Australian Media Perceptions of Confucius Institutes

1. Introduction

China’s economic rise, accompanied by its increasing global political influence, has triggered concerns in many countries. In order to reduce these concerns and improve its national image, China started to initiate soft power strategies to present its benign intentions to the world. In 2004, the first Confucius Institute (CI) was established in Seoul, South Korea, in line with China’s soft power strategy in its cultural diplomacy. Subsequently, CIs have grown quickly all over the world. Despite the wide global reception, CI is considered more as a tool for Chinese political purposes. Accordingly, concerns about “interference” in academic freedom and undue influence on university affairs arise.

CIs are non-profit organizations “inspired by the experience of countries such as the UK, France, Germany and Spain” that aim to “promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries” (Hanban, 2019a). At the end of June 2019, 535 CIs and 1134 Confucius Classrooms had been established in 158 countries and regions around the world (Hanban, 2019b). CIs offer a variety of Chinese language and culture lessons as well as cultural activities, such as speech competitions, exhibitions, concerts, food festivals and many types of lectures. The first Australian CI was established at the University of Western Australia in 2006. Australia has since established 14 CIs and 76 Confucius Classrooms (Zou, 2019) and has the third-highest number of CIs and Confucius Classrooms after the US and UK (King and Hui, 2019).

Despite the number of CIs that have been established in recent years, and the controversy that they have attracted in the media, there has been no published study on media perceptions of CIs in Australia. This research is designed to study Australian media perceptions of CIs over a period of 15 years. It will explore news reporting on CIs since the news coverage of the establishment of Australia’s first institute in 2005 at the University of Western Australia. The research will also examine changes in perceptions and identify the reasons for these changes from theoretical and methodological perspectives.

2. Literature

2.1. Soft power and China

Power is the ability to secure desirable outcomes by impacting the behavior of others; however, the behavior of others can be affected in different ways. They can be coerced with threats, induced with payments through hard power or attracted and co-opted to obtain what they want by using soft power (Nye, 2004). The concept of soft power was first established by Nye (2004) in 1990 for the purpose of arguing against a widely spread view that America’s prestige and reputation were declining. In the following years, the concept was adopted by experts from many fields, such as political leaders, editorial writers and academics. Soft power was defined by Nye (2004) as the ability to get what a country wants by the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies rather than coercion and payments. He argued that a country might obtain what it wants in international circumstances because its values, prosperity and positiveness are admired by other countries, and in this sense, it is more applicable for a country to set an agenda and attract others using cultural means than threaten by military force.

Soft power is especially important in modern society. East Asia, especially China, attaches the most importance to soft power (Gil, 2017). Li (2008) has given three reasons for China’s interest in soft power. First, soft power is an important indicator of a state’s international status and influence. Second, soft power can shape a better perception of China both internally and externally. Third, soft power can help China win in international competition. In addition, Gil (2017) expanded the reasons for China’s urgent utility of soft power, namely, soft power as a prerequisite for superpower status; soft power as the main tool in competition in world politics; other East Asian countries showing interest in soft power; similarities of soft power to past practices and principles in Chinese thought; soft power as necessary for the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China; and soft power to oppose the “China threat” theory.

Soft power originates primarily from three resources: culture, political values and foreign policies. Nye (2004) claimed that when a state’s culture represents universal values and its policies include shared values and interests, it is more likely for the state to obtain the desired outcomes. China, to a large extent, has adopted the concept of soft power from Nye (Gil, 2017; Li, 2008). This is easy to see from the academic articles written by Chinese scholars about soft power. They have substantially cited Nye’s definition of soft power in their books, articles and journals. However, China’s soft power has its own attributes, and it can be best interpreted in the “China model” of multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and good-neighborly policy (Nye, 2004).

Cultural diversity is essential in virtual international teams. In addition to world politics, the Chinese view believes that soft power can also be applied to domestic and local politics to reinforce national identity and ethnic unity (Gil, 2017). In terms of the source of soft power, China has put more weight on two sources. One is culture and domestic values, and the other is policies and institutions (Gil, 2017). Among the various power resources, China gives more attention to culture (Gil, 2017; Li, 2008), which is consistent with China’s domestic cultural revitalization (Li, 2008). The culture that is believed to be fascinating and admirable will be promoted and the one that is less attractive and enjoyable will be ignored (Gil, 2017).

2.2. China’s soft power and Confucius Institutes

Different soft power strategies have been implemented in China. Promoting the Chinese language is considered to be the most prominent element of China’s soft power strategies, and the establishment of CIs is the result of this belief. Each CI is unique in its core objective. For example, the CI at the University of Queensland concentrates on “China’s contribution to science, engineering and technology” while the CI hosted by the Queensland University of Technology “focuses on training language teachers” (Lane, 2009). The process of establishing a CI is that a foreign university looking to host a CI first finds a Chinese partner institution, normally a university. The foreign institution and its Chinese partner then apply to Hanban, the Chinese government entity responsible for managing the CI program. If the application is approved, the foreign institution signs a five-year contract with Hanban as an initial step. Hanban normally provides start-up funding, in addition to ongoing annual funding of $100,000, and the supply of Chinese teachers and teaching materials, while the foreign institution provides office space and staff to work as administrators (Gil, 2017; Wang and Adamson, 2015). In some countries, China even funded the building that houses CIs. In Australia, CIs are managed by an independent board made up of an equal number of representatives from the Australian university and its Chinese partner institution. Confucius classrooms are projects of individual university CIs in primary and secondary schools. CIs provide advice and funding to the classrooms but they are administered independently by the schools. According to Hanban (2014), the major programs of Confucius classrooms are Chinese language teaching, cultural activities, and Chinese and culture competitions. CIs through Confucius classrooms offer professional development programs in language teaching to local primary and middle school teachers, assist in compiling teaching materials and help organize holiday camp programs in China.

CIs have attracted intense worldwide attention in the 16 years since their establishment, and there are diverse opinions about their objectives and achievements. While China views their objective as promoting Chinese language and culture, most Western governments consider them as having political dimensions (Liu, 2019; Luqiu and McCarthy, 2018; Paradise, 2009). Xu Lin, the previous Director General of the Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), said CIs were established to allow the world to understand the Chinese language and culture. They do not serve political purposes or force China’s values on the rest of the world (Zheng and Wei, 2018). Another question is whether CIs have achieved their goals in projecting China’s soft power. Many critics assess CIs from two perspectives. They acknowledge CIs’ merits as a language and culture teaching organization, but do not agree that they have been successful in projecting soft power (Gil, 2015; Hartig, 2012; Lahtinen, 2015; Zheng and Wei, 2018).

2.3. Media and China’s Soft Power Studies

There is no doubt that the news media outside China is the most important factor influencing perceptions of China (Zhang, 2010). Specifically, a country’s media coverage on its relationship with other nations, as well as the frequency and amount of coverage, is directly correlated with how the public in that country views other nations (Metzgar and Su, 2017). The media shapes not only public opinion but also influences government policymakers, who are no doubt aware of and take notice of what is published in the media (Yang and Liu, 2012). Western media coverage of China is often negative and focuses on issues such as human rights, environmental problems and censorship. A common narrative in much of the media in many western countries is that China’s rise is limited to economics.

Confucian Institutes, considered in China as an important symbol of Chinese culture and soft power, are often the focus of western media. For example, Lueck et al. (2014) pointed out that CIs and other soft power topics have often appeared in the New York Times in the same paragraph and sometimes even in the same sentence. However, academic studies on the media perception of CIs are scarce. Zheng and Wei (2018) compared the media coverage of CIs in both America and China and concluded that the Chinese and American media are moving in opposing directions, with the former focusing mainly on cultural aspects and the latter paying more attention to political impacts. Two articles on the New York Times’ coverage of CIs are worth mentioning. One regarded the New York Times coverage of CIs as mostly objective and positive (Metzgar and Su, 2017), while the other stated that the New York Times did not portray China as an emerging power and treated China as the “other” because most of its coverage of CIs was episodic rather than thematic (Lueck et al., 2014).

Few studies have looked at Australian CIs. Hartig, Gil and Chey are the major scholars who have done research on Australian CIs. Hartig (2012) used Australian CIs as a case study to illustrate the stakeholder’s importance in China’s cultural diplomacy. He conducted semi-structured interviews with managers and directors of CIs in Australia to explore how CIs rely on stakeholders to carry out their work. Gil’s (2015) study applied a wide variety of methods, such as interviews, surveys, media reports and internet documentary analysis, to assess China’s cultural projection with CIs as a focus. Although Gil aimed to study CIs as a global phenomenon, most of his interviews and surveys were conducted among staff and students from Australian CIs, and therefore the findings of the study have particular relevance for Australia. Jocelyn Chey devoted a large part of her paper, “Chinese ‘Soft Power’ — Cultural Diplomacy and the CIs”, to analyzing CIs in Australia and argued that CIs might incur academic problems and be accused of disseminating Chinese propaganda because of their link with the Chinese government and party (Chey, 2008).

3. Research Methods

This study employed qualitative content analysis and longitudinal analysis. Qualitative content analysis was applied in this study for the following reasons. First, qualitative content analysis makes an empirical basis for examining changes in perceptions, allowing a comparison and contrast of texts at different periods. Second, qualitative content analysis enables the researcher to examine processes that happen over long periods of time. Al-Ghazo and Smadi (2013) claimed that content analysis allows researchers to analyze texts from historical and cultural perspectives over time, which makes it possible to conduct a chronological analysis.

As this study investigated CIs over a 15-year time period and made comparisons between perceptions from different periods, qualitative content analysis was considered the most appropriate approach. In addition, as an unobtrusive approach to analyzing communications, qualitative content analysis does not affect the themes involved in the study because the documents already exist (Rubin and Babbie, 2001). Moreover, qualitative content analysis is considered a reliable method of text analysis because researchers have an opportunity to test the reliability of data which have been previously coded (Riff et al., 2006).

It is important to highlight that this paper predominantly employs qualitative content analysis, incorporating a very limited use of quantitative analysis (longitudinal analysis) to complement the qualitative research and to demonstrate the strength or prevalence of specific elements. It is also important to note that this is not a mixed methods approach. I employed a small degree of quantitative analysis as a supplementary tool to strengthen the qualitative approach.

This study examined eight mainstream print newspapers, namely, The Australian, The Australian Financial Review, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Advertiser, The Courier-Mail, The West Australian and Northern Territory News. There are several guidelines for the selection of the newspaper. First, the newspapers should have a large audience and extensive distribution in Australia. Second, the newspaper selection should reflect a regional variety and include both national and regional newspapers. Furthermore, this research purposefully chose the six local newspapers on the basis of each coming from the state or city where one or more CIs were housed, because they might have more articles on record in relation to CIs. In addition to print newspapers, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s online news was also included as a complement to the print newspapers. The main reason for including this source was that ABC News is influential and considered to be the most trusted news source in Australia. In a poll of 1,557 people which was conducted by Research Now in 2018, 68% of respondents considered the ABC as “increasingly important in an age of social media and fake news” (The Australia Institute, 2018). The researcher believes that the ABC news will provide the research with a more holistic analysis.

This study utilized an online digital database, Factiva, to locate and collect news articles regarding the “Confucius Institute”. Several keywords, including “Confucius Institute”, “Confucius center” and “Confucius classroom”, were used to search the Factiva news outlets archives in full articles between 1 January 2005 and 31 July 2019. During the review process, articles that were irrelevant to CIs were identified and eliminated, and only the relevant texts, which were related to the specific research topics and made the text easier to work with, remained (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). The following factors were taken into consideration when deciding articles that are included for further analysis. The article must have at least three paragraphs; the article should give priority to CIs. As a result, 449 articles have been retrieved and, subsequently, the number of the articles was reduced to 64 in order to be easily managed for a qualitative analysis approach under the guidance of the criteria.

In this research, coding was conducted by the researcher first, and then a trained postgraduate in order to check intercoder reliability.

4. Findings

4.1. Qualitative content analysis

The findings yielded by this study suggested that most of the news articles on CIs either focused on their establishment or aimed to raise the main concerns related to academic freedom and undue influence of the Chinese government on the Australian educational sector. These results are in line with those reported by Wang and Adamson (2015). Both positive and negative views of CIs emerged from the coding and thematic analysis of the chosen newspaper articles. The positive views include recognition of CIs as a valuable source of funding and resources and providing opportunities to engage with China, whereas the negative views mainly focused on China “interfering” in academic independence, exerting undue influence, and promoting soft power strategies. As will be discussed later, the defense of these criticisms also emerged as a common theme.

Positive aspects of CIs

The countries that host CIs expect to benefit from improvements in their Chinese language education, and greater cultural awareness. However, the benefits attained from CIs differ across countries. Specifically, for Australia, these comprise funds and resources obtained through CIs and wider opportunities to connect with China.

One of the key reasons for setting up CIs in Australia is the prospect of receiving the funds and resources for teaching the Chinese language and culture. Australia welcomes these financial and non-financial resources for several reasons. First, as the number of students learning Asian languages has declined in recent decades (Edwards, 2007), CI funds are expected to boost the interest in Chinese language learning. Professor Elliott, director of one of Australia’s CIs, was reported in a newspaper saying that “we should make the best use possible of these valuable resources that have not been provided by our own governments” (Lane, 2011, p. 23).

In addition, over time, Australian universities found it increasingly difficult to reject CIs because they offered important financial support to bridge the growing gap in funding due to the cuts in the education budget implemented by the successive Australian governments. According to Chey (2008), given that most Western governments have reduced funds for tertiary education, with the arts and language departments most significantly impacted, external financial support may be the only option for many institutions. Therefore, funding, qualified Chinese native speaker teachers, and resources for teaching and activities are all urgently needed by Australia and are met through CIs (Lane, 2011). However, funding is more of an issue at schools than at universities. Most Australian universities fund their Chinese language academics completely from internal sources.

China’s rapid economic development has encouraged many countries to establish trade relationships with this increasingly prominent player on the world’s economic stage. Thus, CIs have been established by some universities not only to improve the teaching of Chinese, but also to use CIs as a platform to promote teaching and research cooperation with China. Australian governments in turn saw education as a means to enhance Australia’s economic relationship with China. There are many examples of media reports on this. The CI at Charles Darwin University was reported to support the teaching of Chinese languages and culture and to engage with business (Watkins, 2010). In addition, Professor Porter, who was Dean of International Relations at the University of Western Australia (UWA) in 2005, said that the growing CI presence in the region is the result of the economic relations between Western Australia and China. He also pointed out that the approval of a $25 million, 10-year training agreement involving UWA just before the opening of the CI was “another area where the links have been developed” (Lane, 2005, p. 33). Similar sentiments were conveyed by former Prime Minister Bob Hawke when he delivered a speech at the launch of the CI at the University of New South Wales (NSW) in 2007, saying that “education was the best way for Australia to strengthen ties” with China (Keefe, 2009, p. 33). Management of many universities in which a CI has already been established is of the view that it is important to connect with China, as China is “changing the context and course of world events” (Keefe, 2009, p. 33).

Negative aspects of CIs

Despite the benefits CIs are expected to bring to Australia and its universities, increased ideological conflicts between the West and China have aroused suspicions and have led to negative perceptions of CIs. The negative views mainly pertain to the potential “interference” in academic freedom and China’s influence. The most common opposition against CIs stems from the belief, common among China Hawks, that CIs place limitations on the universities’ academic freedom. Some Australian scholars and politicians believe CIs censor academic discussions at universities (Switzer, 2018). CIs do not teach history and politics, but it does not prevent accusations that sensitive topics are not discussed in the program (Patty, 2011), suggesting that China may have influenced the curricula adopted at Australian universities, and those taught in Confucius Classrooms. The standard of Chinese at most students at CIs and Confucius Classrooms is so basic that it is inconceivable that they would be able to discuss in Chinese on any topic. Opposition to CIs is also based on the concerns regarding the undue influence the Chinese government could gain at Australian universities through CIs. Fitzgerald (2018) argued in one newspaper without providing any evidence that CIs control the content they offer in courses on Chinese history, culture, and politics, in line with the Chinese government’s guidelines. CIs are also covered by some Australian media outlets as a propaganda tool used by the Chinese government to promote its soft power. For example, they mentioned that collaboration between CIs and universities facilitates the dissemination of Chinese propaganda because China’s position on certain topics will become easily accepted by the Western public if universities accept China’s position first.

4.2. Longitudinal analysis

A longitudinal analysis was applied to news coverage in this study. Undoubtedly, over the past 15 years, news about CIs has changed in Australia, and the emergence of CIs has been accompanied by crucial moments and issues (Hand, 2017). Therefore, the perceptions of mainstream newspapers of the CIs could have changed as well. This section will examine the 15-year period to determine whether any changes have taken place in the news coverage of CIs in order to better understand news media response to significant trends. The longitudinal analysis is very important in this research because it allows the comparison and contrast of news attitudes and tones among different stages during the operation of CIs (Hoffman, 2015).

As the tone of a news article can be positive, neutral, or negative, the retrieved articles were analyzed to identify the main media frames. Each article was rated as “Positive”, “Negative” or “Neutral” in terms of its position on CIs. As a result, a “Positive” rating was given to 24 articles that expressed hope for improvement and positive developments of CIs, whereas 24 articles that took a predominantly critical position on CI developments were rated as “Negative”. Finally, a “Neutral” rating was applied to 16 articles that balanced both positions.

The graph depicting the sentiment of the newspaper articles given in Figure 1 reveals three major trends. First, the number of positive and neutral articles published in the 2005–2016 period is higher than that of the negative ones. Indeed, most of the 40 articles published in this period pertained to the intent to set up a CI, the opening of CIs, the reasons behind the decision to establish CIs and the significant role of CIs. The criticisms voiced during this period tended to target the institute and the academic freedom of universities. All 14 CIs in Australia were established during the 2005–2015 period. Some critics argued that the articles published in the initial period following CI establishment were merely “introductory, documenting the growing number of new CIs built in different countries and varieties of cultural activities offered there, leaving little space for discussion of its complex role and ways of management” (Wang and Adamson, 2015, p. 227). However, analyses performed as a part of this investigation suggest that this is a rather narrow view, as the reports about the expanding CI numbers and establishment of new CIs were always accompanied by the comments of good will and high expectations of CIs.

The second trend commenced in 2017 and was characterized by the growing prevalence of negative articles, given that 18 of the 24 articles published in this period were classified as negative, with only four positive and two neutral.

A third trend also worth noting is that the criticism of CIs has persisted since their establishment. Professor Jocelyn Chey, the former Australian Consul-General in Hong Kong and a visiting professor at the university’s Department of Chinese Studies, has been quoted many times since they expressed concerns about the academic integrity of the Chinese government owing to its connection with the CI of Sydney University. Given that criticisms primarily focus on academic freedom and China’s political intentions, the positive reception of CIs and their staff, as well as favorable feedback from students and parents, is rarely mentioned.

5. Factors Affecting Perceptions

Despite opposition to CIs since their establishment in Australia, the initial perceptions were predominantly positive or neutral. At this stage, two factors were most influential on this favorable view of CIs among the university staff. First, most Australian universities were keen to have a link with China, and the CI project contributed to this ambition. For example, the University of Western Australia management was eager to adopt the CI model. Professor Porter, the Dean of International Relations at the University of Western Australia in 2010, stated in a newspaper, “The university had been looking for ways to set up a center for China studies for three years” to show their enthusiasm to build up ties with China (Lane, 2005). This statement likely explains why the University of Western Australia was the first university in Australia to host a CI. Nonetheless, such eagerness to engage with China does not suggest that management of Australian universities does not value academic freedom, but rather indicates a belief that such concerns are exaggerated and can easily be mitigated by appropriate policy.

Second, as Australia’s primary and secondary education system is arguably unable to meet the demand for instruction in Chinese language and culture, CIs are a viable approach for addressing this gap. Insufficient funding for education and the lack of qualified Chinese teachers and resources have resulted in a decline in the number of schools offering instruction in Asian languages. Consequently, Australia “has to rely on the Chinese government to help the education system do its job” (Lane, 2011, p. 23). Although CIs do have some drawbacks, Australia “cannot afford to be choosy about offers of help” (Lane, 2011, p. 23). The universities were confident about CIs because CI operations are limited to non-credit language and culture and do not encroach on other aspects of an institution’s operations. For example, most universities have instituted a clear separation between their degree academic programs and the CI they host (Stambach, 2014).

Nevertheless, articles published in the Australian media in 2018 and 2019 convey mostly negative views of CIs. This trend can be attributed to a series of events that took place in Australia, prompting the media to highlight the potential inappropriate impacts of CIs. For example, on December 10, 2018, the Australian government introduced the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, targeting individuals or companies in Australia who were acting on behalf of foreign principals in the political sphere. They have to register and detail their activities on a public website (Attorney General’s Department, 2018). Even though CIs have been highlighted as the focus of the scheme, the universities that hosted a CI have ignored the pressure to register. Representatives of some universities explained that their institutions had considered the legislation and concluded they “did not need to register” (Ferguson, 2018, p. 2). Although this refusal demonstrates that the concerns about CIs are not shared by some host universities, CIs are still regarded in Australia as a part of China’s strategy of influencing public opinions on its policies in its favor. This sentiment was echoed in August 2019 by the announcement by the New South Wales Department of Education stating that the 13 classrooms under its CI will cease operation.

Third, given that CIs have also drawn criticism in the US, especially after the election of President Trump, and this has shaped Australian media coverage of these institutes. In the US, an increasing number of CIs were terminated under pressure from the US government. In 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it will ban institutions from receiving federal funding for Chinese language programs if they host a CI (Chan, 2019). As a result, Western Kentucky University, Arizona State University, San Francisco State University, Indiana University, the University of Rhode Island, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Oregon soon announced that they would close their CIs (Chan, 2019). This has had a significant impact on the perceptions of CIs in Australia, as noted by Bradley (2019) in the ABC newspaper: “As other countries start opposing China’s soft power and CIs, Australian security organizations have begun to provide briefings to universities on what they see as a potential danger from foreign countries to academic freedom, sensitive research and intellectual property”. Gil (2017) similarly pointed out that, although Australia’s reaction to CIs is not as strong as in the US, the closure of a series of American CIs has exerted great influence on the stance that both the Australian government and public have taken on this initiative. The increasing negative perceptions in Australian media can thus be seen as directly related to experiences with CIs in America.

Fourth, Australia’s attitudes toward China in recent years have also influenced media opinions of CIs. Australia−China relations are characterized by strong trade bonds. China has generally positive political and economic relationships with Australia, and the two countries have no direct conflicts (Gil, 2017). However, since 2017, many issues have emerged, which have contributed to the deteriorating relations between China and Australia. For example, Australia hardened its stance on Chinese investment, such as banning Huawei’s 5G network, and the rivalry between China and the US in the South Pacific has increased the tensions between China and Australia. Professor Chen Hong, East China University Australia studies director, said in an interview that the growing hostility from the Australian government was triggered by media reports over rising Chinese influence in Australian politics (Bagshaw and Harris, 2019). In the 2019 Lowy poll, when asked to name Australia’s best friend, only 4% of Australians chose China, compared to 8% and 9% in 2017 and 2014. This number is also substantially lower than the 20% in the United States in 2019 (Kassam, 2019).

Finally, given that other government-funded cultural institutions, such as Alliance Françoise, Germany’s Goethe Institutes, the British Councils, and Spain’s Cervantes Institutes, operate separately from universities, many scholars and journalists have increasingly questioned the real intention of having CIs within Australian educational institutions. For instance, Hughes (2014) argued that by aligning CIs with universities, their legitimacy is enhanced, and their high-level academic integrity is implied. Likewise, Liu (2019) recently observed that “using universities as a vanguard would give cultural diplomacy a non-official face” (p. 263). Therefore, the disparities in the way CIs and other cultural institutions operate, along with the fear of China’s rise, have contributed to the negative perceptions of CIs in Australia.

6. Discussion

Based on the qualitative content analysis and longitudinal analysis of the news reports of the nine selected news outlets, the findings can be further analyzed concerning several aspects.

During the 15-year period since the first CI was officially decided to be established at the University of Western Australia, not many changes have been made to the promotional format of the Mandarin teaching and Chinese culture program. At the same time, no clear and specific evidence has emerged supporting the risk of China’s “interference” in academic freedom and its undue influence on the Australian educational system (Gil, 2017). However, Australian media perceptions of CIs have changed dramatically over this period, which reflects the choice of certain perspectives and the portrayal of events by journalists. This suggests that the increasing negative perceptions of CIs are not primarily based on the project of CI itself; rather, they are related to the attitude of the US toward the economic rise of China. Hence, media perceptions in Australia have linked CIs with the broader debate about concerns of China’s rise, its threat to the US-led unipolar world, and its potential influence on Australian politics and education (Groot, 2019).

The change in the US’s and hence Australia’s attitudes toward China is an important factor in the increased negative perceptions of CIs. Australia has shifted from focusing on China as its largest and most important trading partner to seeing China as the major agent of foreign influence.

It is also important to look at what has been included and what has been excluded in the Australian media coverage of CIs. Australia’s media positive perceptions of CIs are limited, and most of them are related to financial benefits. The popularity of CIs is attributed basically to their great commercial potential rather than interest in Chinese culture (Wang and Adamson, 2015). In this view, Australia embraced Hanban’s funding to reduce their own fiscal expenditure in education, and Australian universities hosting CIs aim at increasing connections with China to expand their education programs and to enhance their research to increase their global rankings. Some critics even argued that Australian universities will never close their CIs because they do not want to risk losing Chinese students, who are one of their major sources of revenue. Only occasional reports can be found about strengthening understanding on both sides, most of which are quotations from Chinese academics. For instance, representatives from both Beijing University and Shandong University argued that CI is a platform to promote understanding of Chinese culture (Edwards, 2007; McDonald, 2005). Comments about CIs’ positive reception, the popularity of Chinese teachers and favorable comments from students and parents about Chinese language classes and activities are largely unreported.

Australian media outlets were surprisingly uniform when discussing CIs’ negative impacts with all of them often without evidence focusing on the CI’s potential political “interference”. The frequently used words with negative connotations were “academic freedom”, “political”, “propaganda”, “influence” which are all closely related to politics. On the contrary, the media did not cover other concerns mentioned in the literature about teaching quality, teaching pedagogy and sustainability of CIs.

Concerns about CIs first appeared at the same time as China’s economy was receiving favorable attention in Australia. Hence, Australian media views of CIs were ambiguous. On the one hand, they reflected Australia’s fear of China’s rapid rise, and, on the other hand, they expressed Australia’s admiration and appreciation of China’s economic development. These mixed messages can explain why CIs continued to operate in Australia amid opposition and the diverse views of CIs.

In 17 out of 64 news articles, CIs have been defined as soft power, which is not surprising since China itself defines CIs as a source of soft power. However, this concept of soft power has been identified “exclusively as a Chinese approach” (Lueck et al., 2014, p. 344) and equated with negative connotations. This can be seen from the fact that soft power often appeared in the same sentence with words like “controversial”, “offensive”, “fear”, “oppressive”, “criticize” and “be aware of”. Among the 17 news articles, 16 of them were classified as negative and only one was considered neutral in sentiment, which also shows the disapproving nature of this type of soft power.

7. Conclusion

The CIs in Australia are jointly funded by Australian universities and the Chinese government, aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture. However, the establishment of the CIs has been controversial because they receive financial support from China and have a close association with the Chinese government (Shryll, 2013). The controversy also stems from CIs’ close association with educational institutions, mainly universities. The primary concerns, exploited by critics of China in Australia, are that the presence of CIs on campuses might limit academic freedom and that China’s chief goal of establishing CIs is to advance its political objectives through promoting soft power initiatives.

CIs are valuable because Australians need opportunities to learn Mandarin, and CIs provide funds, native speaker teachers and materials for Australian classes that the Australian government often fails to provide (Kwok, 2018). The CIs in Australia can also play a very important role in strengthening economic ties and deepening understanding between China and Australia. Many CIs face difficulties in functioning normally (Kwok, 2018), and measures should be taken to ensure that CIs can continue to achieve their goal of enhancing Chinese language education for the benefit of China and Australia.

One of the limitations of this study lies in the qualitative method that was employed. Further research in this area could expand the scope to include a mixed-method research approach that could be conducted through the triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative analysis to develop a more accurate portrayal of Australian media perceptions of CIs. Second, due to the relatively small scale of this study, the choice of print newspapers and ABC news could be criticized as being somewhat limited. Indeed, if the scope of the research were to expand in the future, it would be interesting to reveal what other media types, such as TV and radio, discuss regarding CIs. This would also provide a more comprehensive perspective on the analysis of perceptions of CIs in Australia. Third, this study only focused on the Australian media perspective. In the future, more in-depth interviews could be conducted with staff and students of CIs, and with other people involved in the CI programs. In this way, researchers would be able to learn not only how Australian media perceives CIs, but also how people who are directly or indirectly connected view the institutes. Finally, there is no comparative research of the perceptions of CIs between China and Australia or on a global scale. So far, most research has been conducted through the lens of geography and culture. A comparative study of perceptions of CIs between the two countries would provide us with a better understanding of this worldwide education project.

ORCID

Dongnu Guo  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9435-9660