Narrow Results

Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the problem of the fluctuations of tax evasion in a community of honest citizens and tax evaders by using the version of the nonequilibrium Zaklan model proposed by Lima (2010). The studied evolutionary dynamics of tax evasion are driven by a non-equilibrium majority-vote model of M. J. Oliveira, with the objective to attempt to control the fluctuations of the tax evasion in the observed community in which citizens are localized on the nodes of the Stauffer–Hohnisch–Pittnauer networks.

The Zaklan model had been proposed and studied recently using the equilibrium Ising model on square lattices (SLs) by [G. Zaklan, F. Westerhoff and D. Stauffer, J. Econ. Interact. Coord.4, 1 (2008), arXiv:0801.2980; G. Zaklan, F. W. S. Lima and F. Westerhoff, Physica A387, 5857 (2008)], near the critical temperature of the Ising model presenting a well-defined phase transition; but on normal and modified Apollonian networks (ANs), [J. S. Andrade, Jr., H. J. Herrmann, R. F. S. Andrade, and L. R. da Silva, Phys. Rev. Lett.94, 018702 (2005); R. F. S. Andrade, J. S. Andrade Jr. and H. J. Herrmann, Phys. Rev. E79, 036105 (2009)] studied the equilibrium Ising model. They showed the equilibrium Ising model not to present on ANs a phase transition of the type for the 2D Ising model. Here, using agent-based Monte Carlo simulations, we study the Zaklan model with the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise and apply it to tax evasion on ANs, to show that differently from the Ising model the MVM on ANs presents a well-defined phase transition. To control the tax evasion in the economics model proposed by Zaklan et al., MVM is applied in the neighborhood of the critical noise q_c to the Zaklan model. Here we show that the Zaklan model is robust because this can also be studied, besides using equilibrium dynamics of Ising model, through the nonequilibrium MVM and on various topologies giving the same behavior regardless of dynamic or topology used here.

In this paper, we use the version of the nonequilibrium Zaklan model via agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations to study the problem of the fluctuations of the tax evasion on a heterogeneous agents community of honest and tax evaders citizens. The time evolution of this system is performed by a nonequilibrium model known as majority-vote model, but with a different probability for each agent to disobey the majority vote of its neighbors.

A microscopic dynamic model is here constructed and analyzed, describing the evolution of the income distribution in the presence of taxation and redistribution in a society in which also tax evasion and auditing processes occur. The focus is on effects of enforcement regimes, characterized by different choices of the audited taxpayer fraction and of the penalties imposed to noncompliant individuals. A complex systems perspective is adopted: society is considered as a system composed by a large number of heterogeneous individuals. These are divided into income classes and may as well have different tax evasion behaviors. The variation in time of the number of individuals in each class is described by a system of nonlinear differential equations of the kinetic discretized Boltzmann type involving transition probabilities. A priori, one could think that audits and fines should have a positive effect on the reduction of economic inequality and correspondingly of the Gini index G. According to our model, however, such effect is rather small. In contrast, the effect on the increase of the tax revenue may be significant.

This paper investigates multi-item moral hazard with auditing contests.s Although the presented model is widely applicable, we choose tax evasion as an exemplary application. We introduce a tax-evasion model where tax authority and taxpayer invest in detection and concealment. The taxpayers have multiple potential income sources and are heterogeneous with respect to their evasion scruples. The tax authority — unable to commit to an audit strategy — observes a tax declaration and chooses its auditing efforts. We show that the tax authority prefers to audit source by source until it finds evidence for evasion to conduct a full-scale audit thereafter. Furthermore, we provide an explanation for why economic actors engage in both the formal and informal sector at the same time.

The traditional theoretical analysis of tax evasion fails to explain the empirical finding that declared income decreases with the tax rate. We show that one of the reasons for this result is that many such studies overlook advance tax payments in their analyses. Furthermore, we investigate how advance tax payments influence the extent of tax evasion. We conclude that the influence of advance tax payments on the extent of tax evasion depends on whether an individual's preference is based on expected utility theory or prospect theory.

In the withholding tax system, the tax authority requires taxpayers to pay taxes in advance before filing their tax returns. This note investigates how advance tax payments affect the extent of tax evasion in the economy. We show that the extent of tax evasion decreases with increasing prepaid taxes, if individuals behave according to prospect theory.

This paper empirically investigates the relationship among the tax evasion and local disposal income, unemployment rate and demographic variables by using 20 municipalities in Taiwan with the official interior, latest, and wider range of panel data over the period from 1998 to 2011. The main findings support the positive impact of disposal income on tax evasion, while unemployment rate has a negative impact. Among the interest rate effect models, if policy-makers want to hinder the extension of tax evasion, they should reduce the interest rate. Furthermore, government not only applies fiscal policy but also applies monetary policy for improving tax evasion. In our regional effect model, we have found evidence on a positive impact of the demographic structure variables on tax evasion except social expenditure of local government. We have also found clear evidence on the positive impact in South and East areas on tax evasion in the regional effect model. Moreover, both interest rate and regional factors have an influence on tax evasion.

We mainly study a taxpayer's optimal strategies of tax evasion and its relevant properties, in order to deduce some effective suggestions and theoretical bases for the tax authority to restrain tax evasion. Based on the Christiansen static model of tax evasion, we formulate a two-period model where the discovery of tax evasion in the second period induces a tax audit in the first period if it has not been done before. The taxpayer has to choose the amount of tax evasion in each period to maximize the total expected utility of the two periods. We show that the threat of having the first-period evasion discovered in the second period diminishes attractiveness of tax evasion in both periods. We also discuss the policy of audit power enhancement, where the audit probability in the second period will be increased if tax evasion is discovered in the first period. We find that this policy may play two roles. First, it can reduce the incentive of tax evasion in the second period if tax evasion is discovered in the first period. Second, a high potential increase of the audit probability may contain tax evasion in the first period but may cause more evasion in the second period.

We develop an interactive model involving competitive tax evasion to determine optimal transfer prices by multinational firms. We establish that the proposed game is characterized by multiple equilibria. Implications of these multiple equilibria are examined.

In this paper, we present a new agent-based model for the simulation of tax compliance and tax evasion behavior (SIMULFIS). The main novelties of the model are the introduction of a "behavioral filter approach" to model tax decisions, the combination of a set of different mechanisms to produce tax compliance (namely rational choice, normative commitments and social influence), and the use of the concept of "fraud opportunity use rate" (FOUR) as the main behavioral outcome. After describing the model in detail, we display the main behavioral and economic results of 1,920 simulations calibrated for the Spanish case and designed to test for the internal validity of SIMULFIS. The behavioral outcomes show that scenarios with strict rational agents strongly overestimate tax evasion, while the introduction of social influence and normative commitments allows to generate more plausible compliance levels under certain deterrence conditions. Interestingly, the relative effect of social influence is shown to be ambivalent: it optimizes compliance under low and middle deterrence conditions, but not when deterrence is made harder. Finally, SIMULFIS economic outcomes are broadly in line with theoretical expectations, thus supporting the reliability of the model.

In recent decades, the field of entrepreneurship studies has become increasingly interested in the relationship between entrepreneurship and the informal economy. This paper reviews this burgeoning sub-field of entrepreneurship studies that recognizes how entrepreneurs do not always conduct their business affairs wholly by the rulebook. Evaluating this rapidly growing body of literature, it reviews the findings regarding the preponderance of entrepreneurs to engage in the informal economy, the nature of such informal entrepreneurship, the characteristics of informal entrepreneurs and the motives underpinning participation in such endeavor, along with the competing theories that have sought to explain engagement in this type of entrepreneurship. The tentative finding is that there are marked socio-spatial variations in the prevalence and nature of informal entrepreneurship, the characteristics of informal entrepreneurs and their rationales. The implication is not only that different theorizations of informal entrepreneurship apply more in some populations than others, but also that some populations usually seen as lacking in entrepreneurial spirit are perhaps more enterprising and entrepreneurial than currently recognized. Consequently, legitimizing this hidden enterprise culture could be an important means of promoting enterprise and economic development in such populations. The paper concludes by highlighting future avenues for research on this subject.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of two contrasting policy approaches in tackling informal sector entrepreneurship. The dominant deterrence approach theorizes entrepreneurs as rational economic actors who operate in the informal sector when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. The resultant policy focus is upon deterring participation by increasing the costs of operating in the informal sector through increased penalties and probability of being caught. Recently, a more preventative approach has emerged theorizing entrepreneurs as social actors operating in the informal sector when there is a lack of vertical trust (in government) and horizontal trust (in others). The consequent policy focus is upon improving entrepreneurs’ vertical trust (in the state) and horizontal trust (in each other). To evaluate these approaches, evidence is reported from a 2019 Eurobarometer survey in six East-Central European countries (Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia). The finding is that participation in informal entrepreneurship is not significantly associated with the deterrent measures of raising the penalties and probability of being caught but is significantly associated with the preventative measures of improving vertical and horizontal trust. The implications for theory and policy are discussed.

Informal entrepreneurs have been viewed variously as reluctant participants in such endeavors doing so out of economic necessity because of their exclusion from formal work and welfare (structuralist theory), or as willing entrepreneurs who voluntarily exit the formal economy either as a rational economic decision (neo-liberal theory) or as social actors who do not agree with the formal rules and regulations of the state (neo-institutional theory). The aim of this paper is to evaluate these competing theorizations of entrepreneurs’ motives for participating in the informal sector. Reporting evidence from a 2019 Eurobarometer survey involving 27,565 face-to-face interviews in 28 European countries, the finding is that five percent are reluctant participants, twenty percent are willing participants doing so as a rational economic decision, 21 percent are willing participants doing so because of their disagreement with the rules and 54 percent do so for a mixture of these motives. A logistic regression analysis reveals who is more likely to engage in informal entrepreneurship and who is significantly more likely to do so for each motive. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.

In this work, we review various dynamical models in socio-econo-physics, and discuss their roles in understanding socio-economic biases. We deal with fairness in nations, wealth distributions in nations, elections’ dynamics and tax evasion models. We claim that these models can better explain biases in societies than traditional models of economics from 1700s that are based on various assumptions such as the “invisible hand concept” that justifies interventions from social beneficiaries.

States around the world appear more determined than ever to end tax haven abuse. The new U.S. administration, for example, is taking action against both major tax haven problems: corporation income tax avoidance and personal income tax evasion. Some progress may be made. This essay argues, however, that only radically new policy will likely suffice either to shore up corporate tax revenues or to sharply diminish evasion. Global formula apportionment is needed if the corporate income tax is to be preserved, and only a combination of automatic information sharing among governments and source withholding can stamp out evasion. As in most areas of international economic policy, U.S. leadership is essential.

This case discusses tax avoidance in China, which has a long history. The Chinese generally believe taxes are too high, and people do not believe that they are getting much by way of benefits in exchange for their payments. Even famous entrepreneurs share this opinion. The case discusses the relevance of tax paying in China, Confucian values, and the overall business atmosphere in China.