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Revealing China’s Soft Power Narratives in State-Owned Media: A Content Analysis

    https://doi.org/10.1142/S2630531323500087Cited by:0 (Source: Crossref)

    Abstract

    Existing analyses of China’s soft power coverage by the media largely focus on individual soft power activities, and rarely study media coverage of comprehensive soft power projection as a whole. This study shines new light on soft power narratives through a content analysis of its components, actors, information sources, and themes from 2010 to 2019. This study has provided a deeper and more holistic understanding of China’s soft power narratives in its attempts to address negative perceptions and build a positive image. The major findings reveal that Chinese media focus on achievements, weaknesses, and potentials as themes, and their attention has shifted from culture and domestic information sources to economy and non-Chinese information sources in the two periods: 2010–2016 and 2017–2019. The analysis of this paper indicates a trend toward a more balanced portrayal of China’s soft power initiatives. It also presents China’s growing confidence and self-assurance in soft power coverage. However, given the role of the state-run media outlets as instruments of the state’s public diplomacy strategy, the media coverage might reflect a selective representation of soft power to engage with international audiences more effectively.

    1. Introduction

    With the rapid expansion of China’s economy and increasing political and cultural global interactions, scholars have heatedly debated whether or not China’s growth creates a threat to global security (Huang and Xiang2018). Concerns have emerged in many countries around the world as a result of China’s rapid economic development (Chi-Cheung and Du Cros2014). To ease these concerns and enhance the nation’s image abroad, at the beginning of the 21st century, China began to adjust its diplomacy by softening its approach in international relations and applying soft power to assure the world of its benign intentions. Soft power strategies primarily aim to win the hearts and minds of foreign citizens and are pursued by governments through public diplomacy, most simply understood as diplomatic engagement with the public (Melissen2013). To promote soft power and build its international image, the Chinese Government has invested significant amounts of time and funds into public diplomacy activities by providing aid, conducting cultural and educational exchanges, and expanding media outreach worldwide. China aims to impress upon other nations that it is a responsible and peace-loving state. It wants other nations to respect its culture and understand its political system and policies (Hartig2016). China’s purpose in promoting soft power is to fulfill China’s foreign policy objectives and its domestic development by addressing negative perceptions and promoting positive images (Yu2014).

    China’s state-owned English-language media outlets play two roles in promoting China’s soft power to the West. On the one hand, they are an important instrument of China’s public diplomacy under the Going Global project. Given that they mostly represent Chinese Government’s voice, the role of these outlets, according to Shambaugh (2015), is to “[push] back against what it perceives as anti-China sentiment” (p. 103) from Western countries and build a positive image. On the other hand, these outlets also cover and convey information about China’s soft power intentions and activities. This paper centers on media as a prominent platform for conveying China’s narratives on soft power and public diplomacy activities and policies. Specifically, this study investigates how news articles discuss soft power and public diplomacy, examining the implications of the media coverage on China’s efforts to promote soft power promotion.

    To date, a number of studies have examined China’s English-language media and soft power by studying individual aspects of soft power, such as Confucius Institutes and Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). However, little research has been conducted to examine China’ soft power as a comprehensive project, especially using content analysis. This study, therefore, aims to investigate how China’s state-run English-language media outlets promote China’s soft power in an attempt to counteract negative perceptions in the West and create a favorable environment for its development. This study contributes to this growing area of research by exploring the topics and themes of China’s soft power narratives, as well as changes in narratives amid an increasingly tense geopolitical environment. The study could also have practical implications for soft power and public diplomacy policymaking in China. This research argues that China’s state-run English-language media outlets generally present China’s growing confidence and determination in promoting soft power, despite the various obstacles undermining its success.

    2. Literature

    2.1. Soft power with Chinese characteristics

    As China has risen and become more powerful on the world stage, its leadership has attached more importance to soft power promotion. As early as 2007, then Chinese President Hu Jintao said, “we must… enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests, enrich the cultural life in Chinese society and inspire the enthusiasm of the people for progress” (Hu2007, para. 1). Ten years later, in 2017, when calling for measures to be taken to improve China’s soft power, President Xi Jinping further emphasized, “We will improve our capacity for engaging in international communication so as to tell China’s stories well, present a true, multi-dimensional, and panoramic view of China, and enhance our country’s cultural soft power.” (Wang2017, para. 6).

    To build a positive global image, China has made enormous financial investment into soft power projections. In 2012, China reportedly spent US$6.6 billion on overseas media expansion, US$196.3 million on Confucius Institutes, and US$ 29.4 million on Ministry of Culture activities, as well as exercising cultural diplomacy and encouraging overseas cooperation (D’Hooghe2014). A recent article reported that China has spent approximately US$10 billion a year on soft power promotion (China’s $10bn Annual, 2019).

    Numerous studies have explored China’s soft power discussions and practices by examining its Chinese characteristics (Kurlantzick2007;Gil2017Lee2016Callahan2017). Soft power, or the capacity to influence through attraction, is a counterpoint to the concept of hard power, and refers to the ability to achieve a goal through attraction rather than coercion or payment (Nye2004). Despite mostly adopting Nye’s concept, China’s soft power projections have gone beyond this framework and are now also contextualized in terms of scope, cultural focus, and application (Gil2017). Nye emphasizes the role of public diplomacy as a primary instrument of soft power, whereas in China the scope through which soft power is generated is much wider. As Kurlantzick (2007) argued, “soft power in China means ‘anything outside of the military and security realm’ and includes ‘popular culture and public diplomacy’ as well as aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (p. 6).

    Of all the dimensions of soft power, China places strategic importance on culture, given its domestic cultural revitalization plan (Li2008), and its claim that culture serves as the basis for political values and foreign policies (Zhang2017a). Unlike Nye’s conception, which primarily focuses on the role of cultural industries and their products in soft power (Nye1990), the concept of culture, from a Chinese perspective, has been extended to include “both traditional and popular culture, moral influence and artistic charm” (Lee2016). In terms of application, Beijing believes its soft power strategies have domestic implications. According to Zhao (2015), China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs “uses public diplomacy as a tool to win support from the general public, both international and domestic, and so improve the legitimacy of China’s foreign policy as a whole” (p. 19). Callahan (2015) stressed that China’s soft power operates differently compared with Nye’s soft power, and it is used largely for handling internal state affairs rather than external.

    A number of authors have considered the effectiveness of China’s soft power strategies and the reasons for their limited success (Gill and Huang, 2006Nye2004Rawnsley2012). Nye (2004) claimed that it sometimes takes an exceedingly long time for soft power resources to generate expected outcomes, possibly giving the impression that soft power does not work effectively. Despite this, a consensus has been reached both inside and outside China that Beijing’s soft power projections are weak and lag behind its military and economic development. Factors thought to be behind this ineffectiveness have been explored in several studies. They range from “blaming China’s domestic socio-political institutions and policies to accusing anti-China political forces in the world” (Feng et al.2019). Early on in the scholarly discussions regarding Chinese soft power, Gill and Huang (2006) analyzed three major factors that hinder China’s efforts to effectively project soft power: imbalance in resources, legitimacy concerns of its diplomacy, and a lack of a coherent agenda. Rawnsley (2012) connected China’s soft power problems to its “disjuncture between its aspirations and the external perceptions of its actions”, and a perceived lack of credibility because it is “embedded largely in the state system” (p. 132).

    However, not all scholars share the view that China’s soft power initiatives are ineffective. Kivimäki (2014) noted that China’s soft power successes should not be measured against an American standard. He further pointed out that China’s soft power “serves the country relatively well” (p. 411) if analyzed based on China’s specific objectives and the global environment. Recently, Carminati (2020) also argued that “as long as it is supported by economic assets and growth, China’s soft power is bound to attract” (p. 3).

    2.2. “Going Global” and China’s English-language media

    English-language media outlets play an essential role in communicating official narratives in China (Yu2022). The Chinese media system has markedly different features to those in many other countries and is characterized by censorship by the government or self-censorship by the media itself (Luo2015). Chinese state media outlets, serving as “official state vehicles” and “mouthpiece[s] of the CPC” (Zhang and Su2020), are predominantly controlled by the Chinese government. Over the last decades, Chinese media experienced great changes, with the partial commercialization of some state-run media outlets and complete commercialization of non-state-run media. However, the commercialization does not “lead to privatization or relaxation of political control”, and in fact, media still “perform the duty of guiding correct opinion” under government policies (Luo2015). Meanwhile, China’s economic rise and active participation in international affairs have caused concern: Many feel that its growth might pose a threat to global security (Huang and Xiang2018). To lessen these concerns and in an attempt to improve its national image, China began to focus more on soft power initiatives. In 2009, China launched a global media project titled Going Global in response to an increasingly negative image of China. As a result, a range of prominent state-run media outlets heavily financed by the Chinese Government, including China Central Television, China Radio International, Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, People’s Daily, and others, began appearing in many countries. Therefore, it is evident that the English-language media outlets under the Going Global project serve a propaganda function through focusing on disseminating information to other countries under the direction of the Chinese Government (Edney2012). Examining China’s state-owned English-language media’s narratives can provide insights into the official directions and intentions regarding China’s soft power projection.

    2.3. Media and China’s soft power studies

    Previous research on China’s soft power and media largely examined media expansion and outreach as a primary instrument of soft power projection (Flew2016Sun2015Gao et al.2016Zheng2022Thussu et al.2018). Zheng (2022) applied word frequency analysis and thematic analysis to examine how Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia engaged with the local media to promote China’s soft power through activities, such as organizing media events, publishing articles in local newspapers, and granting interviews and giving briefings to local media. The analyses revealed diverse views on China’s soft power efforts in this region. Countries with maritime disputes with China, such as Indonesia and Brunei, generally have less favorable opinions than those countries without such disputes, for example Singapore.

    Researchers have also analyzed Chinese soft power narratives in foreign media outlets (Zhang2017cChichava et al.2014Ospina Estupinan2017; Turcsanyi et al.2020). Turcsanyi et al. (2020) used content analysis to examine the two leading newspapers in each of the United Kingdom, Spain, and Poland to explore how China’s signature public diplomatic initiative the BRI was covered there from 2013 to 2018. It found the media initially took a positive view of the BRI. The narratives in these media were largely aligned with Chinese narratives of the BRI as promoting equal opportunities for economic prosperity without expressing many concerns over geopolitical and security issues.

    Comparative analysis has been applied to examine soft power rhetoric between China’s media and/or media of other countries (Zheng and Wei2018Zhang2017bEl Damanhoury and Garud-Paktar2021). Zheng and Wei (2018) compared the media coverage of Confucius Institutes in both the United States and China and concluded that the Chinese and U.S. media are moving in two parallel directions, with the former mainly focusing on the cultural aspects and the latter paying more attention to the political impacts.

    In summary, existing analyses of China’s soft power and public diplomacy coverage by the media have largely focused on individual components and actors, such as Confucius Institutes and the BRI, and have rarely studied media coverage of comprehensive soft power and public diplomacy narratives as a whole, especially through content analysis. Given the close connection between the Chinese government and China’s state-run media, it is central to expand the currently available body of literature to systematically investigate how China project its soft power and public diplomacy narratives through its media lenses, in order to achieve a better understanding of the intention of its soft power projection.

    3. Methodology

    3.1. Qualitative content analysis

    To provide knowledge and improve understanding regarding the coverage of soft power and public diplomacy in Chinese state-run English media, qualitative content analysis was conducted. Qualitative content analysis is defined as an “approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step-by-step models, without rash quantification” (Mayring2004). To achieve a better analysis, based on different approaches, three types of qualitative content analysis as categorized by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) have been applied: conventional content analysis, directed content analysis, and summative content analysis. Conventional content analysis is usually employed for explaining a phenomenon using the categories to emerge from the data and without applying preconceived categories (Hsieh and Shannon2005). The approach is usually suitable when limited theory or research literature is found on a phenomenon (Hsieh and Shannon2005). A conventional approach evolves from the specific to the general, so that instances are observed and then integrated into a general statement (Hyde2000). In this study, themes of news articles are produced by using this approach. Directed content analysis, according to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), uses current theory or research for predictions about the variables so that the “initial coding scheme or relationships between codes” (p. 1281) are easily identified. The approach is applied when enough former knowledge exists and the study aim is to test theory (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane2006). Summative content analysis is used to identify and quantify “certain words or content in text” in order to comprehend the use of the words or content in contexts (Hsieh and Shannon2005). This analysis involves word counts or manifest content during the early period of analysis, then moves on to analyze the latent meanings and themes. This approach gives the impression of a quantitative approach in the initial stage, but its main aim is to discover the underlying meanings of the words or content through a qualitative analysis (Zhang and Wildemuth2009).

    A combination of the three methods is used in analyzing the frequency and percentage of soft power components and actors, the information source, as well as the themes. According to Forman and Damschroder (2007), although most studies use codes developed either in a deductive or inductive way, most of the time content analysts apply mixed approaches. Summative content analysis is particularly useful for the current study because this study will conduct some initial quantitative analysis approaches such as word frequency analysis before exploring the deep and latent meaning of the media articles. This approach provides a useful guide for this study, allowing it to go beyond the mere word counts, and offer deep interpretations of the articles by combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. In this way, a more rigorous and nuanced research result can be achieved. At the same time, in the process of obtaining the codes, both conventional and directed approaches are applied depending on whether there is previous knowledge or not.

    3.2. Data collection

    Three Chinese state-owned English-language newswires were selected for analysis: the Xinhua News Agency, China Daily and the English edition of People’s Daily. The two main reasons for choosing these three media sources for analysis were, first, they are among the most popular English-language media in China. Second, they are directly owned and managed by the Chinese government and their news content mostly represents the voice of the Chinese Government. Three sets of keywords including “China” and “soft power”, “China” and “public diplomacy”, and “China” and “image” were used as the keywords for searching headlines and news articles from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2019. Articles were accessed from the online database Factiva. Identical articles or those irrelevant to the theme were removed. Consequently, a set of 112 articles was generated.

    4. Findings

    This section analyzes soft power and public diplomacy narratives quantitatively by displaying the frequencies and percentages of components, actors, and information sources, and qualitatively by examining the media themes. Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage of the article content analyzed from the 112 news articles collected.

    Table 1. The Percentage Distribution of the Content of News Articles.

    CategoriesComponentsActorsOthersTotal
    Number of articles711427112
    Percentage63.4%12.5%24.1%100%

    4.1. The percentage distribution of the content of news articles

    To identify the contents of news articles, a directed method was applied. The researcher concentrated on soft power and public diplomacy components and actors, which are critically important, while reading news articles to search for patterns that the news articles focused on. However, in the analysis of the collected data, some articles that provide overall opinion on China’s soft power fall into neither components nor actors because they are trying to provide a comprehensive comment on soft power. Therefore, they were categorized as “other”.

    As indicated in Table 1, the majority of the news articles focused on soft power and public diplomacy components, with public diplomacy actors accounting for only 12.5% of the data collected. The following subsections analyze soft power components and actors in more detail.

    4.2. Coverage of soft power and public diplomacy components

    This study drew on the work of Cull to select which key components to use. Cull established a taxonomy of components and interrelationships for public diplomacy, which catagorized public diplomacy components into five types: (a) listening, (b) advocacy, (c) cultural diplomacy, (d) exchange, and (e) international broadcasting (Cull2008). According to D’Hooghe (2014), public diplomacy can be categorized into five aspects: media, events, strategic communication projects, people and institutions, and publications/promotional materials. D’Hooghe (2014) further classified China’s public diplomacy instruments in the media as follows: new media, foreign media, cultural institutes and activities, educational institutes and activities, Confucius Institutes, and foreign aid. Therefore, based on Cull and d’Hooghe’s taxonomies of public diplomacy, nine components were assigned to 67 news articles concerning soft power and public diplomacy sources and methods: (a) culture; (b) economy, industry, and business; (c) opinion polls; (d) advocacy; (e) promotional materials; (f) media; (g) international assistance; (h) dealing with controversies; and (i) exchanges and institutions. While coding, some articles might include more than one component, but only one component was coded for each article to enable comparison among different aspects. The criterion for articles including more than one type of public diplomacy element is that those with a heavier emphasis or bias toward a particular subject, for example culture, are placed in the corresponding component, i.e., culture. Finally, the components that are mutually exclusive are used for further analysis.

    To ascertain how Chinese news media’s reports on China’s public diplomacy changed over time, the author also conducted a comparative analysis regarding the soft power components and information sources during two periods: 2010–2016 and 2017–2019. The year 2017 was selected as a watershed because it is considered as the year of significant deterioration of China’s relationships with some major Western countries, notably the United States and Australia. One indication of these deteriorated relationships is President Donald Trump’s ascension to power in January 2017. Trump’s administration adopted a series of measures to contain China’s development. In addition, his administration described China as a “strategic competitor” in the 2017 National Security Strategy (National Security Strategy of the United States of America2017), followed by the trade war against China in 2018.

    As shown in Table 2, during the overall period of 2010–2019, culture was the most covered component at 25.35%, with economy was second at 15.49%, followed by opinion poll at 14.08%. During the period 2010–2016, while culture remained the most covered topic at 30.00%, advocacy and promotional materials were second, both at 12.00%. However, from 2017–2019, the category of economy received the most coverage, having substantially increased to 28.57% from 10.00% during the 2010–2016 period. For the same 2017–2019 period, poll and culture were at 23.81% and 14.29% respectively. Notably, compared to the 2010–2016 period, the poll coverage grew by 13.81%. In contrast, culture, advocacy, and promotional materials fell by 13.79%, 7.24%, and 12.00% respectively.

    Table 2. The Percentage Distribution of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Components.

    CultureEconomyPollAdvocacyPromotional MaterialMediaInternational AssistanceDealing with ControversialExchanges and InstitutionOtherTotal
    2010–201925.35% (18)15.49% (11)14.08% (10)9.86% (7)8.45% (6)7.04% (5)5.63% (4)4.23% (3)4.23% (3)5.63% (4)100% (71)
    2010–201630.00% (15)10.00% (5)10.00% (5)12.00% (6)12.00% (6)8.00% (4)4.00% (2)4.00% (2)6.00% (3)4.00% (2)100% (50)
    2017–201914.29% (3)28.57% (6)23.81% (5)4.76% (1)0.00% (0)4.76% (1)9.52% (2)4.76% (1)0.00% (0)9.52% (2)100% (21)

    4.3. Coverage of soft power and public diplomacy actors

    In devising a coding system, the author considered which actors and information sources would be used by referring to the literature by d’Hooghe. According to d’Hooghe, the actors that are involved in China’s public diplomacy include national state actors, subnational actors, and non-state actors. She regarded those party and government bodies that play a role in China’s public diplomacy at the national level as national state actors. Examples include the State Council Information Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Leaders, and the Chinese Communist Party. The subnational state actors include city and local governments. Non-state actors refer to groups and organizations from Chinese society, and include “people’s diplomacy organisations, intellectual elites, volunteers and celebrities, companies and overseas Chinese” (D’Hooghe2014). News coverage of soft power and public diplomacy actors includes these three categories: state actors (national and subnational state actors), non-state actors, and a combination.

    As shown in Table 3, among the 14 news articles focusing on public diplomacy actors, most of the coverage was applied to non-state actors, with marginal number of articles focusing on state actors or combination of both state and non-state actors.

    Table 3. The Percentage Distribution of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Actors.

    CategoryState Actors 1 (7.14%)Non-state Actors 12 (85.71 %)Combination 1 (7.14%)
    Spokesmen 1 (7.14%)Tourists 3 (21.43%)Research centers 2 (14.29%) Minority writers 1 (7.14%) Enterprises 1 (7.14%) First lady 2 (14.29%) Universities 1 (7.14%) Journalists 1 (7.14%) Individuals 1 (7.14%)Forum and media 1 (7.14%)

    4.4. The percentage distribution of information source

    Information sources include the information “quoted, paraphrased or attributed” (Cui2015) in a news article. They include “people, letters, books, files, films, tapes” — anything that can be used by journalists to report stories (2019). In content analysis, the source is important because it assists the reader to “understand the pattern of attribution” and helps to obtain a better comprehension of the role that media has played (Zhao2003). The information source is essential when evaluating news media because the journalist is setting an agenda which can influence the flow of the information (Kim and Weaver2003). The unit of analysis for this study is individual sources. Based on the research question, the information sources in this research have been divided into three categories: Chinese sources, non-Chinese sources, and unidentified sources (sources from anonymous persons or sources).

    As shown in Table 4, during the 10-year period 2010–2019, Chinese information was the most adopted source in the three news outlets, comprising 61%, compared with the non-Chinese information of 37.1%. During 2010–2016, the three newswires attached more emphasis to Chinese sources with the percentage as high as 67.5%; in contrast, the percentage of non-Chinese sources is as low as 30.5%. During 2017–2019, the media reduced the usage of Chinese sources with a notable 25.4% decrease from 67.5% to reach 42.1%. On the contrary, the usage of non-Chinese sources significantly increased to 56.5%.

    Table 4. The Percentage Distribution of Information Source.

    PeriodChinese SourcePercentageForeign SourcePercentageUnidentifiedPercentageTotal
    2010–201613767.5%6230.5%42%203 (100%)
    2017–20192942.1%3956.5%11.4%69 (100%)
    2010–201916661%10137.1%51.8%272 (100%)

    5. Themes

    The author also considered themes of news coverage. Themes are patterns related to the research question in a set of data on an interpretative underlying level (Graneheim and Lundman2004). To help understand Chinese media’s perceptions of China’s soft power and public diplomacy, a thematic analysis was employed. To explore the pattern of each article and discover the collective meanings that represent the messages the news articles convey about China’s soft power and public diplomacy, this research followed Braun and Clarke’s (2016) six phases of thematic analysis. These include becoming familiar with (a) data, (b) creating initial codes, (c) exploring themes, (d) reviewing themes, (e) identifying and naming themes, and (f) reporting. As a result of a conventional analysis, three themes were generated: promoting achievements, soft power weaknesses, and soft power potential.

    5.1. Promoting achievements

    A considerable number of news articles have covered the progress of China’s soft power efforts over the years covered in this study. The coverage focused on support provided by the Chinese government, achievements in public diplomacy activities, and positive evaluations from experts and surveys. In news coverage, the Government’s policy and financial support to China’s projection of soft power are believed to play a crucial role, which is reflected in the leaders’ speeches, official conferences, meetings, and documents. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speeches calling for the strengthening of China’s soft power have been highlighted in many articles. In a news article from Xinhua (Tian2014), it was reported that Xi vowed, at a group study session of members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, to “promote China’s cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world” (para. 1).

    To boost its public diplomacy, China has employed a wide range of cultural activities, including expansion of TV and radio broadcasting, international aid, establishing Chinese language study centers, and actively taking part in international organizations. These topics have been frequently mentioned in media articles. In doing so, the media aimed to show the achievements of China’s soft power efforts. Stories with such titles as “Year of Cultural Exchange Refreshes China’s Image in Latin America” and “China Image: Film Festival Kicks Off in London” suggest that China was making efforts to promote culture to increase its global influence. In particular, the coverage shows that these activities will not only present a “new and modern China” to foreign audiences, but also enhance mutual understanding and cooperation.

    The coverage of polls of China’s national image and comments from domestic and overseas experts is another indicator of China’s soft power achievements and improvement. Opinion polls, according to Blanchard and Lu (2012), are the most popular measures to assess the effectiveness of soft power. Ten articles focused on polls and surveys of China’s national image, and the results are all positive. Among them, a Gallup poll conducted in 2017 reportedly revealed that half of Americans “have a favourable opinion of China, up from 44% in 2016 and 41% in 2012” (Luo2017). Considering the effectiveness of polls, these surveys with positive results are the best evidence of China’s successful soft power. However, it must be stressed that the coverage with regard to polls is a selection of presentations by journalists and the purpose is to emphasize the improvement of China’s national image and the successful aspects of China’s soft power initiatives.

    5.2. Soft power weaknesses

    Amid the positive reports of the significant achievements made by China’s soft power, many articles also focused on its weaknesses. The most frequently reported weakness is that China’s soft power is relatively weak because it not only falls far behind other major countries, such as the United States, but also behind its own projected economic development. This problem, if not addressed properly, will negatively impact China’s soft power projection, and subsequently affect the realization of a cultural superpower. These weaknesses can be classified into internal and external weaknesses. The internal problems comprise China’s social setups, dependence on state and individual government representatives, and lack of competence in effective communication. In China Daily, Wang (2015) argued that “When China tries to influence public opinion in the US through public diplomacy, it cannot find corresponding social factors to do so, because of the difference in the two countries’ social set-ups.” (para. 4). The external challenge reported in these news articles is that China is often targeted by foreign politicians, especially Americans, in their campaign for election, which consequently affects public opinion. American politicians blame China for failures happening in their society, from economic decline to unemployment. The media have pointed out that the reason for the negative overseas perception is that China’s message to clarify the misperceptions is not reaching its intended audience.

    5.3. Soft power potential

    Despite the weaknesses, China’s media show confidence in China’s soft power and note that China’s soft power will have great potential if it continues to be harnessed. Several suggestions have been reported concerning how to improve China’s soft power. First, while acknowledging the importance and leading positions of state actors, the news coverage pointed out that China’s soft power should give more weight to non-state actors. For example, China Daily cited Wang, a researcher at the Public Communication Institute of Renmin University of China, as claiming that when conducting public diplomacy dialogues with other countries, “Chinese think tanks, media outlets, universities, enterprises, and social organizations can become more effective partners [of decision-making departments] than the government … for non-governmental organizations have a unique strength when it comes to public diplomacy and cannot be replaced by the government.” (Wang2015, para. 7).

    Second, reform and innovation were other themes that emerged from the analysis. China’s economic success has benefited substantially from its implementation of reforms and innovations. Therefore, China decided to continue and even deepen the reforms of its cultural system to promote the development of soft power. The advocacy of reforms and innovations is multi-faceted, covering economic, cultural, technological, digital, and industrial reforms and innovations: It has been suggested that reform is the solution to many problems, whether they are domestic or international (Zhang2014). Third, the traditional culture China has relied heavily on for its soft power is also considered to have shortcomings. The values reflected in traditional Chinese culture often confuse non-Chinese people. Michael Barr, international politics lecturer at Newcastle University, England, indicated that China emphasizes “traditional Chinese values of harmony and peace, which Westerners may have a hard time believing when they witness the problems China faces today, such as territorial disputes” (Liu, 2014, para. 6). Fourth, rapid economic growth is another central source of the projection of China’s soft power. However, this approach is not always successful, because the focus on material riches does not always win over its intended audience. China needs to explore other values to gain trust and favor of other nations. Fifth, in response to the lack of effective communication, China needs to establish an ad hoc organization to manage public diplomacy activities under a unified leadership. China also needs to enhance national rhetorical competence. Zhao Qizheng, former head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was cited as arguing that national discourse power is “highly important to express the country’s unique features effectively, and it is the key to successful public diplomacy” and maintained that the most effective way to do this is to “think how it [China] can express its stance more clearly and rethink the use of words to describe its uniqueness.” (Ma2011, para. 3).

    6. Discussion

    This study conducted four types of analysis on the selection of articles for a detailed review, with a focus on (a) coverage of soft power and public diplomacy components, (b) coverage of soft power and public diplomacy actors, (c) information sources, and (d) themes.

    The high percentage of overall coverage of culture is consistent with prior studies that found culture is the most important source of soft power initiatives (Kurlantzick2007Lee2016Cho and Jeong2008). However, a shift in priority in coverage of public diplomacy components occurred during the two periods: 2010–2016 and 2017–2019. Compared with the period 2010–2016, it is apparent that economy and industry received more coverage in 2017–2019 and a possible reason for this might be that China had been increasingly using the economy as a tool in projecting soft power initiatives. Most of the articles discussed that China had mostly successfully discarded the label of being associated with cheap and low-quality products. Instead, Chinese products and services, especially in the areas of technology, education, transportation, and construction, have attracted more positive feedback from foreign countries owing to their high quality. The results also reveal that advocacy was given much less attention in 2017–2019 than 2010–2016. This may be explained by the fact that when China initially began the soft power and public diplomacy projects in the early years, more activities and events focusing on the advocacy of policies, values, and ideas, which aimed at informing others of the principles of China’s soft power initiatives, were required. Meanwhile, the period 2017–2019 witnessed more coverage of the evaluations of soft power such as polls, which may be attributed to the fact that it often takes an exceedingly long time for soft power resources to generate the expected outcome (Nye2004).

    It is essential to highlight the complexity between the representation of soft power actors in media and their actual roles in China’s public diplomacy. The findings that non-state actors receive more coverage than state actors may indeed seem at odds with the existing literature, as noted by D’Hooghe (2014) and Hartig (2016). D’Hooghe (2014) claimed that despite both the increasing number and diversity in the groups of non-state actors, state actors still “outnumber non-state actors” (p. 181). Similarly, Hartig (2016) stated that China relied on the traditional diplomacy of adopting more state actors through comments such as, “Although the non-Chinese discourse focuses on mutuality, exchange, and reciprocal communication, China is more concerned with getting its message out and convincing the world of its benign intentions.” (p. 655). However, this study suggests that the predominant media coverage of non-state actors may not necessarily signify their active or dominant participation in the state’s public diplomacy activities, but rather a reflection of evolving public diplomacy narratives that include a broader spectrum of participants such as NGOs and civil societies, elites, and individuals. In addition, the coverage, particularly of non-state actors, often centers around their potential for contribution to public diplomacy or, conversely, their actions that may detract from China’s image. This nuanced portrayal aligns with the perspective of Yang et al. (2017), who claimed that “the involvement of diverse social actors, especially NGOs, may be an important process through which governments address the legitimacy issues and increase the credibility of their public diplomatic campaigns.” (p. 12). Furthermore, it may also signal a response to calls for more inclusive diplomatic engagement and possibly indicate an openness to a new model of public diplomacy that fosters dialogue and collaboration rather than the traditional one-way communication (Hartig2014).

    Compared with 2010–2016, the percentage of non-Chinese sources is higher than that of domestic news sources during 2017–2019, which suggests a more global perspective in the news coverage. Because most of the articles are written by Chinese journalists and most of the events happened in China or involve Chinese participants, more domestic news sources are expected to be used because journalists tend to “look inwardly” when selecting sources (Dimitrova and Strömbäck2009). There are two possible explanations for adopting more foreign sources. First, China’s tactics of “letting foreigners help tell China’s story”, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s proposal of “telling China’s story well”, which implies telling stories in a way that foreigners can understand. Experts and politicians made another proposal of “letting foreigners help tell China’s story” because it would help overseas countries notice the differences between China, as depicted by the Western media and the real China (Pan2021). Therefore, using more foreign information sources can enable the news stories to be “culturally resonant for the audience.” (Dimitrova and Strömbäck2009). Second, this result is likely to be related to China’s increasing self-confidence driven by the growing economy and comprehensive national strength.

    The results of the thematic analysis corroborate the findings of a significant portion of previous studies. Scholars and experts have indicated that, despite China’s efforts in promoting soft power through substantial investments and official policy support, China’s soft power initiatives are far from satisfactory and, although China’s soft power has been on the rise, it still faces many obstacles (Gill2020Ellis2019D’Hooghe2014). In terms of the soft power achievements and improvement, Chinese media coverage emphasizes soft power size and scale, such as the quantity of soft power activities, the amount of money put in investment, the number of tourists and international students going abroad, and the number of Confucius Institutes, among others. This is contrary to Western scholars who have argued that “many apparent soft power assets and so many soft-power tools” can only show that Chinese soft power has exerted great influence worldwide, “but [is] not necessarily… able to develop and sustain its international allure” (Blanchard and Lu2012).

    Another finding that has emerged from the analysis is contrary to Western media and experts who often attribute China’s soft power weaknesses to China’s internal problems regarding political system, media practice, and human rights behavior. Chinese media concentrate on both internal and external problems. As for the internal problems, Chinese media often blame the ineffectiveness in communication with other nations and contrast the differences between China’s soft power approaches and those of the West. However, Western governments and scholars often emphasize China’s political ideology and its strict policies over the economy, culture, and media (D’Hooghe2014, p. 125).

    Other opinions question whether China’s soft power development has a positive potential to achieve China’s foreign policy objectives. Existing Western literature mostly does not expect China’s soft power to achieve great success, citing China’s structural and institutional problems. However, Chinese media reveal that China’s soft power, if it continues to be harnessed, will have great potential to contribute to global governance. As stated in People’s Daily, “The world will look more and more to China in the coming decades for answers to global, regional and local issues.” (2015, para. 14).

    There is also a revelation that the increasing intense relationship between China and the Western countries, especially the United States, have had a significant impact on how Chinese state-run English-language media portray its soft power and public diplomacy initiatives. Given the considerably more non-Chinese information sources have been covered in the latter period than the first period, which seems to be more consistent with the Western standards of media diversity and representation, it can be concluded, to some extent, that Chinese state-run media has adapted to include a broader range of views to win favorable opinions from the international audience.

    China’s state-owned English-language media are not playing a dominantly defensive role in addressing the controversial problems or denying criticisms from other countries. Instead, they increasingly play the proactive role of conveying its own soft power narratives. This can be interpreted from the perspective of the Chinese state-owned media setting the agenda for its media coverage without being significantly affected by the Western discourse. This is consistent with China’s recent policy to establish discursive power with Chinese characteristics and enhance its cultural self-confidence.

    7. Conclusion

    This paper has explored China’s state media coverage of soft power and public diplomacy to help understand how China promotes its soft power through the media. The study conducted a qualitative content analysis to examine the coverage of soft power components, actors, information sources, and themes. The comparative analysis on components and information sources has revealed that changes in domestic and international environment have impacted on China’s soft power projection. Thematic analysis suggests that China is well aware of the achievements, weaknesses, and potential of its public diplomacy, and displays an urgency to improve the implementation of its strategies.

    The analysis of this paper indicates a trend toward a more balanced portrayal of China’s soft power initiatives. It also presents China’s growing confidence and self-assurance in soft power coverage. China adopts a proactive role in presenting its own narratives rather than primarily responding to international criticisms. However, given the role of the state-run media outlets as instruments of the state’s public diplomacy strategy, the media coverage might reflect a selective representation of soft power in order to engage with international audiences more effectively.

    This study of Chinese state media’s coverage of soft power not only explains how China pursues its soft power intentions and operations, but also helps to improve our understanding of how China positions itself in the process of soft power promotion. However, this paper analyzed only three mainstream print newspapers — a relatively limited number of media outlets. Social media and other types of news outlets are popular and they might provide perspectives different from what are presented in this paper. Future research into a larger number of media outlets will provide a more comprehensive picture of China’s soft power.

    ORCID

    Dongnu Guo  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9435-9660