Narrow Results

For the asset market with finite numbers of investors whose utility functions are general concave functions, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the nonnegative equilibrium price vector that clears the asset market, through considering the expected utility maximization problem under the assumption that the joint distribution of risky assets' returns is an elliptical distribution. An explicit formula for the equilibrium price is given. We also discuss the economic implication of the given condition and demonstrate that our necessary and sufficient condition can be regarded as a necessary condition to maintain the stability of the asset market. These results extend some results about the equilibrium analysis of the asset market.

We analyze Hotelling's duopoly model on the plane. There are two players (firms) located in different points inside a circle and the customers are distributed with some density in it. The solution of two game-theoretic problems is derived. The first problem is to find the equilibrium prices for the homogeneous goods, and the second problem is to find the equilibrium allocation of the players inside the circle. The equilibrium in location game is constructed for uniform and non-uniform case.

This paper considers a noncooperative transport game of $n$ players on a communication graph. Here players are passenger transportation companies (carriers). Service requests form a Poisson process with an intensity rate matrix $\mathrm{\Lambda }$. Players announce prices for their services and passengers choose an appropriate service by minimizing their individual costs (the ticket price and the expected service time). For each carrier, we solve the pricing problem and define the equilibrium intensity flows in the conditions of competition. A special emphasis is placed on polynomial latency functions.

This chapter considers a noncooperative transport game of n players on a communication graph. Here players are passenger transportation companies (carriers). Service requests form a Poisson process with an intensity rate matrix Λ. Players announce prices for their services and passengers choose an appropriate service by minimizing their individual costs (the ticket price and the expected service time). For each carrier, we solve the pricing problem and define the equilibrium intensity flows in the conditions of competition. A special emphasis is placed on polynomial latency functions.