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How far can energy markets be free as well as competitive? What do low oil prices mean for the oil industry and other energy markets? How can economic efficiency in the energy industries be reconciled with environmental protection? How far is the UK model of liberalising electricity and gas industries being applied elsewhere in the world and how is it faring, at home and abroad? These are typical questions addressed in this collection of articles written by an international group of economists. Edited by the leaders of the two leading UK academic centres of energy economics, the book demonstrates how important the analysis of policy and regulatory frameworks has become for those interested in efficient energy and environmental outcomes.
Sample Chapter(s)
Foreword (72 KB)
Chapter 1: Introduction (378 KB)
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_fmatter
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https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0003
In this chapter I want to take a rather broad look at the regulatory system for Britain's utilities. I begin from some issues of principle about the nature of competition and the nature of regulation and then discuss to what extent Britain has devised a regulatory regime which is an advance on other such regimes. En passant, I shall say a few words about British utility privatisation schemes because they were important determinants of the regulatory system. I shall conclude with some observations on the review of regulation which the government is conducting.
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A major intention for guidelines on deregulation of electricity markets is to provide electricity at more competitive (= lower) prices than under monopolies with franchised service areas. Despite little doubt that there will be short term decreases in electricity prices – at least for large customers – it is not clear how long these price reductions will last. This is due to the fact that nobody knows how the structure of the European power industry will develop in the long run. Since there is no final stage of an equilibrium market it is likely that mergers will take place and that small utilities will disappear. The major conclusion of this chapter is that without a new strong regulation – probably on an EC level – electricity prices in the long run may be at the same or an even higher level as under the past regimes of monopolies with franchised service areas.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0012
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https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0017
Many countries around the world liberalise their electricity markets by introducing power exchanges. At the same time the share of renewable energy supplies is steadily increasing.
Renewable energy supplies, such as are derived from sunlight or wind, have more fluctuating production patterns than those derived from more conventional power generation.
Power exchange is one way to balance out the fluctuations in energy production. Generators of fluctuating power can incorporate their production offers on the daily spot market on the power exchange at the same prices as other generators. The only extra expenses for fluctuating power arises if the generators are unable to fulfil the commitments made on the spot market when the actual deliveries take place. This expense comes about from the regulation expense the system operator encounters by maintaining the total balance between supply and demand on the spot market.
The goal of this chapter is to examine this type of expense and how the use of a power exchange tends to balance out the effect of fluctuations in wind power production. To illustrate this, the Nordic power market is used as the main example.
The chapter briefly describes the different markets of Nord Pool, the Nordic power exchange, and their potential use for enabling wind power to be utilised fully. By use of research results on the prices on Nord Pool and a Danish case study, different scenarios are set up for the wind power producer's use of the power exchange. It is found that not only does the accuracy of the prediction influence the use of the power exchange, but the structure of the power exchange itself may also play an important role.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0018
Liberalisation of the electricity market in 1998 offers an opportunity for a major diffusion of renewable technology. With inelastic supply, demand may be vital for determining the future development of renewable electricity market. This chapter examines previous experiences of the demand for renewable electricity, mainly in the U.S. and in the Netherlands, to draw lessons for the British market and recommendations for the electricity regulator, if it seeks to promote these alternative technologies. This chapter finds that, although small, a niche demand is likely to actually (as well as hypothetically) exist for 'green' electricity in the United Kingdom at the usual premium prices charged. Raising awareness and generating confidence amongst customers, as well as keeping price differentials low, are likely to be vital to increasing demand for renewable electricity.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0019
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The pressures to demonstrate a robust and rigorous basis for the environmental appraisal of energy options are now stronger than ever. The stakes are as high where investment decisions are dominated by Government policy or regulation as where they are influenced more through the structures of commercial markets and consumer demand. However, the available analytical tools for environmental appraisal are suffering something of a 'crisis of confidence'. After a period of ascendancy in the 1980's, comparative risk assessment has been cumulatively undermined by criticism of its neglect of the scope and complexity of environmental performance. There is currently an energetic bid to establish environmental cost-benefit analysis as a replacement approach to analysis for regulation and public policy intervention. However, though the issues may be concealed by a new vocabulary, essentially the same questions may be raised.
Based on insights gleaned in the field of risk analysis, this paper examines some of the difficulties encountered in attempts to characterise the broad environmental effects of energy options as monetary 'externalities'. A series of important general factors in environmental appraisal are identified: such as the divergent forms and distribution patterns of the effects of different options; the varying degrees of autonomy on the part of those affected by different types of impact; the treatment of uncertainty and variability and the framing and presentation of analysis. These factors are then discussed in relation to a number of highly influential recent environmental valuation studies. It is shown that, if anything, neoclassical environmental economics in practice actually adds to the deficiencies displayed by comparative risk analysis.
The results obtained by more than thirty major environmental valuation studies in the electricity sector are then reviewed. Attention is focused on the variability in the literature and on the resulting ambiguity in the possible rank-orderings of different options. The results obtained by different studies are found to vary by factors ranging up to several orders of magnitude. The literature as a whole might be taken to accommodate several radically different environmental rank orderings of generating technologies. In addition, it is argued that the values derived for energy externalities may reflect the constraints imposed by existing market prices as much as they do the relative magnitudes of different environmental effects.
The paper concludes by pointing to alternative practical approaches to the social appraisal of environmental impacts. Looking at recent experience in the USA, Germany and Switzerland, it is argued that other techniques are available which offer greater transparency and rigour and which, through structured public participation, avoid futile and politically polarising attempts to impose an 'analytical fix' on the essentially political business of comparative environmental appraisal of energy options.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0024
Nuclear liabilities are the costs of dealing all the unwanted products of the nuclear age - radioactive wastes, spent reactor fuel and redundant nuclear structures. These have been accumulating in the UK over the past 50 years and now amount, on official estimates, to some £41.8 billion (undiscounted). There is a conventional wisdom that nuclear generation, alone among the energy sources, accounts for and makes financial arrangements to meet all its costs, including liabilities.
Our recent paper demonstrates that this 'wisdom' is false. Past arrangements for the payment of future nuclear liabilities have failed. This is primarily because nuclear generation was and is uneconomic, so that provisions invested internally in new nuclear reactors did not generate the required rate of return. A large funding gap has developed. Slight improvements in the funding arrangements were instituted by the 1996 privatisation in the form of the British Energy Segregated Fund - but the liabilities covered by this Fund are only a small proportion of the total ostensibly in the private sector. In addition, most of the liabilities left in the public sector are unfunded.
The consequence is to raise serious questions about the compatibility of nuclear liability arrangements with the commitment of successive UK Governments to the principle of sustainability in environmental policies. Sustainability - "development which does not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" - proves easy to define but difficult to implement.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_0025
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https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848160293_bmatter
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Sample Chapter(s)
Foreword (72k)
Chapter 1: Introduction (378k)