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How Hard and Soft Law Interact in International Regulatory Governance: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists

    We thank John Bronsteen, Manfred Elsig, Brett Frischmann, Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Halberstam, Terence Halliday, Kal Raustiala, Joel Trachtman and Spencer Waller for their comments, as well as the participants at a conference at the University of Michigan entitled “Systemic Implications of Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Competition” on May 8, 2008; at a panel on Transnational Legal Orders at the Law and Society Association conference on May 30, 2008; and at a workshop at Loyola University Chicago School of Law on May 7, 2008. We thank Melissa Beckman, Mathew Bills, Mathew Fortin and Kisa Patel for their research assistance. All errors of course remain our own.

    https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812838490_0004Cited by:1 (Source: Crossref)
    Abstract:

    The following sections are included:

    • Introduction

    • The Canonical Literature on International Hard and Soft Law: Their Attributes as Alternatives and their Interaction as Complements

      • Definitions of hard and soft law

      • Advantages and disadvantages of hard and soft law as alternatives

      • Hard and soft law interaction as complements

    • Theorizing International Hard and Soft Law Interaction: Power, Distributive Conflict and Regime Complexes

      • The EU, the US, and power in international regulatory governance

      • The challenge of distributive conflict

      • The challenge of fragmented regime conflicts

    • Hard and Soft Law Interaction as Antagonists

    • Hypotheses as to the Interaction of Hard and Soft Law Instruments

    • Conclusions

    • References