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Modeling behavioral social systems

N. Bellomo

Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Politecnico di Torino, 10129 Torino, Italy

E-mail Address: nicola.bellomo@polito.it

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F. Brezzi

Istituto di Matematica Applicata e Tecnologie Informatiche del CNR, Pavia, Italy

E-mail Address: brezzi@imati.cnr.ir

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M. Pulvirenti

Department of Mathematics, University of Roma, “La Sapienza”, Italy

M&MOCS, International Research Center on Mathematics and Mechanics of Complex Systems, University of l’Aquila, Palazzo Caetani, Cisterna di Latina, (LT) 04012, Italy

E-mail Address: pulviren@mat.uniroma.it

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https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218202517020018Cited by:25 (Source: Crossref)

Abstract

This paper presents the papers published in a special issue devoted to the modeling of behavioral social systems. Some perspective ideas on possible objectives of future research are extracted from the contents of this issue and brought to the reader’s attention. The final ambitious aim is the development of a mathematical theory for complex living systems.

Keywords:

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