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This study considers the supplier's warranty return and the buyer's rebate policy as business-return policy in the supplier–buyer supply chain. The policy as well as the displayed stock level influences the behavior of the buyer. Distinct from the traditional single-stage inventory model, we investigate a two-stage replenishment policy model for deteriorating item considering the effect of imperfect production process, product design, stock level and business-return. A mathematical model utilizing the time weighted inventory (TWI) approach and two-variables fixed point optimization technique is developed to derive the optimal inspection starting time, the number of deliveries, the optimal delivery-time interval and the optimal business-return period. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the model developed. The result shows that the fixed demand rate, the unit holding cost and the unit inspection cost are the critical factors affecting the scheduling and performance of the two-stage supply chain.
The agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety aims to promote the overall continuous improvement of the agricultural products market’s quality and safety level. But its market effect in the case of information asymmetry determines its actual role. Based on the lemon market theory, this study designed a two-stage single-group post-test experiment. The first stage simulated the consumer’s agricultural product selection behavior in the case of information asymmetry, and the second stage verified the market effect of the agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety. The results show that under the condition of information asymmetry, the agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety is indeed conducive to improving the consumers’ perceived quality. Only when the improved perceived quality exceeds the overall average quality of the market, are consumers willing to pay and buy. This study verifies the market effect of agricultural product incentive policy for quality and safety, and reveals its boundary conditions when it works, which has great guiding significance for practice.