China’s Strategic Engagement in the Middle East: Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative and U.S. Leverage of the Abraham Accords

Introduction

Abraham Accords are Arab-Israeli relationship normalization treaties through which some Arab countries opened the doors to diplomatic relations with Israel, which were previously unimaginable. The Accords were established to ease the peace process in the Middle East. Egypt recognized Israel as a state in March 1979, followed by Jordan in 1994, and under the Abraham Accords the UAE and Bahrain in August and September 2020, respectively. The accords aim to achieve peace, cooperation, constructive diplomacy, and friendly relations with the United States and Israel. These countries agreed on the importance of strengthening and maintaining peace in the Middle East and around the world, based on coexistence, mutual understanding, and respect for human dignity and freedom, including religious freedom.¹ Upon his arrival at the White House, President Trump talked with Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain about forming an Israel-centered Arab alliance. In May 2017, in a speech before 50 Arab and Muslim leaders in Riyadh, he spoke about the need to combat terrorism and extremism, resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and achieve lasting peace.

On September 15, 2020, Trump marked the signing of the Abraham Accords as the “dawn of a new middle East” and a foundation for peace in the entire region.² According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump was bringing together many countries in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years earlier. Trump reinforced this by stating that 5–6 more countries in the Middle East could join the normalization process, driven by their shared enmity with Iran.³ Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s foreign minister, explained the logic behind the pro-Israeli alliance as being “caused by Turkish interference in the region’s internal matters.⁴ Abraham Accords will open the doors to an extensive economic partnership between the Arab Gulf and Israel, a modern nation. This partnership will provide participants countries with access to Israel’s state-of-the-art technology, agriculture, and defense sectors. Meanwhile, those countries that find themselves in opposing positions will continue their military struggles against each other. The three participants in the deal expect the Palestinian government to secure political, economic, and military gains for the youth and civil society under U.S. guidance and to allow Muslims to enter the holy city gates. Israeli newspapers have referred to the Abraham Accords as the Peace Agreement.⁵ A recent consensus has dubbed it “The F-35 Triangle: America, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates” because the agreement allows the UAE to purchase F-35 Joint Strike Fighters from the United States. This pattern began with Egypt in 1979, which received the second-largest military aid package, followed by Jordan in 1994, which brought debt assistance and F-16 fighters.⁶ The New York Times called the Abraham Accords “The Love Triangle That Spawned Trump’s Middle East Peace Deal.” However, some newspapers have headlined it as the “shameful Israel–Bahrain agreement,” which has been rejected by both Iran and Turkey. The Turkish foreign ministry stated that the deal would harm the Palestinian cause, while the Iranian foreign ministry declared that Bahrain had made itself a partner in Israel’s crimes by signing the agreement.⁷

The normalization has also been viewed as a formalization because the normalcy between Israel and the UAE is not a regular occurrence and could spark conflict among Muslim states. The so-called peace agreement was opposed by the Ayatollah and Turkey’s ruling party. Nevertheless, the decisions of the UAE and Bahrain have confused the Muslim world and rendered the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) irrelevant, further dividing the organization into Arab and non-Arab groups. The OIC did not address this issue before it materialized, making future discussions appear unpromising.⁸

The real test is for the countries that joined the deal out of hostility toward Iran and fear of Turkey. At the same time, these countries have multi-million-dollar agreements with China, and the United States is leaving no stone unturned to hinder China’s growth. As a result, the participating countries are facing significant challenges. This study highlights the various U.S. activities aimed at obstructing China’s development in the Middle East, particularly its anti-BRI moves. In the midst of these rival powers, the challenge for the signatory parties to the Abraham Accord is to maintain their shared interests. The study focuses on the dynamics between the United States, China, Israel, the Middle East, and belt and road initiative (BRI) members. Based on past experiences, a causal hypothesis is established that the United States can influence the BRI by turning the Abraham Accords members against the mega-project.

U.S. Pressure on Gulf Countries

U.S. relationships with any country under the Abraham Accords are akin to a double-edged sword for allied nations. Washington and its G-7 allies have raised concerns about China’s 5G technology. On the one hand, countries like Israel, the UK, Australia, Canada, and the United States have distanced themselves from Chinese technology, accusing it of espionage. On the other hand, the UAE and Bahrain, both signatories of the Accords, have signed agreements with China for 5G technologies. The U.S. leadership has opposed these agreements and pressured these nations to exclude Huawei’s 5G from the Middle East, citing security risks.⁹

The Trump administration’s efforts to encourage more states to recognize Israel have emboldened regional actors in the Middle East, which could turn against China in the long term. Former Chinese ambassador Hua Liming, who served in Iran and the UAE, said that the Abraham Accords were part of a broader U.S. plan for the Middle East aimed at isolating Iran, China’s economic partner. He further remarked that the United States might also seek to exclude Chinese companies from the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Syria.¹⁰ Mike Pompeo later asserted that the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region are committed to challenging China’s economic influence, particularly its flagship project, the BRI. Pompeo also expressed skepticism about infrastructure contracts offered to developing nations, cautioning that a careful examination is necessary, and suggested that the free offerings from the Chinese state are not truly free.¹¹

During a critical period, Trump took hostile actions against China and Iran, primarily by imposing sanctions on two Chinese firms involved in transporting Iranian oil. The United States enforced these sanctions, citing efforts to counter Iran’s ambitions related to arms and ammunition. Additionally, five individuals were barred from entering the United States as part of these measures.¹² Another U.S. strategy is its Indo-Pacific alliance aimed at countering China, highlighted by the closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston.¹³ Anti-Iran and anti-China forces coordinated efforts to secure Arab-Israeli support when Iran engaged in 400-billion-dollar projects with China under the BRI. The primary motivation of these forces is to contain Beijing’s growing influence over key economic supply routes.¹⁴

The United States indirectly curtailed the flow of Arabian economic resources into Russia and China, weakening its rivals. This U.S. action is a test of its dominance in the arms market. China currently supplies drones to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and the UAE, but the Pentagon aims to prevent China from expanding its military logistic facilities to the UAE. Trump leveraged U.S. weapons to secure a strategic policy victory.¹⁵ However, Taimimi argues that China’s presence in the Middle East serves as a strategic tool for diversification, not just economically but also politically, amid apparent U.S. retrenchment.¹⁶ Saudi Arabia has paved the way for Middle Eastern recognition of Israel and prepared its citizens’ mentality for it. A recent study revealed that 80% of Saudi Arabian citizens support normalization with Israel.¹⁷

China and the U.S.-Israel Alliance

Israel-China cooperation in education, science, tourism, investment, technology, and innovation became notable around 2000 when China expressed interest in learning from Israel’s success. These sectors were later integrated under the BRI, strengthening their ties further. Various Chinese investment firms leveraged these friendly relations, and by 2013, firms began bidding, particularly in the technology sector. However, the United States created disruptions between 2015 to 2020. Despite this, business data since 2018 shows that China has become Israel’s second-largest trading partner.¹⁸

A key U.S. strategy has been to apply pressure on Israel regarding its cooperation with China. In 1999, the U.S. vetoed an aircraft deal between China and Israel. In 2004, China sent its Harpy unmanned aerial vehicle to Israel for upgrades, but it was returned to China without repair due to the U.S. anti-China campaign. By 2005, Israel had terminated its defense trade with China.¹⁹ Although Israel attempted a pragmatic approach, the United States threatened to withdraw its support.²⁰ A notable instance occurred in May 2020, when Pompeo visited Israel despite travel restrictions to urge the rejection of a Chinese bid for Israel’s largest desalination plant, a clear example of U.S. interference opposing Chinese interests in the region.²¹ Israel was informed that this conflict was part of a New Cold War, particularly concerning Russia, rather than a simple trade war. The United States also stated that it would be impossible for Israel to follow an ally in this context.

The friendship between China and Israel began with Israel’s efforts to cultivate a fruitful relationship. However, Israel has not significantly benefited from its long-standing ties with China.²² China sought to reduce Cold War-era thinking by issuing statements suggesting that the U.S. alliance system is unsustainable, as it focuses solely on security and forming alliances for military purposes.²³ How can Israel assure China that its new alliances will not be used against Chinese interests in the Middle East? U.S. concerns did not end with Israel’s refusal of the desalination plant under American pressure. The United States also raised alarms over future 5G technologies and the Haifa port project, both of which involve Chinese firms.²⁴ How can Israel refuse U.S. demands when Washington recently recognized the occupied Syrian territories as Israeli territory and moved its embassy to Jerusalem under a peace plan advocating for settlement blocks in the Jordan valley.²⁵ A Channel 12 survey revealed that the Israeli population is minimally concerned about the annexation of Jordanian territory. Ksenia Svetlova, a former member of the Knesset, highlighted the risks, predicting that if Netanyahu succeeded in the annexation, it would strengthen radicals and violate international humanitarian law.²⁶ For unknown reasons, Netanyahu did not proceed with the annexation in July 2020, which the United States leveraged in favor of the Abraham Accords, collaborating with the UAE to halt the annexation of Jordanian territory.²⁷

A significant concern is that Israel might one day be forced to choose between its long-standing ally, the United States, and its new partner, China. This moment came in January 2019 when Pompeo warned that U.S. security cooperation and intelligence sharing with Israel would be reduced if Israel did not scale back its collaboration with China. John Bolton called for strict measures regarding Chinese technology involvement in Israel.²⁸ Since 2018, the Trump administration has been pressuring and intimidating Israel to distance itself from China, even demanding the cancellation of certain deals. The United States was unconcerned about Israel’s future choices, driven by its animosity toward China. The case of the Phalcon radar system is a notable example from the recent past. Under U.S. pressure, Israel canceled its 200-million-dollar agreement and paid China 150 million dollars in damages.²⁹ Currently, U.S. threats have been effective again, as Israel’s foreign ministry informed the security cabinet of the risk of confronting the United States or restricting Chinese investments in Israel.³⁰ It has been predicted that Israel may not benefit from future cooperation or acquisitions with China. This raises questions about other countries joining alliances under U.S. influence. Narang stated, “Who has been the worst hit by the UAE-Israel Abraham Accord to establish formal diplomatic ties? Not Iran. Not even Palestine. But, it is China.³¹

The United States has interfered in Israel projects such as the Tel Aviv railways, the Haifa Port, and the city project, which were awarded to the China Railway Tunnel Group in 2015 and aimed at improving traffic conditions.³² While meditech and biotech can receive Chinese investments, Europe and the United States continue to scrutinize such investments. Although these technologies are for civilian purposes, any initiative supported by China draws attention from Washington.³³

According to Samuel Ramani, an Oxford scholar on the Middle East, U.S.-Arab cooperation focuses on countering maritime threats. This collaboration allows for military drills under U.S. supervision, which aligns with China’s expectations from U.S. initiatives, except for some hidden motives. The U.S. focus on the UAE-China relationship has been clarified; the United States seeks a Middle Eastern ally to join its coalition against China.³⁴ The United States argues that its economic interest will help safeguard other economies. While the UAE benefits from U.S. security against Turkey, it questions whether the United States is reliable in the long term due to shifting security priorities. Abu Dhabi is aware of this issue, doubts the continued U.S. presence, and is opting for a closer relationship with China. Similar to Syria’s situation, the UAE brought Abu Dhabi back into the Arab League to counter Iran and Turkey.³⁵

For the UAE, Bahrain, and other states that might follow in their footsteps, managing relations between the United States and China will be a significant challenge. The United States believes that China would extract all value from their partnership, and leaving behind nothing. Given this hasty and aggressive stance against China, no positive outcome can be expected. Pompeo and Trump have made their rhetoric about China clear, warning and instilling fear in both the political and private sectors. Recently, Pompeo set a red line for allies and partners, urging them to reconsider their involvement in Beijing’s alliances not as a coercion or threat, but as a fact-based warning supported by data. He continued to stoke fear among business communities by highlighting the risks of operating in a country governed by a single party.³⁶

In the absence of a clear U.S. policy, Israel should recognize that the United States can blacklist companies that collaborate, cooperate, or subcontract with Chinese firms, as demonstrated by the blacklisting of 24 Chinese companies. The rationale behind this approach is U.S. desire to control global shipping routes. China Harbor Engineering Co., a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company, which built the new southern port at the existing Ashdod Port, has been blacklisted along with most companies delivering projects in Israel. Carice Whitte noted that “it seems these sanctions are part of a new wave, and the fallout could also affect Israel.³⁷ The current Israeli alliances are proving difficult to manage, as demonstrated by the recent decision to relocate the embassies of Kosovo and Serbia to Jerusalem. Israel assured Serbia it would not recognize Kosovo, as Kosovo is as crucial to Serbia as Jerusalem is to Israel. Israel plans to invest in Serbia, having previously opposed Kosovo’s efforts at independence, fearing that Palestine might use it as a precedent. The EU strongly opposed the relocation of the embassies to Jerusalem.³⁸

The West has been strategizing to counter China’s growing influence in the Middle East. Policy institutes have advised the European Union to closely monitor China’s security and economic presence in the region and identify new ways of engaging with China.³⁹ In addition to the United States, European countries have also taken steps to limit China’s market influence, particularly in 5G technology. After pressuring Brazil and Israel, the United States successfully lobbied with Australia and the UK to block Chinese telecommunication technologies.⁴⁰ The United States aims to gain geopolitical and economic advantages by encouraging Israel to use American products over Chinese one, seeing this as a key opportunity to boost exports to Israel.⁴¹ Furthermore, the United States has been taking precautionary measures as it anticipates that Arab youths may be more influenced by the Chinese model than the American one.⁴²

Chinese Approach to the Middle East

The strategic use of oil plays a crucial role in the U.S. campaign against Iran and China. Trump secured alliances with many Middle Eastern countries under the banner of normalization, as China’s dependency on oil from the region is as high as 40%. The Strait of Hormuz supplies 76% of the oil to the Asian market. China is concerned that Washington might disrupt the flow of Middle Eastern oil, except for Iran’s.⁴³

Russia and China, alongside Iran, have been seeking to expand their influence in the Middle East, particularly through the arms race. This was especially concerning as Saudi Arabia was moving closer to China for purchasing defense components.⁴⁴ China the largest trading partner for 13 countries in the Middle East-including Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, also has strategic partnerships with Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey. China is a major investor in construction, infrastructure, agricultural, and scientific developments through its BRIs.⁴⁵

China is currently focused on economic expansion through its BRI, particularly in South Asia, prioritizing development over military activities. The BRI has established China as a “financier, builder, owner, and operator of airports, seaports, warehouses, highways and other infrastructure projects that connect China across the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas and beyond.⁴⁶ To counter this prestigious and trusted status globally, especially along BRI routes, the United States has created diplomatic hindrances, such as fostering Arab-Israel alliances, which are tied to maritime security cooperation. The Arab-Israel-U.S. coalition shares common goal, opposition to Iran and the containment of Turkey. This trio is expected to increase vigilance over key strategic chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca.⁴⁷

China is Israel’s second-largest trading partner and a significant trading partner for the UAE with 60% of the UAE’s maritime trade conducted with China. The UAE is home to 200,000 Chinese nationals and over 3999 Chines business. In Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa port alone, Chinese maritime cargo increased by 82% in the last 6 months. China has also planned to use Gawadar as an alternative to the Strait of Malacca during time of crisis. Similarly, China views Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria’s six ports as an alternative to the Suez Canal. As for Strait of Hormuz, Duqm in Oman, valued at 10.7 billion dollars, serve as an alternative, with substantial Chines investment in free economic zones.

Israel remains vigilant regarding Chinese developmental activities in Lebanon, as Hezbollah a political party with its own militia controls much of the country. This concerns Israel, as Hezbollah fought a 36 days war with Israel in 2006. Hezbollah is also supported by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which backs the Assad government in Syria. Israel’s missile strikes on Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards forces near Damascus are well- known, contributing to ongoing tension in the region.

The U.N. estimates that postwar reconstruction in Iraq will require 250 billion dollars, and China is willing to take the lead through its BRI, connecting Tripoli to China via Iraq and Iran. Damascus has also encouraged this trade route, which would enhance China’s soft power. However, the United States is expected to use all possible means to hinder this intercontinental connectivity.⁴⁸ A similar pattern is emerging in Syria, where reports suggest that China is positioning itself to support post-war reconstruction efforts. Under the BRI, China has been granted access to key Syrian ports, including Latakia and Tartous.⁴⁹ In recent years, China has significantly strengthened its economic and diplomatic engagements with Middle Eastern countries. China’s focus is on key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, construction, agriculture, and finance. The Middle East strategically located at the crossroads of five continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe connects crucial waterways, including the Mediterranean Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the Black Sea. Additionally, the region is home to vital maritime routes such as the Bosphorus, the Bab al-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Dardanelles.

The Western world has traditionally relied on military intervention to address perceived threats to democratic process. In contrast, China’s BRI presents a new model for regional security and comprehensive development. Several Middle Eastern states, along with their ports and industrial parks, are increasingly cooperating with China. Notable examples include the UAE’s Khalifa Port, Oman’s Duqm Port, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan Port, and Egypt’s Port Said. In the construction sector, Chinese companies are working on projects such as a sports stadium in Lusail, Qatar, and a high-speed railway within Saudi Arabia. Chinese businesses are also poised to play a key role in the reconstruction of war-torn Iraq and Syria.

China’s latest investment in the region, a 400-billion-dollar deal with Iran, includes provisions for energy, infrastructure, defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the supply of cheap Iranian oil to China. Iran’s involvement in the BRI threatens to undermine U.S. influence in the Middle East. Washington is likely to react strongly, as evidenced by sanctions imposed under the Caesar Act, which block any country from engaging with the Syrian regime. This could affect the 2015 agreement between the Syrian Ministry of Communications and the Chinese company Huawei.

The UAE is a founding partner in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Abu Dabhi and Shanghai have been collaborating to raise funds for BRI projects. Washington’s anti-China rhetoric cannot be fully accepted by Arab countries, but the fear of losing the U.S. security umbrella may reduce their enthusiasm for BRI. In August 2019, Arabian media anticipated that Pompeo would visit the UAE to discuss issues related to Iran and China, particularly the security challenges faced by the United States, highlighting U.S. interventions in the Middle East aimed at countering China.

China’s approach to international cooperation and development does not involve interference in the internal affairs or policies of partner countries. China primarily focuses on economic activities and has demonstrated its ability to maintain neutrality in conflicts as seen in the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and during the Palestine-Israel episode. This is because China favors bilateralism and avoids the politically motivated, interventionist style of the United States.⁵⁰ However, this neutral image may be jeopardized in the long term due to challenges from its American rival, as Washington seeks to address multiple geopolitical issues simultaneously. China also supports smaller nations in resisting a hegemonic global order, which runs counter to U.S. interests.⁵¹

Europe, unlike the United States, is not strictly opposed to the BRI and shares a more flexible stance with Middle Eastern countries, many of which are open to joining the initiative. In the Middle East, countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt have signed the memorandums of understanding for China’s Digital Silk Road, a navigation satellite that competes with the U.S. GPS, the EU’s Galileo, and Russia’s GLONASS. Additionally, China recently signed a 400-billion dollar, 25-year military and trade partnership with Iran.⁵²

It is evident that the United States will not allow the success of the BRI to proceed unnoticed. In response, the United States is likely to create barriers and seek unity among its allies. The recent agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, facilitated by Israel, serves as a clear example of this strategy. Historically, the United States engaged in various forums to counter the influence of the Soviet Union, and a similar approach was adopted against the BRI.⁵³

The Muslim countries that joined the Abraham Accords did so without regard for the sentiments of the 57 Muslim-majority countries, representing 1.9 billion people, many of whom oppose the injustices imposed by the Israeli occupation. It is feared that America’s current trajectory in the Middle East may reshape the region in ways that conflict with China’s interests.⁵⁴

The Pakistani Prime Minister visited Malaysia for a conference, which was halted by the Saudi Arabian Prince. The Pakistani leadership complied with the request without resistance, highlighting Saudi Arabia’s influence. Many Muslim countries, except for Turkey, Malaysia, Iran, and Kuwait, still look to Saudi Arabia for green signal. Meanwhile, Pakistani media, without fully grasping the broader implications, have suggested that China could gain access to the Saudi peninsula through CPEC, emphasizing Pakistan’s pivotal role in the BRI. However, countermeasures have been suggested to mitigate this influence.

Conclusion

Avoiding the Thucydides Trap is achievable through diligent efforts by both China and the United States.⁵⁵ Israel and the United States can mitigate risks by implementing various measures.⁵⁶ Countries involved in the BRI that wish to join the Abraham Accords must carefully consider their strategic decisions and consult with the United States in advance, all while prioritizing their national interest. They should strive to maintain a non-aligned and neutral stance in their cooperation with China, offering them the chance to develop economically without engaging in U.S.-style alliances. Some countries that have joined the Abraham Accords may not have fully considered the implications, particularly regarding Washington’s anti-China stance. Israel, in particular, has opportunities to benefit if it skillfully navigates its position between both powers. Otherwise, failure could be costly, with potential damages amounting to 150 million dollars. Israel now faces the challenge of defining its role in supporting the United States.⁵⁷

Former Mossad Deputy Director Ram Ben-Barak sensibly advised that Israel should make decisions freely but avoid severing ties with either the United States or China, as such actions would be futile.⁵⁸ Other nations should focus on strengthening international organizations’ role with the support of the UN to promote stability. Although the United States has attempted to influence bodies like the WTO and WHO, a WTO panel’s decision regarding tariffs on Chinese goods in 2018 demonstrated that international trade rules must be upheld.⁵⁹

Trump’s focus on the Arabian Peninsula highlights his desire to disrupt China’s activities in the Middle East. Chinese leaders must remain cautious and scrutinize U.S. actions in the Middle East; otherwise, the United States could extend its influence and force China to reconsider its approach. U.S. think tanks and intelligence agencies, aligned with political interests, are already discussing future strategies.⁶⁰

Minilateralism, which targets China, cannot be ignored in the context of the Abraham Accords, as the nations involved may find it difficult to reject the United States. China must continue to maintain its presence in the Middle East while adhering to its non-interference policy. However, U.S. maneuvers could disrupt Chinese interests in the region. Many Asian nations ignored U.S. call to reject Chinese initiatives, which has infuriated the U.S leadership. Consequently, the United States is likely seeking further alliances, particularly with Saudi Arabia and India, to counter China’s influence Broderick suggested that the United States is actively working to undermine Beijing’s plans, targeting networks stretching from Asia to Arabia and Africa.⁶¹

America is not only using the Quad to counter China’s growing influence but has also enlisted Middle Eastern countries to advance its interest. The increasing reliance of many countries on China has aggravated U.S. leadership, promoting strategic efforts to halt the expansion of the BRI. This has not only cast doubt on the initiative but also raised questions about its long-term benefits. The United States observed that countries like Pakistan and Nepal resisted its influence, leading to further obstruction efforts in the Middle East. Although China initially welcomed the Abraham Accords and emphasized that peace is essential for development, it remains vigilant regarding American involvement in the Middle East.

Notes