REWARD CULTURE AND BANKS’ PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between banks’ “reward culture” and banks’ performance and risk during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Reward culture is defined as a result-oriented culture influenced through the incentives structure. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) Chief Executive Officer incentives; (ii) Vice Presidents’ incentives; and (iii) employee incentives. A reward culture score represents the common factor in incentives across all employee levels. I find strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. Classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 2006, I find that during the crisis period, banks within both the high and low reward culture groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks within the average reward culture group. The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high.
