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COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES

    https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001448Cited by:0 (Source: Crossref)
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    Abstract

    We develop an interactive model involving competitive tax evasion to determine optimal transfer prices by multinational firms. We establish that the proposed game is characterized by multiple equilibria. Implications of these multiple equilibria are examined.