Uncovering Core–Periphery Dynamics: Pakistan’s Global Stance and Scope of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Abstract
This research delves into core–periphery dynamics in Pakistan’s relations with the United States and China, with a focus on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It investigates how these dynamics shape interactions and Pakistan’s global stance. The study analyzes the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, where the U.S. core dominance influences Pakistan’s socioeconomic trajectory. Shifting to the Pakistan-China partnership, China’s dual core–semi-periphery roles define its involvement in CPEC, merging developmental investments with strategic interests. This study employs a comparative analysis to dissect the core–periphery dynamics within Pakistan’s interactions with the United States and China, specifically in the case of CPEC. Correspondingly, the core–periphery framework exposes structural imbalances and the interplay of power, economics, and geopolitics. The research highlights the framework’s insights — revealing traditional core–periphery dynamics in Pakistan-U.S. ties and intricate complexity in Pakistan-China relations. China’s multifaceted role as a developmental supporter and strategic actor adds layers to the narrative. In essence, the core–periphery framework unveils the interwoven narratives of power, economic reliance, and strategic motivations that underpin the evolving global order.
Introduction
In the context of the contemporary global landscape, the intricate interplay between core and periphery nations holds profound significance in shaping international relations. This paper embarks on a journey to explore Pakistan’s distinct position within this core–periphery framework, closely examining its convoluted affiliations with two influential global actors: the United States and China. The crux of this exploration centers around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a pioneering initiative that mirrors China’s rising influence and Pakistan’s aspirations for economic resurgence.
At its heart, this paper aims to unravel Pakistan’s multifaceted interactions within the context of two distinctive paradigms: one led by the Western powers, predominantly the United States, and the other guided by China’s ambitions, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and CPEC.1 As Pakistan embarked on a trajectory transitioning from being manipulated by neo-imperial forces, exemplified by the United States, to forging a partnership with the emerging powerhouse, China, a profound transformation in its global stature and ambitions unfolded.2
Structured into two fundamental sections, the initial part of this paper critically dissects the relationship between Pakistan — positioned as a periphery state — and the United States, a quintessential core nation.3 It is within the realm of the Western-driven paradigm that Pakistan’s socioeconomic and political trajectory intersects with various factors, including the subsidized domestic economies of dominant Western entities, technological breakthroughs, diplomatic strategies, indirect democratic processes, conflicts, and the economic and political pressures that reverberate across emerging economies.4
The subsequent section shifts the spotlight to the Chinese perspective, characterized by a more equitable and pluralistic approach to global governance. Central to this perspective is the ongoing BRI, an embodiment of transformative global development that embraces economic expansion, infrastructural advancement, regional integration, and the amplification of business opportunities.5 Significantly, within this framework lies CPEC, heralded as a flagship project under the BRI. CPEC embodies Beijing’s commitment to catalyzing Pakistan’s economic progress and fostering regional stability. This endeavor has played a pivotal role in reshaping Pakistan’s international narrative.6
Theoretically, the core–periphery framework underpins this article’s analysis, and the focus lies squarely on the core–periphery dynamics. This framework facilitates a deeper comprehension of Pakistan’s peripheral stance in the global hierarchy, juxtaposed with the core status of the United States and the semi-peripheral role assumed by China.
Against this complex backdrop, the Pakistan-U.S. relationship often hinges on strategic and political considerations, whereas the China-Pakistan partnership encompasses strategic and economic dimensions. The unfolding narrative unravels the underlying motivations that led Pakistan to embrace the CPEC initiative and extend a welcoming embrace to Chinese investment. Within the core–periphery framework, the intricate dynamics underscore the complex interplay among nations as they navigate their trajectories within the ever-evolving contours of the global order.
Literature Review
Core and Periphery Distinctions
The foundation of core–periphery framework underscores the fundamental division between core countries and periphery countries.7 Core countries wield substantial economic supremacy, cutting-edge technological advancements, robust industrialization, and well-established governance structures. These core nations hold commanding positions in the global economic arena, exercising significant control over international trade, financial systems, and diplomatic negotiations. In stark contrast, periphery countries find themselves ensnared in economic underdevelopment, characterized by limited technological capabilities and fragile governance systems. These nations often grapple with higher levels of poverty, illiteracy, and pronounced wealth disparities when juxtaposed against their core counterparts.8
Central to the core–periphery framework is the intricate web of interdependence that binds core and periphery countries together.9 Core countries exploit the resources, labor, and markets of periphery nations to fuel their own economic expansion and prosperity. This exploitation takes various forms, including the imposition of unequal trade relationships and the extraction of valuable resources. In return, periphery countries supply the core with essential resources and labor, contributing to the core’s economic growth. Nevertheless, this exchange seldom occurs on equitable terms, resulting in periphery nations receiving disproportionately meager benefits. This perpetuates a cycle of imbalances, further deepening the divide between core and periphery and sustaining the cycle of underdevelopment and dependency.10
The core–periphery framework also accommodates a semi-periphery category, occupying an intermediary position between core and periphery. Semi-periphery countries exhibit characteristics of both core and periphery nations, often oscillating between the two poles in response to evolving economic and political circumstances. These states may demonstrate certain levels of economic diversification and development, yet remain vulnerable to the influence exerted by core countries.11 The alliance between Pakistan and the United States encapsulates a core–periphery pattern, characterized by U.S. dominance over a comparatively weaker Pakistan. Historical alignments, military collaboration, and geopolitical factors have collectively shaped this dynamic. Notwithstanding the cooperative efforts, suspicions and policy discrepancies have strained these ties. U.S. aid, military operations, and economic sanctions have fundamentally impacted Pakistan’s trajectory. The intricate interweaving of strategic interests, security apprehensions, and economic vulnerabilities constitutes the crux of this core–periphery interplay.12
The application of the core–periphery framework gains added complexity in the context of China’s ascendancy as a global player. China’s engagement with other nations, exemplified by initiatives like BRI, introduces fresh dimensions to the established core–periphery framework. Perspectives on China’s involvement vary: while some view it as exploitative,13 others consider it an avenue for periphery countries to access development opportunities and vital infrastructure investments.14
Deciphering Pakistan’s Yearning for CPEC
Pakistan’s resonance with CPEC is rooted in its endeavor to address pressing challenges. The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks saw Pakistan grappling with terrorism, economic adversity, energy scarcity, and security predicaments. Seeking economic rejuvenation and stability, Pakistan embraced the geoeconomic shifts and regional dynamics, epitomized by China’s ascent and South Asia’s growth potential. The promise of CPEC catalyzing economic expansion, infrastructural development, and regional connectivity impeccably aligned with Pakistan’s aspirations, forging an unwavering bond with China — characterized as an “all-weather” friendship.15
However, the core–periphery framework offers a critical vantage point through which to analyze the multifaceted relationships between nations, particularly evident in the cases of U.S.-Pakistan and Pakistan-China relations. These interactions are shaped by an intricate interplay of economic disparities, strategic interests, and geopolitical considerations. Applying this theoretical framework deepens our comprehension of power dynamics, economic dependencies, and strategic motivations that shape and govern global interactions on the international stage.
Methodology
This research employs a qualitative analytical approach, integrating elements of comparative analysis and case study methodology. The study is primarily driven by an interpretive framework grounded in the core–periphery dynamics of international relations. This theoretical lens allows for a nuanced exploration of Pakistan’s interactions with the United States and China, with a specific emphasis on CPEC.
Primary data sources encompass a diverse range of academic literature, official reports, and expert analyses pertaining to Pakistan’s relations with the United States and China. These sources are gathered from reputable official web-sources, the governmental institutions, and international organizations, such as Pakistan’s Board of Investment, the CPEC Secretariat in Islamabad, the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, China Overseas Port Holding Company, China’s Ministry of Commerce, and various research institutions are integrated. In addition to primary sources, secondary data is gathered from established repositories including research articles, monographs, and reports available on platforms such as Research-Gate and Google Scholar.
CPEC serves as a critical case study within the broader framework of BRI. A comparative approach is employed to juxtapose Pakistan’s relations with the United States and China. This analysis involves a detailed examination of the socioeconomic, political, and strategic dimensions of each partnership. The core–periphery framework serves as the theoretical foundation for interpreting the complex interactions between Pakistan, the United States, and China. This framework enables a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s position as a peripheral state, the core status of the United States, and China’s semi-peripheral role. Correspondingly, theoretical perspectives on globalization are interwoven with the core–periphery framework to elucidate the underlying motivations and power dynamics shaping Pakistan’s engagement with the United States and China.
Theoretical Foundation: Core–Periphery Framework
The core–periphery framework provides a lens through which we can comprehend the intricate dynamics that shape the interactions between core and periphery countries. This framework unveils the structural inequalities and imbalances inherent in the global system, shedding light on the socioeconomic and political ramifications of these relationships. At its core, the core–periphery context emphasizes the division between core and periphery countries. Core countries wield economic dominance, advanced technologies, industrialization, and robust governance structures. These nations stand at the forefront of global economic activities, holding significant influence over trade, finance, and international affairs. They benefit from diverse economies and a relative lack of external control.16 Conversely, periphery countries occupy a less privileged position within the global hierarchy. These nations often grapple with economic underdevelopment, limited technological capabilities, and vulnerable governance systems. The periphery is marked by higher levels of poverty, illiteracy, and a glaring wealth disparity in comparison to the core.17
This framework highlights the interconnectedness and interdependence between these two categories of nations. Core countries exploit the resources, labor, and markets of periphery nations to fuel their economic growth and prosperity. This exploitation can take various forms, including unequal trade relationships and the extraction of resources. In return, periphery nations supply resources and labor to the core, contributing to the latter’s economic expansion. However, this exchange is seldom equitable, with periphery countries often receiving meager benefits in comparison. This perpetuates the cycle of disparities between the core and periphery, leading to continued underdevelopment and dependency.18 Semi-periphery countries occupy an intermediary position within this framework. These states share traits of both core and periphery nations and often navigate between the two based on shifting economic and political circumstances. Semi-periphery countries may exhibit some economic diversification and development, but they remain susceptible to the influence of core countries.19
From a core–periphery perspective, the global system perpetuates power imbalances. Core countries maintain control over periphery nations through various means, including economic mechanisms, political pressures, and sometimes even military interventions. This control enables core countries to sustain their dominant positions.20 In recent times, China’s rise as a global player introduces a fresh dimension to the core–periphery framework. China’s engagement with other nations, exemplified by initiatives like the BRI, adds complexity. While some perceive China’s involvement as exploitative, others view it as an avenue for periphery countries to access development opportunities and infrastructure investments.21
The core–periphery framework sheds light on the relationships between countries, particularly in the context of the United States and Pakistan, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with China.
U.S.-Pakistan Relations through the Core–Periphery Lens
In the framework of core–periphery dynamics, U.S.-Pakistan relations exemplify the power dynamics between a core country (the United States) and a periphery country (Pakistan). The United States, as a core nation, has historically exercised significant economic, political, and military influence on Pakistan, positioning itself as a dominant player.22 This relationship has often been marked by U.S. strategic interests, especially in terms of regional security, which has led to Pakistan’s involvement in various conflicts and security strategies.23 From a periphery perspective, Pakistan’s alignment with U.S. interests has been driven by economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities. Pakistan has faced territorial disputes, security challenges, and an economic structure weakened by factors like an IMF debt trap. Its cooperation with the United States, particularly in the context of the “war on terror,” has resulted in significant human and economic costs, including loss of lives and a compromised economy.24
Pakistan-China Relations through the Core–Periphery Lens
Applying the core–periphery framework to Pakistan’s relationship with China offers valuable insights into their dynamic. In this case, China emerges as a player with features of both a core and a semi-periphery country. While China is ascending toward a core role on the global stage, it is also providing developmental assistance to developing countries like Pakistan, which are traditionally considered periphery nations. CPEC exemplifies this interaction.25 From a periphery standpoint, Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities and need for development infrastructure make it reliant on external assistance. China, with its robust economy and technological advancements, is providing investments and expertise to boost Pakistan’s economic growth and infrastructural development. China’s role in the relationship, however, is not purely altruistic; it is intertwined with its own interests and the broader geopolitical landscape.26 China’s BRI serves to expand its influence and access to global markets, thus aligning with core-country objectives. However, for Pakistan, the engagement with China brings potential benefits in terms of economic growth, connectivity, and enhanced geopolitical standing.27
“Applying the core–periphery framework to Pakistan’s relationship with China offers valuable insights into the recent developments in Beijing-Islamabad alignment amid growing China-U.S. rivalry.”
In the core–periphery context, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship presents a traditional core–periphery dynamic where the United States exercises influence over a comparatively weaker Pakistan. In contrast, the Pakistan-China relationship reflects a more complex interaction, with China acting as both a core-like developmental partner and a country with its own strategic interests. In essence, applying the core–periphery framework to these relationships allows us to dissect the power dynamics, economic dependencies, and strategic motivations that underpin the interactions between different countries on the global stage. However, the context of core–periphery offers a crucial understanding of the complex interactions between countries on the global stage.28 This framework highlights the disparities between core and periphery nations, exposing how economic and political imbalances shape the dynamics of the global system.
Peripheral Realities: Exploring Diplomatic Ties Between Pakistan and the United States
Pakistan, positioned as a developing state of limited strength on the global stage, finds itself on the periphery of core nations, notably the United States. The nation has a diverse socio-political landscape coupled with a fragile economic structure, in contrast to its more developed counterparts.29 The inception of diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan, rooted primarily in military ties and, to some extent, economic assistance, holds significance. The strategic concerns of both nations, stemming from Pakistan’s animosity toward India and U.S. alarm over Soviet expansionism, laid the foundation for a security-focused alliance. Additional concerns embraced counter-terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, democratization, economic reforms, and human rights.30 Pakistan’s formal alignment with Western nations took shape in 1954 as a reaction to the Indian factor. This collaboration led to Pakistan joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alongside countries like the United States, UK, France, and Australia. Such engagements underscore Pakistan’s security-related connections with the United States.31 The lease of Peshawar station to American forces in 1956 and other strategic agreements reinforced the ties between the two nations.32
Complexities and Shifts in the Pakistan-U.S. Relationship
The dynamics of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship have been marked by a series of shifts and complexities. Collaborative endeavors, such as allowing the United States to conduct espionage operations against the USSR from Pakistani territory, were pursued during various periods. This cooperation, especially during the Cold War, led to increased financial and military assistance from the United States, but significant portions were lost during the India-Pakistan War of 1965. Subsequent military and economic embargoes further strained Pakistan’s economy. Notably, despite arms embargoes, the United States supported Pakistan during the 1971 war with India, reflecting the strategic importance attributed to Pakistan during the Cold War.33 The relationship endured challenges and improvements through different presidencies, ranging from Bhutto’s collaboration with President Nixon to the era of President Zia, which witnessed enhanced military cooperation aimed at curtailing Soviet expansionism in the region.34
During General Zia’s regime, Pakistan received substantial military and economic aid from Washington, making it a significant recipient of U.S. assistance. However, this relationship encountered turbulence as the U.S. Congress introduced the Pressler amendment, suspending major military and economic aid unless Pakistan could assure that the funds were not supporting nuclear proliferation. The 1990s witnessed further sanctions due to the changing geopolitical landscape and allegations of terrorism sponsorship. Attempts by Pakistani leaders, including Benazir Bhutto, to alleviate sanctions and improve relations had mixed results. The nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan added to the complexity, leading to a shift in U.S. policy and sanctions targeting both nations under the Glenn amendment.35
The post-9/11 era brought about a renewed partnership between Pakistan and the United States, with Pakistan becoming a pivotal strategic partner in the “war on terror.” Collaborative efforts, however, were not devoid of skepticism and mistrust, particularly surrounding the utilization of aid money for Pakistan’s own defense strategies.36 The Kerry–Lugar bill of 2009 aimed to enhance partnerships through nonmilitary aid but introduced conditions to promote civilian authority over the military. Operations like the capture of Taliban leaders improved collaboration but mistrust persisted.37
Pakistan’s Strategic Realignment and Challenges
As Pakistan navigated its way through changing global dynamics, it fostered close ties with China, viewing it as a reliable ally. CPEC symbolized this partnership, which was viewed as transformative for Pakistan’s economy and social structure.38 However, the project faced criticism, with claims of economic dependence and debt-trap diplomacy.39 The economic rivalry between China and India added another layer of complexity, with Pakistan caught in the crossfire. However, Pakistan’s positioning on the periphery of core nations has been marked by strategic alignments, fluctuations, and complexities.40 The evolution of its association with the United States has witnessed multiple transitions, influenced by security imperatives, shifts in global politics, and differing strategic goals.41 Concurrently, Pakistan’s interaction with China presents an alternative trajectory for progress and collaboration, albeit accompanied by its distinct intricacies and worldwide repercussions. In traversing the intricate fabric of international diplomacy, Pakistan is tasked with the ongoing challenge of harmonizing its affiliations while upholding its national interests and sovereignty.
Bilateral Milestones and the Core–Periphery Nexus: Pakistan’s Enduring Relationship with China
Pakistan’s role within the core–periphery context is underscored by its longstanding and strategic partnership with China. This alliance was officially established on May 21, 1951, solidifying diplomatic relations between the two nations. Particularly notable is Pakistan’s distinction as the first country to recognize the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China during the 1950s, signaling the inception of their official relationship. A survey conducted by the BBC in 2014 revealed that a significant 78 percent of Pakistanis viewed China’s influence positively, with a contrasting 13 percent expressing reservations.42 This enduring connection has been nurtured through successive accomplishments and is underpinned by the mutual commitment of both leaderships to its continued growth.
Historical Milestones and Expanding Cooperation
The evolution of China-Pakistan relations is punctuated by notable milestones. Pakistan’s initiation of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flights to China marked a substantial step, demonstrating its commitment to enhancing connectivity. This was complemented by cultural cooperation agreements, which fostered people-to-people exchanges and contributed to strengthening bilateral ties. The period from 1970 to 1972 emerges as pivotal as Pakistan’s facilitation of secret visits by U.S. State Secretary Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon to China paved the way for the establishment of the first official relationship between the United States and China.
The significance of scientific and cultural collaboration within the context of globalization, both nations formalized their commitment through a cooperation agreement in 1976. The subsequent construction of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) in the 1980s, involving immense sacrifice by Chinese and Pakistani workers, fostered land route connectivity between Gilgit Baltistan and China’s Xinjiang, adding further depth to their partnership. Augmenting their cooperative endeavors, the China-Pakistan border opened for two-way travel in 1982, coinciding with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on educational exchange in 1983. A significant development in 1989 was the mutual support and protection of investment document, reinforcing the commitment of both nations to fostering economic ties. A noteworthy tripartite agreement involving Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan centered on “Traffic in Transit” was also inked, further enhancing regional connectivity.
Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit during the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties marked a phase of redefining bilateral relations, with the signing of a tourism cooperation agreement as a testament to their multifaceted cooperation.43 The following year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit led to agreements encompassing information technology cooperation and a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and good neighborly relations. The initiation of the economic relationship through a free trade agreement in April 2006 laid the groundwork for substantial economic collaboration, including China’s significant investments in Pakistan’s telecommunication infrastructure.44
China’s Resolute Support Amid Challenges
Amidst Pakistan’s challenges in combating terrorism, China emerged as a steadfast ally. Despite international skepticism, China consistently supported Pakistan’s stance on regional and global matters, notably expressing solidarity when Pakistan faced hard-hitting situations in economy and politically. China’s unwavering support during times of adversity underscores the depth of their relationship.45
The proactive approach of China in deepening cooperation materialized through the proposal of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by Prime Minister Li Keqiang in 2013. This led to the signing of a joint declaration on comprehensive strategic cooperation, setting the stage for enhancing their multifaceted partnership. The launch of CPEC coincided with a transformative phase for Pakistan’s economy and security system. China’s involvement and substantial investment in the project contributed to reshaping international perceptions of Pakistan, positioning it as a recipient of significant Chinese investment and a hub for economic growth and stability.
“CPEC has become a strategic pathway to align with China’s rapid economic growth and engage with a region poised for development.”
Subsequent years marked a series of pivotal events in China-Pakistan relations. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to China in 2018 resulted in an agreement to bolster strategic partnerships and collaboratively build a stronger China-Pakistan community for the future. The CPEC transitioned to its second phase, emphasizing industrialization. The signing of the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) and the groundbreaking of the Rashakai Special Economic Zone further exemplified the expansion of economic cooperation. Notably, the launch of Remote Sensing Satellite-1 (PRSS-1) underscored the scope of their collaboration. Amid these developments, 2019 marked significant milestones, including the groundbreaking of the Allama Iqbal Industrial City (M-3) and the Faisalabad Special Economic Zone. Premier Imran Khan’s participation in the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation and the visit of the Chinese vice president underscored their high-level engagements. Additionally, Pakistan hosted the third China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Minister Dialogue, emphasizing their regional roles.
Why did Pakistan Crave the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?
Analyzing the provided paragraphs in the context of Pakistan’s engagement with China within the core–periphery framework reveals a multifaceted approach to CPEC and its significance.
Economic Recovery and Regional Prosperity
CPEC emerges as a pivotal endeavor for Pakistan’s economic revitalization and regional prosperity. Pakistan faced numerous challenges, including the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a fragile security situation, and an ailing economy. Investors were reluctant due to security concerns and inadequate infrastructure development. This dire reality underscored the urgency for transformative measures. CPEC offered a ray of hope, aiming to rejuvenate Pakistan’s economy through infrastructural investments, energy projects, and enhanced connectivity.46
Pakistan encountered a plethora of challenges in the early 21st century, from economic woes to terrorism. CPEC served as a catalyst for change, injecting fresh energy into the economy. Despite persistent terrorism concerns, the project began to improve the security scenario. Foreign direct investment and international business interest increased, indicating a shift towards a more stable environment. China’s substantial investment package during heightened terrorism levels transformed Pakistan’s condition, underscoring the transformative potential of CPEC.47
Strategic Shift and Economic Impetus
The changing geopolitical landscape, with a shift in economic gravity from the trans-Atlantic to the trans-Pacific region, prompted Pakistan to seek new economic avenues beyond North America and Western Europe. As India and China emerged as regional growth engines, Pakistan recognized the need to harness these economic opportunities. CPEC became a strategic pathway to align with China’s rapid economic growth and engage with a region poised for development.
Pakistan’s geographical position at the confluence of South Asia, China, and Central Asia significantly elevated its strategic importance. The region experienced robust economic growth, and Pakistan aimed to play a substantial role in connecting these regions through initiatives like CPEC. The BRI aligned with Pakistan’s vision of becoming a crucial player in the interconnectedness of these regions, offering a chance to impact a substantial portion of the global population.48
Realization of Vision and Mutual Benefits
CPEC’s prominence within Pakistan’s socioeconomic sectors and regional connectivity can be attributed to the longstanding friendship and mutual trust between China and Pakistan. Pakistan’s “Vision 2025” development plan emphasized modern infrastructure and regional connectivity as a core component. The “4 E’s” framework, encompassing economy, energy, extremism, and education, underscored the pillars of this agenda. Both nations stood to gain from this enterprise, with the CPEC serving as a linchpin to achieve shared objectives.49
Correspondingly, Pakistan’s pursuit of greater economic opportunities with China and BRI member countries underscored its commitment to regional cooperation and integration. The “1 + 4” cooperation framework exemplified Pakistan’s collaborative approach, with CPEC at its core. This framework aimed to enhance energy generation, transport infrastructure, connectivity, and industrial cooperation. CPEC’s multifaceted components were essential to achieving common economic development and regional integration. However, Pakistan’s engagement with China, particularly through CPEC, is a strategic response to its economic challenges, regional dynamics, and global shifts. The initiative serves as a conduit for economic growth, connectivity, and collaboration, positioning Pakistan as a crucial player in the evolving global landscape.50
Conclusion
This study reveals that the Pakistan-U.S. relationship showcased a traditional core–periphery dynamic, with the United States exerting significant influence over Pakistan. Historical alignment, military collaboration, and geopolitical considerations have contributed to shaping this intricate relationship. While the assistance from the United States has impacted Pakistan’s socioeconomic trajectory, various challenges and shifts in global politics have also strained these ties. This case illuminated how core–periphery dynamics can shape a nation’s socio-political and economic trajectory within the global order.
While the examination of the China-Pakistan relationship presented a more multifaceted dynamic, China occupied a dual role, acting as a core-like developmental partner while pursuing its own strategic interests. CPEC exemplified this complexity, aligning with Pakistan’s aspirations for economic recovery, infrastructural development, and enhanced regional connectivity. However, concerns about economic dependence and debt-related issues also emerged, underscoring the intricacies of core–semi-periphery interactions. However, CPEC emerged as a strategic response to Pakistan’s economic challenges and aspirations within the core–periphery framework. By addressing the need for economic rejuvenation and regional integration, CPEC capitalized on Pakistan’s strategic location.
Based on the findings of this study, several recommendations can be offered to guide policy and practice in the context of core–periphery relationships and initiatives such as CPEC. Foremost, given the significant influence core nations wield, periphery nations like Pakistan can benefit from enhancing diplomatic efforts and cooperation to mitigate potential tensions and ensure equitable terms in partnerships. Second, to avoid over-reliance on a single core partner, periphery nations should consider diversifying their strategic alliances to enhance economic stability and reduce vulnerabilities. Third, initiatives like CPEC should prioritize transparent agreements that ensure equitable benefits for all parties involved, addressing concerns of economic dependence and debt. Fourth, Periphery nations should invest in building technological capacities to reduce disparities with core nations, fostering a more balanced exchange of resources and knowledge. Fifth, policymakers should aim to balance economic development across regions within a nation, reducing internal disparities that can exacerbate core–periphery dynamics. Sixth, regular monitoring and assessment of partnerships like CPEC are crucial to ensure that the benefits align with long-term development goals and that any emerging challenges are addressed promptly. Seventh, periphery nations can enhance their collective bargaining power by strengthening regional cooperation and alliances, enabling more equitable negotiations with core nations. Finally, sustainable economic practices can help periphery nations safeguard their resources, environment, and economic stability while engaging in core–periphery interactions. However, these recommendations aim to foster more balanced and mutually beneficial core–periphery relationships and ensure that initiatives like CPEC contribute positively to the socioeconomic development of the nations involved.
Notes
1 Pascal Abb, “All Geopolitics Is Local: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor amidst Overlapping Centre–Periphery Relations,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 44 No. 1 (2023), pp. 76–95; Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440.
2 Khushboo Ejaz and Mariam Masood, “Neo-imperialism: A Case Study of China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Journal of Politics and International Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January-June 2019), pp. 85–96.
3 Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. IV, No. I (2019), pp. 432–440.
4 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec.
5 “Full Text of President Xi’s Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum,” Xinhua News, May 14, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
6 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec.
7 Immanual Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), pp. 23–24.
8 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Duke University Press, 2004); Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 5 (March 1997), pp. 1075–1090.
9 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Duke University Press, 2004).
10 Andre Gunder Frank, “A Plea for World System History,” Journal of World History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1991), pp. 1–28.
11 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Duke University Press, 2004).
12 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” Brooking Institution, February 26, 2008, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/02weak_states_index.pdf; Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440.
13 Mark Langan, Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of ‘Development’ in Africa (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 61–88; Jonathan Holslag, “How China’s New Silk Road Threatens European Trade,” International Spectator, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2017), pp. 46–60; Christine Fair, “Pakistan Can’t Afford China’s Friendship,” Foreign Policy, July 3, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/03/pakistan-cant-afford-chinas-friendship/; Kerry Brown, “The Belt and Road: Security Dimensions,” Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2018), pp. 213–222.
14 Zheng Bijian, “China’s One Belt, One Road Plan Marks the Next Phase of Globalization,” New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2017), pp. 27–31; Yamei, “Full Text of President Xi, J. President Xi’s Speech at Opening of Belt and Road forum”; Wenshan Jia, “Chiglobalization? A Cultural Argument,” in Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, eds., Greater China in an Era of Globalization (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 17–26.
15 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec.
16 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Duke University Press, 2004).
17 Ibid.
18 Andre Gunder Frank, “A Plea for World System History,” in Ross E. Dunn, Laura J. Mitchell and Kerry Ward, eds., The New World History: A Field Guide for Teachers and Researchers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), pp. 130–144; Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Duke University Press, 2004).
19 Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 5 (1977), pp. 1075–1090.
20 Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes, “World-Systems Analysis,” Annual Review of Sociology, No. 21 (1995), pp. 387–417.
21 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec; J. Holslag, “How China’s New Silk Road Threatens European Trade,” The International Spectator, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2017), pp. 46–60.
22 Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440; Pascal Abb, “All Geopolitics Is Local: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor amidst Overlapping Centre–Periphery Relations,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2022), pp. 76–95.
23 Asmatullah and Hanif Khalil, “Pakistan USA Relations: Prospects & Dynamics in a New World Order,” Global Political Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 2021), pp. 66–73.
24 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec; Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), pp. 3–15.
25 Pascal Abb, “All Geopolitics Is Local: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor amidst Overlapping Centre–Periphery Relations,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2022), pp. 76–95; Majeed Akhter, “Infrastructure Nation: State-space, Hegemony, and Hydraulic Regionalism in Pakistan,” Antipode, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2015), pp. 849–870.
26 Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440.
27 Zahid Khan, Guo Changgang, and Muhammad Afzaal, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at the Cross Intersection of China, Central Asia and South Asia: Opportunities for Regional Economic Growth,”Chinese Economy, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2020), pp. 200–215.
28 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 814; Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440.
29 Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440.
30 Office of the Historian, “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Pakistan,” https://history.state.gov/countries/pakistan/.
31 M. Razullah Azmi, “Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1983), pp. 37–50.
32 “Timeline: History of U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” Dawn, July 4, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/731670/timelinehistory-of-us-pakistan-relations.
33 Munawar Hussain, “Pak-US Relations: An Historical Overview,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2016).
34 M. Raziullah Azmi, “Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Third Quarter 1983), pp. 37–50.
35 Ibid.
36 Tehmina Mahmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Quarterly Survey: January-June 2000,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 53, No. 2/3 (2000), pp. 1–13.
37 Priyanka Subramaniam, “The Kerry-Lugar Bill,” Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, November 5, 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/focusthemsel.php?articleNo=2998.
38 Hassan Askari Rizvi, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Cooperation and Socio-Economic Development,” Strategic Studies, Vol. 34/35, No. 4/1 (Winter 2014/Spring 2015), p. 10; Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec.
39 Zahid Khan et al., “Debunking Criticism on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Chinese Economy, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2020), pp. 477–487.
40 David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
41 Muhammad Shakeel, “Political Economy of Development: A Study of CPEC,” Global Social Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2019), pp. 432–440.
42 Richard Wike et al., Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2014), pp. 37–41.
43 Tehmina Mahmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Quarterly Survey: January-June 2000,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 53, No. 2/3 (April-July 2000), pp. 1–13.
44 Zahid Khan, Guo Changgang, and Muhammad Afzaal, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at the Cross Intersection of China, Central Asia and South Asia: Opportunities for Regional Economic Growth,” The Chinese Economy, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2019), pp. 200–215.
45 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (Anchor Books, 2006).
46 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec.
47 Siegfried O. Wolf, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Its Impact on Regionalization in South Asia,” in Sumana Bandyopadhyay et al., eds., Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Socio-economic, Spatial, Ecological and Institutional Aspects (Cham: Springer International Publishing, August 29, 2017), pp. 99–112.
48 Zahid Khan, Guo Changgang, and Muhammad Afzaal, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at the Cross Intersection of China, Central Asia and South Asia: Opportunities for Regional Economic Growth,” The Chinese Economy, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2019), pp. 200–215.
49 Ahsan Iqbal, “Pakistani Minister on China’s Economic Corridor Speech,” United States Institutes of Peace, February 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/pakistani-minister-chinas-economic-corridor-cpec.
50 “A Deep Sea Port Exploring Global Opportunities,” COPHC Gwadar, http://cophcgwadar.com/gitl.aspx.