objects may be dispensed with (eliminated or re-conceptualized) in favor of the structure of the theory. In this paper we shall argue that the underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics is a consequence of a too strict naturalism in ontology. As a result, when a mitigated ontological naturalism is taken into account, underdetermination does not appear to have such dark consequences for object-oriented ontologies in quantum mechanics.

Since its origins, quantum mechanics has presented problems with the concept of individuality. It is argued that quantum particles do not have individuality, and so, one can speak about “entities without identity”. On the contrary, we claim that the problem of quantum non individuality goes deeper, and that one of its most important features is the fact that there are quantum systems for which particle number is not well defined. In this work, we continue this discussion in relation to the problem about the one and the many.

Standard common causal explanations of the EPR situation assume a so-called joint common cause system that is a common cause for all correlations. However, the assumption of a joint common cause system together with some other physically motivated assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy results in various Bell inequalities. Since Bell inequalities are violated for appropriate measurement settings, a local, non-conspiratorial joint common causal explanation of the EPR situation is ruled out. But why do we assume that a common causal explanation of a set of correlation consists in finding a joint common cause system for all correlations and not just in finding separate common cause systems for the different correlations? What are the perspectives of a local, non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation for the EPR scenario? And finally, how do Bell inequalities relate to the weaker assumption of separate common cause systems?

In this work we develop a modal structure for the simultaneous treatment of actual and possible properties of quantum systems. A logical system based on orthomodular lattices enriched with a modal operator is given, obtaining algebraic completeness and completeness with respect to a Kripke-style semantic. We show that, in spite of the fact that, the language is enriched with the addition of a modal operator, contextuality remains a central feature of quantum systems.