Antitrust Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Competitor Cooperation
Reprinted from Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 18(7) (1991), 118–144.
This paper is based in part on Jorde and Teece [1989a], [1990a], [1990b] and Teece [1986]. We are extremely grateful for financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, The Pew Foundation, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Bill Baxter, Oliver Williamson, and Dick Nelson made helpful comments on earlier drafts and oral presentation. We implicate none of the above in our conclusions.
The following sections are included:
Overview
The Nature and Importance of Competition and the Goals of Antitrust
Innovation and Market Power Assessment
Innovation and Cooperative Agreements among Competitors
The (Traditional) Serial Model
The Simultaneous Model
Organizational Requirements of Innovation
Governance Alternatives for Innovation
The price mechanism
Internal organization
Strategic alliances
Antitrust Treatment of Agreements Among Competitors
Proposed Modifications to U.S. Antitrust Law Affecting Cooperative Agreements Among Competitors
Conclusion
Summary
Zusammenfassung
References
