Study on Market Effect of Agricultural Product Incentive Policy for Quality and Safety

The agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety aims to promote the overall continuous improvement of the agricultural products market’s quality and safety level. But its market effect in the case of information asymmetry determines its actual role. Based on the lemon market theory, this study designed a two-stage single-group post-test experiment. The first stage simulated the consumer’s agricultural product selection behavior in the case of information asymmetry, and the second stage verified the market effect of the agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety. The results show that under the condition of information asymmetry, the agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety is indeed conducive to improving the consumers’ perceived quality. Only when the improved perceived quality exceeds the overall average quality of the market, are consumers willing to pay and buy. This study verifies the market effect of agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety, and reveals its boundary conditions when it works, which has great guiding significance for practice.