China Dreams

The following sections are included:

• Contents
• About the Editors
• About the Contributors
• Introduction

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The China Dream as Revival of Historical Greatness
• What Historical Greatness?
• The Missing Dream of Chinese Constitutionalism
• Dreaming about the Future Rather than the Past

“China's Dream” is a new slogan just coined by Xi Jinping since his election as CCP Secretary General and Chair of the Central Military Commission at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. As such, it has achieved almost instant currency, both domestically and abroad. As generally understood China's dream is not a mere fantasy but a vision of the future that has a realistic chance of achievement. But although the coinage is new, as a new nation emerging from the world's greatest revolution China has long been conceived and sustained by a collective dream. Like other revolutions before it the Chinese revolutionary dream embraced the world as well as the nation-state: the revolution would not be complete or secure for the part until the whole has been liberated. The mythic depiction of that experience as the triumph of hopelessly outclassed underdogs after having been driven to the brink of extinction in two civil wars and a foreign invasion has left a residue of high credibility for the notion that the old man can move the mountain, China can prevail against all odds. To be sure, the attempt to sustain the revolutionary dream encountered obstacles and setbacks at least as challenging as those faced en route to Liberation. And to its credit, the CCP leadership has made periodic adjustments to reconcile the dream with reality, either changing policies to implement the dream more effectively or adjusting the dream to fit political realities. Despite periodic readjustment I argue here that amid all pragmatic policy adjustments China's dream has consistently pursued three objectives: first, “modernization,” as conventionally understood in terms of strong GDP growth (both aggregate and per capita), a rich and strong nation, and a good life (xiaokang shehui 小康社會); second, it should be consistent with what in the PRC is usually referred to as “Chinese characteristics” or Chinese national identity, definitions of which have evolved over time with China's socio-economic transformation; and third, a coherent vision of how the rest of the world should be transformed to make it compatible with Chinese national security and prosperity…

Since becoming China's preeminent leader in late 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted his “China Dream” concept in both domestic and international contexts. As Bill Bishop writes, the domestic version of the China dream “ties together national rejuvenation, improvement of people's livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and military strengthening as the common dream of the Chinese people that can be best achieved under one party, Socialist rule.” In a recent article in the National Interest, State Councilor and senior foreign policy official Yang Jiechi outlines some of the concrete international manifestations of the Chinese Dream. Yang writes that the “Chinese dream requires a peaceful and stable international and neighboring environment, and China is committed to realizing the dream through peaceful development. … China will share more development opportunities with other countries so as to facilitate their efforts to realize their dreams. China hopes to see win–win cooperation and common development with the rest of the world.” But such cooperation, Yang emphasizes, would not stand in the way of Beijing's continued efforts to “resolutely [uphold] China's core national interests.”

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Super-Ministry Reform as the Pursuit of Efficient Governance
• A Cure for Fragmented Authoritarianism? Little Effect on Taming Vested Interests
• Conclusion: A Realistic Assessment

IN 1793 a British envoy, Lord Macartney, arrived at the court of the Chinese emperor, hoping to open an embassy. He brought with him a selection of gifts from his newly industrializing nation. The Qianlong emperor, whose country then accounted for about a third of global GDP, swatted him away: “Your sincere humility and obedience can clearly be seen,” he wrote to King George III, but we do not have “the slightest need for your country's manufactures.” The British returned in the 1830s with gunboats to force trade open, and China's attempts at reform ended in collapse, humiliation and, eventually, Maoism.

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• “China Dreams” — What to Make of It?
• “China Dreams” — A Critique
• The “Chinese Dream” Weltanschauung
• Conclusion

It has become a rite of passage for the newly anointed supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to coin and disseminate an original ideological phrase that represents the political trademark of that particular leader and ruling generation. Therefore, barring the collapse of China's current collective leadership, it is probably only a matter of time before General Secretary Xi Jinping's political signature, “The China Dream,” is enshrined in the CCP Constitution as the latest addition to its lengthy official ideology: “Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of the Three Represents (Jiang Zemin), and the Scientific Outlook on Development (Hu Jintao).” China Dream awaits. Each segment of the CCP's official ideology has been deployed to justify particular political, economic, and social policies of the time. Subsequent leadership then redefines the legacy of each part to fit current agendas.

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The Shifting Role of the Market in the Chinese Context
• Building Regulatory Capacity in China
• Constraints on China's Market Development
• China Dream and Action for a Better Market
• Conclusion

Discussions of “the China Dream” commonly focus on two ends of the spectrum: the individual Chinese person enjoying an improved and relatively comfortable standard of living (xiaokang 𣕧 𤉇), in large part characterized by increased levels of consumption, or, more likely, China, the nation-state, under the leadership of the Communist Party, recovering (fuxing 𤒉 𳊈) its historical status as a major player on the world stage. In theory, there is no contradiction between the two; they constitute and reinforce each other. Less explored is exactly how the individual Chinese, especially those with deficit reserves of economic capital, marketable skills or guanxi, are supposed to achieve whatever “dreams” they might have…

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Change and Continuity of the Chinese Grain Market and the Provincial Governor's Responsibility System for Food Security
• Model–SinoTERM CGE Model of China
• Simulation Models and Results
• Concluding Remarks and Policy Implication

The following sections are included:

• Index