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In the past two decades, China has substantially increased its economic presence in Latin America. The impressive rate of economic growth in China has resulted in a voracious appetite for Latin American commodities and energy sources. China has also become a major investor in the region, and has loaned billions of dollars to Latin American countries. This paper evaluates how aware Latin American citizens are of this increased economic presence of China, and also studies citizens’ attitudes toward the rising influence of China in Latin America. Public attitudes toward the Chinese economic and political model, and evaluations of the Chinese popular culture are also presented and discussed. The evidence suggests that the image of China is improving in Latin America as a result of its new economic role in the region. However, Chinese soft power faces several limitations in the region. The Chinese political and economic models, and the Chinese popular culture are still not very attractive in Latin America.

In 1967, Taiwan began dispatching a portion of its navy, the ROC “Fleet of Friendship,” on goodwill missions to allied nations to strengthen diplomatic friendships. Since that time, one of the major areas of focus for fleet visits has been Taiwan’s allies in the Pacific. In an attempt to move beyond emphasis on the China–Taiwan rivalry in the Pacific, this paper examines firsthand sources to advance three modes of contextualizing the Fleet of Friendship and reveals various layers of historical, pragmatic, and symbolic meaning that exist beyond simple competition with China. First, with specific focus on the performances presented during the fleet’s goodwill visits, this paper contextualizes fleet performances within Taiwan’s unique history, including an extended Martial Law period and tensions regarding the concept of “multiculturalism.” Second, the paper more broadly examines the fleet as a holistic entity on three levels: a hard-power superstructure in which the fleet serves as a reminder of military power; soft-power content in which the activities of the fleet run at cross-purposes with its symbolic military nature; and a hard-power underbelly, in which Taiwanese embassy descriptions of fleet performances and Pacific reporting evince concepts of frenzy, threat, and potential violence. Finally, the paper highlights ulterior motives interlaced within the fleet’s goodwill tours and contextualizes these motives based on other aspects of Taiwan’s diplomacy in the Pacific that demonstrate similar trends. The article evinces the importance of situating analysis of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and soft power within a variety of contexts and demonstrates the nuance inherent within Taiwan’s Pacific diplomacy.

In recent years, China has embraced the idea of soft power with ever more keen interest. Today, soft power is Beijing’s key strategy in international politics, albeit not in the way the concept is understood and applied in the West. However, this strategy can hardly be said to have yielded fruit in Africa despite China’s growing visibility and presence over the last two decades. This article aims at probing this issue by examining how China’s soft power is manifested in Tanzania. In an attempt to show that soft power is not entirely a new practice in international politics, the article first applies a historical perspective to illustrate that it has been part and parcel of Chinese diplomacy, long before the term was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. The article then analyzes Chinese activities in Tanzania and how they have shaped perceptions of Tanzanians of China in the era of globalization. These activities are structured in line with three traditional sources of soft power as postulated by Nye, namely culture, political values and foreign policy. As a supplement to Nye’s definition, however, elements of hard power are also included in the article, such as the use of economic inducements to produce, bolster and wield soft power. In general, China has made headway in its soft power ambitions by gaining positive reviews in Tanzania. While the current achievement is crucial as an initial step, there is still a long way to go for China in consolidating its soft power. Although China has earned admiration in some quarters of Tanzanian society, it is still premature to assume that in the long run Beijing will continue to enjoy increasing soft power in the country. Indeed, in some cases, such admiration only exists in verbal recognition. In the meantime, activities that damage China’s image have further complicated matters and undermined China’s soft power in Tanzania.

This paper offers an overview of the size, progress, and impact of the Belt and Road Initiative, based on a relatively comprehensive examination of relevant literature, policy documents, and academic essays to dissect various aspects of mega-project. It delves into the theoretical foundations that underpin the initiative, including theses on economic integration and Beijing’s use of soft power, explores the role of China’s grand strategy in shaping the Belt and Road Initiative, emphasizing the dual objectives of securing sustained domestic growth and expanding Beijing’s global influence. Aimed at advancing both geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, the Belt and Road Initiative is expected to play a larger role in regional infrastructure connectivity and global economic transformation.

This study investigates Beijing’s use of educational initiatives as a tool for soft power in Pakistan. It explores how these initiatives influence various stakeholders within Pakistan. The research employs a descriptive analysis approach. It examines the mechanisms China utilizes through its educational system to build relationships with Pakistan, promote Chinese culture, and shape Pakistani perceptions of China. Beijing leverages its educational system through four key mechanisms to exert soft power in Pakistan. Confucius Institutes offer Chinese language courses and cultural events, fostering direct engagement with Chinese culture. University partnerships facilitate knowledge exchange and joint research collaboration between Chinese and Pakistani universities. Scholarship programs attract Pakistani students to study in China, providing them with language skills, cultural understanding, and potential career opportunities. Finally, the internationalization of Chinese universities, offering English-taught programs, makes them more accessible to Pakistani students. The impact of these initiatives varies across stakeholder groups. Students and academics directly benefit by gaining language skills, cultural understanding, and potential career opportunities. However, concerns exist about ideological influence, academic freedom, and brain drain. Broader Pakistani society experiences indirect exposure through media, interactions with graduates, and changing perceptions of China.

Over the last three and half decades, China’s rapid advancement in development efforts has been accompanied by a conscious effort in projecting itself as a major frontrunner in the economy. Despite being a developing country (Huang, 2015), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s announcement in World Economic Forum (WEF) (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017) had hinted China’s growing interest in the development of trade and network among countries. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also one such development put forward to institutionalize China’s soft power presence in the world and create harmony with rest of the world. The Initiative has been placed as synonymous to a way of friendly cooperation signaling the project as “Road for Peace” (Kasturi, 2017). China has placed a tremendous amount of effort for its “charm offensive” approach with an estimated US$10 billion spending every year on its global soft power presence (Kurlantzick, 2017). Under the project, China has placed initiatives in approaching for regional connectivity in the South Asia region with China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being regarded as its flagship program. As it goes, of all the projects China has undertaken in the BRI, its ventures in South Asia are considered challenging and need strong cooperation (Stratfor Enterprises, 2017). The unstable geo-politics and security threats in the region pose Beijing with a lot to consider before it can preach about the peaceful connectivity. Most significant of all, the problems in the region will be with India as it has openly expressed its dissatisfaction towards BRI. India not only observes the initiative as a security threat with CPEC corridor passing through the controversial Kashmir area, but also sees it as an initiative to undermine its traditional influence in the region. As such, this paper tries to provide an analytical view of BRI with China’s soft power presence in the South Asia region.

I seek to grasp the genealogy of China’s Belt and Road (BRI) in relation both to the imperial Chinese world order and the historical sequence of forms of global domination, i.e., modern imperialism, the ‘imperialism of nation-states’ during the inter-war and Cold War period as well as the post-Cold War notion of ‘soft power’. While we may think of BRI as poised uncertainly between the logics of the older imperial Chinese order and the more recent logic impelled by capitalist nation-states, there are significant novelties in the new Chinese order, mostly in relation to debt, the environment and digital technology which constitute new realms of power not easily dominated by a hegemon.

Existing analyses of China’s soft power coverage by the media largely focus on individual soft power activities, and rarely study media coverage of comprehensive soft power projection as a whole. This study shines new light on soft power narratives through a content analysis of its components, actors, information sources, and themes from 2010 to 2019. This study has provided a deeper and more holistic understanding of China’s soft power narratives in its attempts to address negative perceptions and build a positive image. The major findings reveal that Chinese media focus on achievements, weaknesses, and potentials as themes, and their attention has shifted from culture and domestic information sources to economy and non-Chinese information sources in the two periods: 2010–2016 and 2017–2019. The analysis of this paper indicates a trend toward a more balanced portrayal of China’s soft power initiatives. It also presents China’s growing confidence and self-assurance in soft power coverage. However, given the role of the state-run media outlets as instruments of the state’s public diplomacy strategy, the media coverage might reflect a selective representation of soft power to engage with international audiences more effectively.

Confucius Institutes (CIs) are an important strategic instrument in promoting China’s soft power and public diplomacy. However, the establishment of the CIs in the West has been controversial because they receive financial and administrative support from China’s Ministry of Education. The primary concerns are that the presence of CIs on university campuses might “interfere” with academic freedom and that China’s chief goal of establishing CIs is to promote its political soft power. This paper adopts qualitative content analysis and longitudinal analysis to examine the Australian mainstream media’s perceptions of CIs. The findings reveal both positive and negative views on CIs. The positive views include recognition of CIs as a valuable source of funding and resources that provide opportunities to engage with China. The negative views focused on the possibility of China “interfering” in academic independence and exerting undue influence. Australian media views on CIs thus mirror their appreciation of China’s economic strength on one hand and their fear of China’s rise on the other.

Vietnam and India became exceptional friends in the context of globalization and global and regional security in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. India paid a significant consideration to South East Asia and expanded its role in this region in the early 21st century. Meanwhile, Vietnam is one country that experienced a thriving economy in its international and regional integrations. This country has a pressing demand for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with all countries in the world. Especially, the objective of rising India’s soft power along with its hard power contributed to promoting India’s benefits and involvement in Southeast Asia and Vietnam. Likewise, Vietnam has been fully aware of India’s intervention in disputes in the South China Sea and its well-meaning plans to tighten relations with Vietnam over various fields. Vietnam considered India as a partner to conduct Vietnam’s soft power. Since Strategic Partnership (2007), Vietnam has accelerated this relation through cultural exchanges, cultural projects, and shared values of Indian culture. Thus, the image of Vietnam becomes familiar to Indian people. Likewise, India encouraged Vietnam to hold cultural events and academic seminars to exchange ideologies, opinions, and plans for many domains. Vietnam is also a goal of India’s soft power in Southeast Asia. This paper aims to examine cultural diplomacy in Vietnam’s foreign policy in Vietnam–India diplomatic relations mainly based on theories of Liberalism, public diplomacy, and soft power. Thus, it clarifies cultural diplomacy in Vietnam and India’s foreign policy. Finally, the author would like to anticipate the scenario of Vietnam–India cultural diplomacy in the future.

India and South Korea relationship has seen remarkable journey in the last three decades. Apart from rising political and economic weights of both the countries, India and South Korea have also emerged as important soft powers in the region. Their soft powers are based on their rich cultural and historical heritages, their democratic traditions and productions of world famous entertainment contents such as movies, dramas, music and so on. The awareness of the cultural connection between the two countries might have been less than expected but both the countries are indeed committed to reach out each other through these connections. Actually soft powers of both the countries are also useful in connecting them bilaterally as well as providing them access to the Southeast Asian countries. This paper tries to look at the role of soft powers of both the countries in their bilateral relations. When the small and middle powers of the region are forced by the US-China contests to work more on their hard powers and alliances/partnerships, the paper argues that a cooperative narrative may emerge in the region through the soft powers reach outs of India and South Korea and their attempts of agenda setting for the region. The paper would also try to explore trajectory of India-South Korea people-to-people connections and flag problems and prospects in the process.

Power and influence are important concepts in world politics. In this process, every country tries to maximize its interests and influence over other countries. The present world order, soft power, plays an important role in influencing others’ policy-making processes in one’s favor to establish a world order. This paper aims to give an overview of Chinese soft power and find out whether Chinese soft power is creating a debt trap or becoming a shared interest for both Bangladesh and China. Based on secondary sources, the paper has found that although Chinese soft power, especially its growing investment in Bangladesh, is a part of establishing its influence, it is a shared interest rather than a debt trap. Different infrastructure development projects are opportunities for Bangladesh, as that will open the door to economic development if Bangladesh can effectively utilize them, although China’s investment can put Bangladesh’s economy under pressure. However, economic and political instability, fragile institutions, growing corruption, leadership crisis, etc. are more harmful to its economy and can lead to an economic crisis.

Much has been written about China’s state-funded global network of Confucius Institutes and its alleged attempts to influence how foreign students view and think about the PRC. Less attention has been given to the PRC’s Ministry of Education’s enormous increase in funding of Chinese scholars for conference travel, visiting scholar awards, and research. This funding in itself is not unusual, particularly in the context of China’s East Asian neighbours. South Korea (via the Korea Foundation), Japan (via the Japan and Nippon Foundations), and Taiwan (via the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation) have all sought to project soft power through the strategic funding of scholarship that reflects favourably on their societies and political positions. The result has been a growing perception that pan-Asian scholarly organisations such as the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) over-represent China-related themes and concerns about the potential marginalisation of non-China related scholarly output, particularly work focused on South and Southeast Asia. In this chapter, I examine this alleged impact and reflect on what the future might hold.

This article discusses the nature and mechanism of corporation soft power and analyzes the relationship between soft power and competitiveness.